The instant case involved the court determining whether a formal decree of divorce was a sine qua non for claiming maintenance, given that the appellant had separated from her first husband through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) rather than a judicial decree. The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting.
The facts of the instant case involved a series of instances. Appellant No. 1, married Nomula Srinivas in 1999 and had a son. The couple separated in 2005 and executed an MoU dissolving their marital relationship. However, no formal decree of divorce was obtained. In 2005, Appellant No. 1 married Respondent. He later filed for annulment under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (HMA), which was granted on 01.02.2006. Subsequently, in 2006, the couple remarried and had a daughter. Due to matrimonial discord, Appellant No. 1 sought maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Family Court awarded maintenance, but the High Court set it aside, holding that she could not be considered a "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as her first marriage was still legally subsisting.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the High Court’s ruling, restored the maintenance awarded by the Family Court.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court involved the interpretation of "wife" under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court reiterated that Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a social welfare provision designed to prevent destitution and vagrancy. It placed reliance on Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha (2011) 1 SCC 141, which emphasized that the term "wife" should be given a broad and purposive interpretation to include women in void or voidable marriages. The Court distinguished Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat (2005) 3 SCC 636, where maintenance was denied to a second wife due to the subsistence of the first marriage. It noted that in Savitaben, the second wife was unaware of the first marriage, whereas in the present case, the Respondent was fully aware of the Appellant’s marital history. Regarding the legal status of the first marriage & its effect on maintenance, the Court noted that Appellant No. 1 and her first husband had de facto separated and were not deriving any legal benefits from the marriage. The existence of an MoU signified mutual separation, even though it lacked the authority of a judicial decree. The Court held that a strict requirement of a formal divorce decree would frustrate the remedial purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C., which aims to protect financially dependent spouses. Regarding the respondent’s conduct & Doctrine of Estoppel, the Court emphasized that the Respondent had married the Appellant twice and was aware of her first marriage. It applied the principle of estoppel, holding that the Respondent could not now claim that the marriage was void ab initio to avoid his duty of maintenance. This reasoning aligns with the ruling in Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188, where the Court barred a husband from escaping maintenance liability by claiming that his marriage was void. The Court further referenced Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1686), which recognized the financial vulnerability of homemakers. It underscored that maintenance is a legal and moral duty, not a mere statutory benefit. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that a woman is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. even if her first marriage was not formally dissolved, provided that the parties were de facto separated, the second husband was aware of the first marriage and the woman was financially dependent and vulnerable.
This judgment expands the protective scope of Section 125 Cr.P.C. and discourages men from exploiting technical legal loopholes to evade maintenance obligations. It strengthens women’s financial rights in informal marriages or voidable unions. It reinforces equitable principles in maintenance claims. Finally, it signals a progressive approach to maintenance laws, emphasizing substance over form in marital relationships.
The Supreme Court of India, in this case, adjudicated upon an appeal challenging the judgment of the Kerala High Court, which had affirmed the conviction and death sentence imposed by the Trial Court. The case revolved around the rape and murder of a nine-year-old child, with the prosecution relying entirely on circumstantial evidence. The judgment serves as a seminal pronouncement on the evidentiary standards required for conviction in cases based on circumstantial evidence.
The case arose from an incident in 2012 where the victim, a nine-year-old girl, went missing while on her way to a madrassa. Investigations revealed that she had last visited the house of the appellant, who was alone at the time. The prosecution contended that the appellant raped and strangled the victim and attempted to conceal the body. The deceased’s body was later recovered from the bathroom adjacent to the appellant’s house.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant for offenses under Sections 302 (murder), 376 (rape), and 201 (destruction of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, awarding the death penalty. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. The appellant approached the Supreme Court, which adjudicated on the legal and evidentiary aspects of the case.
The Supreme Court emphasized fundamental principles governing the appreciation of circumstantial evidence, reiterating the five essential tenets established in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116:
The Court further set out guidelines for evaluating circumstantial evidence:
The Supreme Court scrutinized the evidence and noted several deficiencies in the lower courts’ methodology of assessment. As per the last-seen theory, the victim was last seen entering the appellant’s house. This was corroborated by witnesses, but the prosecution was required to exclude all other possibilities to sustain a conviction. As far as medical and forensic evidence is concerned the postmortem report confirmed sexual assault and strangulation. DNA evidence matched the appellant, strengthening the prosecution's case. Moving further, the initial search of the appellant’s premises did not yield results, but a subsequent search led to the discovery of the body. The Court found that the appellant’s conduct—delaying access to his premises—was incriminating. The appellant’s evasive responses and subsequent recovery of the victim’s belongings from his premises further corroborated his involvement. The Court addressed the appellant’s contention regarding procedural lapses, particularly in forensic sample handling. However, it concluded that the evidence was sufficiently credible to establish guilt. Hence, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction but criticized the lower courts for inadequate articulation of evidentiary analysis. The Court held that while the conclusion of guilt was justified, the reasoning lacked the required depth and rigor.
Further, considering the appellant’s death during the pendency of the appeal, the question of executing the death sentence became moot. However, the Court’s findings reaffirmed the principles of circumstantial evidence and procedural propriety in criminal trials.The judgment in Abdul Nassar v. State of Kerala reinforces the judiciary’s responsibility to meticulously assess circumstantial evidence. While affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court underscored the necessity for trial courts to methodically analyze evidence and articulate clear judicial reasoning. This ruling serves as an authoritative precedent on evidentiary evaluation in cases where direct evidence is absent, ensuring that judicial determinations are made with precision and adherence to established legal principles.
In the present case, the Supreme Court addressed a Special Leave Petition filed by the accused in multiple cases related to the 2020 Delhi riots, including the murder of an Intelligence Bureau officer and charges under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act ("PMLA"). The petitioner sought interim bail to campaign for the Delhi Assembly Elections. The case raised critical questions about the scope of statutory rights, interim bail provisions, and public interest.
The petitioner had been in custody since March 2020 and contended that denial of interim bail to campaign for elections infringed upon his rights, particularly given the prolonged duration of his detention. The High Court had earlier allowed custody parole for filing nomination papers but refused interim bail for campaigning. The petitioner’s appeal led to a split verdict by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court.
Justice Mithal dismissed the petition, emphasizing that the right to campaign for elections is not a fundamental or statutory right. He noted that the petitioner’s rights were adequately protected through custody parole, which allowed him to file his nomination papers. The Court underscored that granting interim bail for campaigning would set an undesirable precedent, opening the door for numerous undertrial prisoners to seek similar relief. The judgment highlighted that under Section 62(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, incarcerated individuals are prohibited from voting, and extending the right to campaign would conflict with this statutory restriction. Furthermore, Justice Mithal expressed concerns over the potential for witness tampering, given the serious allegations against the petitioner, including the use of his premises as an "epicenter" for riots.
In a dissenting judgment, Justice Amanullah allowed the petitioner interim bail until February 4, 2025, subject to strict conditions. While acknowledging the gravity of the allegations, he emphasized that they remained unproven, and the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration without trial violated principles of personal liberty under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Justice Amanullah observed that the petitioner had secured bail in several related cases and noted systemic delays in the trial process. He highlighted that meaningful participation in elections requires direct engagement with the electorate, which could not be achieved solely through indirect means like social media. The dissenting opinion framed the denial of interim bail as a disproportionate restriction on the petitioner’s statutory and constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court’s split verdict reflects the complexity of balancing individual liberties with public interest in cases involving severe allegations. Justice Mithal’s opinion prioritized legislative intent and public safety, while Justice Amanullah’s dissent underscored constitutional guarantees and the presumption of innocence. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for final resolution, highlighting its significance in evolving election and criminal law jurisprudence.
In this case, the Supreme Court deliberated on important issues relating to sexual assault and its evidentiary requirements under criminal law. The Court highlighted that the absence of bodily injuries does not negate the occurrence of sexual assault and emphasized the need to consider victims' responses to trauma through a nuanced and empathetic lens. The present case pertains to the conviction of the appellant under Sections 363 and 366-A of the IPC, which was upheld by the High Court before being challenged before the Supreme Court. The primary issue for consideration was whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The prosecution alleged that the appellant kidnapped the prosecutrix, the daughter of PW-1, with the intent of subjecting her to illicit intercourse. The trial court found the appellant guilty under Sections 363 and 366-A IPC, and the High Court upheld this conviction. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offenses beyond reasonable doubt. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecutrix (PW-2) in her testimony admitted that she voluntarily accompanied the appellant. Furthermore, her younger sister, who allegedly saw her leaving with the appellant, was not presented as a witness by the prosecution. The FIR was lodged with considerable delay, casting doubts on the credibility of the prosecution’s claims. Medical evidence presented by PW-3 showed no signs of injury or sexual assault. Additionally, the prosecutrix’s age was determined to be between 16-18 years, making it uncertain whether she was a minor at the time of the incident. Given this ambiguity, the benefit of the doubt was extended to the appellant.
The Supreme Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s Handbook on Gender Stereotypes (2023) to reaffirm that bodily injuries are not necessary to prove sexual assault and that victims react differently to trauma. The Court noted that trauma responses are deeply individual. Some victims may exhibit outward signs of distress, while others may remain calm or silent due to fear, stigma, or helplessness. It is a misconception that sexual assault necessarily leaves physical injuries. Fear, shock, and social conditioning often prevent victims from resisting or reporting the crime immediately. The absence of physical injuries or immediate outcry should not form the sole basis for discrediting the victim’s account.
However, in the present case, there was no evidence to establish coercion or force, undermining the charge under Section 366-A IPC. Regarding the charge under Section 363 IPC, the prosecution’s failure to present a key witness and the lack of conclusive evidence regarding the prosecutrix’s age further weakened the case against the appellant. Considering the inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case, the Court found no justification to sustain the conviction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and quashed the impugned judgment. The appellant was discharged of his bail bond, and the appeal was allowed.
This judgment reinforces the principle that a conviction must be based on clear and substantive evidence, rather than assumptions or delayed allegations, ensuring fairness in criminal jurisprudence.
The present case before the Delhi High Court arising under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), highlights critical aspects of bail jurisprudence, the right to liberty, and the interplay between stringent statutory provisions and constitutional mandates.
The Enforcement Directorate (ED) filed a prosecution complaint against the applicants under the PMLA, 2002. The complaint was based on an earlier investigation conducted by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO). The predicate offense, investigated by SFIO, resulted in charges under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013, alongside Sections 409, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). In the prosecution complaint filed by ED, the allegations are that as per the SFIO investigation report, ex-promoters of M/s Bhushan Steel Ltd. (hereafter, the BSL) had obtained a loan of Rs. 56,000 Crores from various banks and financial institutions before BSL went into insolvency and CIRP was initiated. These funds were allegedly siphoned off using a complex network of over 150 shell companies. The applicants were accused of playing an instrumental role in aiding the ex-promoters. Both applicants had been in custody with ED relying primarily on statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA. Section 50 of the PMLA pertains to the powers of the authorities during the course of an investigation under the Act including the power of ED to summon individuals, record statements, and collect evidence in connection with money laundering offences. The High Court was tasked with determining whether prolonged incarceration and an indefinite delay in trial constituted a violation of the applicants’ fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.
While addressing the nature of the allegations against the applicants, the court observed that while the ED accused them of critical involvement in the fraudulent scheme, no money had been shown to flow into their accounts, nor were they identified as direct beneficiaries. For one of the appellants, the ED relied on unsigned draft Letter of Credit (LC) templates seized from his residence as evidence. The Court noted that these documents were mere templates and unsigned, making their evidentiary value questionable. Further, the allegations regarding Zinc ingot sales were countered by the fact that BSL had already settled the matter with the Excise Department by paying a penalty, thus closing the issue. For another appellant, the allegations pertained to his role as a dummy director in several shell companies. However, the Court noted that his direct involvement or knowledge of financial transactions was not substantiated. The statements implicating him were primarily recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, which, while admissible, would need rigorous scrutiny during trial.
It was further noted that Section 45 of the PMLA imposes strict conditions for bail and the Court must have reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and he is not likely to commit an offense while on bail. The Court, citing the landmark case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 929), reiterated that these twin conditions do not impose an absolute bar on bail and the discretion to grant bail lies with the court, especially when constitutional rights under Article 21 are at stake. The Court observed that certain circumstances like prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the fact that the trial’s conclusion is unforeseeable would render Section 45 unduly restrictive. In this context, the Court relied heavily on recent Supreme Court judgments including Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement (2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920), wherein the Supreme Court underscored that prolonged incarceration before trial, particularly where the accused’s guilt is yet to be established, violates Article 21. Similarly, in Prem Prakash v. Union of India (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2270), the Court held that statutory bars under Section 45 must align with constitutional guarantees, emphasizing that detention should not become a substitute for punishment. The Court also referred to V. Senthil Balaji v. ED (2024 INSC 739), where the Supreme Court held that when trials are unlikely to conclude within a reasonable timeframe, courts must ensure that constitutional protections prevail over stringent bail conditions. Hence, the Delhi High Court placed significant emphasis on the applicants’ right to a speedy trial which is a cornerstone of Article 21. It noted that the investigation in the present case began in 2019, with the ED filing charges against 156 accused persons and listing 82 witnesses. Given the voluminous evidence (over 2.5 lakh pages), the Court found no realistic possibility of the trial concluding anytime soon. Citing Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, the Court emphasized that courts cannot allow statutory provisions like Section 45 of PMLA to subjugate constitutional rights indefinitely. The court further noted the Supreme Court’s instance wherein it has held time and again that “bail is the rule, and jail is the exception,” and pre-trial detention must not become a punishment. Moreover, in the present case, the primary accused and other key officials had already been granted bail. Given the applicants’ comparatively minor roles and lack of direct financial gain, their continued detention could not be justified on grounds of parity. In light of the foregoing analysis, the Delhi High Court granted regular bail to the applicants. The Court reasoned that the allegations, though serious, were yet to be established, and prolonged incarceration without trial infringed upon the applicants’ constitutional rights under Article 21. Also, the twin conditions under Section 45 were satisfied, as the applicants posed no flight risk and had cooperated with the investigation.
The Supreme Court earlier in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.2023 (12) SCC 1, clarified that proceeds of crime must arise from a criminal activity related to a scheduled offense that has already occurred. If the crime forming the basis of money laundering is not proven or is quashed, the entire case under PMLA would lose its foundation.
Despite the clarity provided by Vijay Madanlal's judgment, the Madras High Court recently in Vijayraj Surana adopted a different approach. In this case, the petitioner was accused of misappropriating loans taken by companies he managed. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered a case (Regular Case “RC”) and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) also filed a complaint under Section 447 of the Companies Act, a scheduled offense under PMLA. Section 447 deals with the punishment for fraud in relation to the affairs of a company. It is one of the most stringent provisions introduced under the Companies Act, 2013 to address fraudulent activities. The Karnataka High Court later quashed the CBI’s RC, holding that the SFIO had exclusive jurisdiction to investigate the matter. Following this, the petitioner approached the Madras High Court, seeking to quash the PMLA proceedings initiated by the ED. However, the Madras High Court refused to quash the PMLA proceedings. It reasoned that the RC was quashed only on technical grounds (jurisdictional issues), not on the merits of the case. Further, the SFIO complaint under Section 447 was still pending before the Special Court in Chennai. Since a scheduled offense was still being pursued, the ED could continue its investigation under PMLA. The Court further observed that technical or procedural flaws leading to the quashing of an FIR do not automatically invalidate PMLA proceedings. Each case must be evaluated individually to decide if money laundering charges can continue. This judgment in Vijayraj Surana creates a potential conflict with earlier decisions. Under the PMLA, the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), an internal document prepared by the ED, is directly tied to the existence of a predicate offense (“scheduled offense”). If the FIR or the criminal case forming the scheduled offense is quashed, the ECIR would naturally lose its legal basis. For instance, the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal and the Delhi High Court in Rajinder Singh Chada v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine Del 715 both held that an ECIR cannot survive if the predicate FIR is quashed. Moreover, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chetan Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement 2024 SCC OnLine P&H 1326 explained that the scheduled offense is like a wall, and the money laundering case under PMLA is the plaster on it. If the wall collapses, the plaster cannot hold up by itself. In contrast, the Madras High Court in Vijayraj Surana gave the ECIR an independent existence, allowing it to survive even when the FIR was quashed. This interpretation introduces confusion and raises concerns about the misuse of enforcement powers.
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is undoubtedly a landmark piece of legislation in India's legal framework. Section 25 of the act holds particular significance, as it allows for the alteration, modification, or revocation of orders passed under the Act. However, the scope and limitations of this provision have been subject to varied interpretations, leading to the present case before the Supreme Court.
The case originates from a domestic dispute between S Vijikumari (the appellant-wife) and Mowneshwarachari C (the respondent-husband). S Vijikumari filed a petition under Section 12 of the PWDVA seeking protection and maintenance. The learned Magistrate allowed the petition granting Rs. 12,000 per month as maintenance and Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation. The husband's subsequent appeal against this order was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the grounds of delay, resulting in the Magistrate's order attaining finality.
The husband later filed an application under Section 25 of the PWDVA before the Magistrate. This application sought to set aside the original order and requested a refund of the entire maintenance amount paid, alleging fraud by the wife. The Magistrate dismissed this application, but on appeal the Appellate Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate, directing reconsideration of the Section 25 application. The wife's revision petition to the High Court was dismissed, upholding the Appellate Court's remand order. Aggrieved by these orders, the wife appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
The appellant-wife contended that the application under Section 25 was not maintainable as it sought to set aside a final order rather than alter, modify, or revoke it as permitted by the provision. She argued that the prayers in the husband's application went beyond the scope of Section 25(2) of the PWDVA, which does not allow for setting aside of orders or refund of maintenance. The wife's counsel emphasized that the original maintenance order had attained finality by merging with the appellate order that dismissed the husband's appeal on the grounds of delay. Furthermore, they asserted that Section 25(2) cannot be used to retrospectively challenge orders or seek refunds for periods prior to the application.
On the other hand, the respondent-husband's arguments centered around allegations of fraud. He claimed that the wife had misrepresented her employment status, which went to the root of the maintenance order, thus justifying the application under Section 25. The husband's counsel argued that the discovery of this alleged misrepresentation constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration of the maintenance order.
The Supreme Court, in its nuanced and comprehensive judgment, allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and Appellate Court. The judgment clarifies that while Section 25(2) allows for alteration, modification, or revocation of orders based on a change in circumstances, these changes must occur after the initial order is passed and cannot relate to a period prior to the order. The Court emphasized that the provision is broad enough to deal with all nature of orders passed under the Act, including maintenance, residence, and protection orders.
A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court's elaboration on the interpretation of the phrase "change in circumstances." Noting that this crucial phrase is not defined in the Act, the Court held that it gives discretion to the Magistrate to interpret based on case specifics. The judgment advocates for a broad interpretation, stating that changes can be of a pecuniary nature (such as income changes) or other significant life changes of either party. Factors such as cost of living, income fluctuations, and other circumstantial changes post the initial order can be considered relevant in determining a change in circumstances.
The Court strongly emphasized the prospective nature of orders under Section 25(2). It clarified that such orders operate prospectively, not retrospectively. The judgment states that alterations can take effect from the date of the application or as specified by the Magistrate.
The Court categorically ruled against using Section 25(2) to seek refunds for maintenance already paid.
This judgment has far-reaching implications for the application of the PWDVA. It provides much-needed clarity on the scope and limitations of Section 25, preventing its misuse to reopen settled matters. By ruling against retrospective revocation and refunds, the judgment safeguards the interests of women who are beneficiaries of maintenance orders.
This Supreme Court of India in a recent judgement addressed two writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioners are the wives of Indian Army officers who sought to quash a First Information Report (FIR) and related proceedings against army personnel, including their husbands. The case stems from a tragic incident on December 4, 2021, in Nagaland, where army personnel from the 21 PARA (SF) unit were involved in a situation that resulted in the death of six civilians. The incident escalated, leading to more civilian casualties and the death of one army personnel. Subsequently, a suo moto FIR was registered against the army personnel under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.
The legal issues revolved around the applicability of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA) in the area where the incident occurred. Section 6 of AFSPA mandates that no prosecution, suit, or other legal proceedings can be instituted against any person for actions done in the exercise of powers conferred by the Act, except with prior sanction from the Central Government. The court noted that as of July 19, 2022, no such sanction had been granted, leading to an interim order staying further proceedings related to the FIR.
On March 7, 2024, the court was informed that the competent authority had declined sanction under Section 6 of AFSPA on February 28, 2023. Despite the court's initial inclination to close the matter and quash the FIRs, the Advocate General for the State of Nagaland requested time to file an affidavit, which was granted. The final hearing took place on August 6, 2024.
In its decision, the Supreme Court allowed both writ petitions, effectively closing the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIRs. However, the court made a crucial caveat: if sanction under Section 6 of AFSPA is granted at any future stage, the proceedings may continue in accordance with the law. The court also addressed a separate writ petition (Criminal Diary No. 17297 of 2024) filed by the State of Nagaland challenging the rejection of sanction, acknowledging that if this petition leads to a grant of sanction, the proceedings could be revived.
The court refrained from issuing any directions regarding potential disciplinary proceedings against the officers within the Armed Forces, stating that such decisions fall within the sole discretion of the Armed Forces themselves. This judgment highlights the complex interplay between civilian law enforcement and military operations in areas under special laws like AFSPA, emphasizing the importance of proper sanctions in prosecuting armed forces personnel for actions taken in the line of duty.
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).8535/2024
The Supreme Court of India while dealing with the issue of an accused being called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of documents produced by the prosecution under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) held that that asking an accused to admit or deny the genuineness of documents produced by the prosecution along with the list under Section 294 of CrPC is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The court further clarified that such a requirement does not amount to compelling the accused to be a witness against himself, which is protected under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself. Whereas, Section 294 of CrPC aims to accelerate the pace of the trial proceedings by reading into the relevant piece of evidence in the trial, leaving aside unnecessary material. It states that where the genuineness of any document is admitted or its formal proof is dispensed with, the same may be read in evidence.
The facts that gave rise to the instant suit involved the petitioner challenging an order where the trial court had observed that deliberate denial of the genuineness of documents by the accused could be considered an ‘aggravating circumstance’ while determining the quantum of sentence if convicted. The Supreme Court, while upholding the overall order, directed the deletion of this specific observation made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order. Therefore, the court in the instant case held that calling the accused to admit/deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution will not amount to a violation of the right against self-incrimination. However, the adverse observation recorded against the accused was deleted by the Court.
The court emphasized that the petitioner-accused retains the liberty to raise all legally permissible contentions during the course of the trial. This ruling strikes a balance between the procedural requirements of criminal trials and the constitutional protections afforded to accused persons.
This judgment provides clarity on the application of Section 294 of CrPC in relation to document verification, potentially streamlining trial procedures while safeguarding the rights of the accused.
CRL.A. 578/2024
The Delhi High Court recently provided a possible interpretation for Section 531(2)(a) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 regarding pending appeals. Justice Bhambhani noted that a plain reading of this section suggests that if an appeal, application, trial, inquiry, or investigation was pending before the BNSS came into force, it should be continued under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, the court highlighted a possible interpretation that only appeals pending before the BNSS's enforcement would continue under the CrPC. he further noted that the general principle is that an appeal is considered a continuation of the trial. This principle seems to conflict with the potential interpretation of Section 531(2)(a) BNSS.
Given the complexity of the issue, the court left open the question of whether the present appeal should be entertained under Section 374 of the CrPC or Section 415 of the BNSS for future consideration. The appeal was filed under BNSS, challenging the conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The investigation and trial were conducted under the old CrPC. The court suspended the appellant's sentence when the appeal was pending, considering factors such as his age, health condition, and the nature of the sentence.
This judgment highlights the challenges in transitioning from the old criminal law system to the BNSS. The court's cautious approach in leaving the interpretation question open reflects the complexity of applying new procedural laws to cases that began under the old system.
The court's interpretation of Section 531(2)(a) BNSS, if adopted more broadly, could have significant implications for pending and future appeals. It suggests that the timing of filing an appeal could determine which law applies, potentially creating a complex landscape for cases straddling the transition period.
The Supreme Court in the present case grapples with the intricate balance between procedural compliance and substantive justice, particularly in cases involving grave offenses punishable with life imprisonment or death. The Apex Court addresses a critical issue of whether a conviction stands justified if the accused is not given an opportunity to explain key incriminating circumstances during their Section 313 examination. In addressing this issue, the Court delves deep into the principles of natural justice, the doctrine of prejudice, and the overarching aim of criminal trials.
The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the charge against the appellant, noting that he was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (murder) with the aid of Section 34 (common intention). The Court emphasized that in cases where extreme penalties like death or life imprisonment are imposable, procedural safeguards ensuring the protection of the accused's rights must be stringently followed.
The Court then addressed the core issue of non-compliance with Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) citing the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and referencing the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Company Limited v. Modern Construction and Company[1].
In examining the Section 313 proceedings, the Court found that two crucial incriminating circumstances were indeed not put to the appellant during his examination:
The Court noted that these circumstances formed the very foundation of the charge against the appellant and were central to establishing his common intention under Section 34 IPC. Their omission from the Section 313 examination was deemed a serious lapse. While acknowledging that non-compliance with Section 313 does not automatically vitiate a trial, the Court emphasized that it must be shown to have caused material prejudice to the accused. In this case, the Court found such prejudice existed. It pointed out that the trial court's judgment explicitly relied on these two circumstances to establish the appellant's common intention, yet he was never given an opportunity to explain them.
The Court rejected the State's argument based on State of Punjab v. Swaran Singh (2005) 6 SCC 101, which suggested that if an accused had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but did not avail the same then omission to question him later under Section 313 would not cause prejudice. The Court distinguished the present case, noting that the very charge framed against the appellant was based on these unquestioned circumstances. Importantly, the Court considered the passage of time since the incident (over 29 years) and the fact that the appellant had already served more than 12 years in prison. Citing its recent decision in Raj Kumar @ Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609, the Court deemed it unjust to remand the case for a fresh Section 313 examination after such a long period.
The Court concluded that the failure to question the appellant on these crucial circumstances was not a curable defect but a patent illegality that vitiated the trial against him. It was held that this omission had resulted in material prejudice and a clear miscarriage of justice. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court in respect of the appellant. The Court acquitted the appellant of all charges against him and ordered his immediate release if not required in connection with any other case. However, the Court was careful to limit the scope of its decision. It explicitly stated that this judgment would not disturb the conviction of the other accused and should not be taken as confirmation of his conviction, leaving open the possibility of a separate appeal by him.
The Court's ruling underscores the necessity of giving accused persons a fair opportunity to explain all incriminating circumstances, failing which the very foundation of a fair trial may be compromised. By prioritizing the right of the accused to explain every incriminating circumstance, the Court has reaffirmed the foundational principles of natural justice and fair trial. The decision is likely to have far-reaching implications for the Indian criminal justice system.
[1] (2014) 1 SCC 648
The Supreme Court in a landmark decision involving an appeal filed by a foreign national prosecuted for offenses under Sections 8, 22, 23, and 29 of the NDPS Act, against bail conditions imposed by the High Court. This judgment addresses two critical issues pertaining to the legality of imposing a condition requiring the accused to "drop a PIN on Google Maps," and the necessity of obtaining a certificate of assurance from the relevant embassy or high commission for foreign nationals.
The case involved the interpretation of Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which allows courts to impose conditions while granting bail "in the interests of justice." The scope of this provision and the extent to which it allows curtailment of an accused's rights was a key issue. Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which places additional restrictions on granting bail in certain NDPS cases, was also relevant. The interplay between the NDPS Act's bail provisions and the general bail provisions in the CrPC needed to be considered. Article 21 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to life and personal liberty, was central to the appellant's arguments against the bail conditions. Previous Supreme Court judgments recognizing that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights were cited to argue that an accused on bail should have even greater protection of their Article 21 rights.
The Supreme Court delivered a detailed decision addressing the two main issues raised regarding the bail conditions imposed on Frank Vitus. Regarding the condition of dropping a PIN on Google Maps, the Court found this condition to be problematic and ultimately ordered its deletion. They reasoned that:
Imposing any bail condition that enables constant tracking of an accused's movements would violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Based on the affidavit submitted by Google LLC, the Court noted that dropping a PIN on Google Maps does not actually enable real-time tracking of a user or their device. The user has full control over sharing PINs, and the pinned location is static, not dynamic. Therefore, the condition as imposed was technically ineffective and redundant. The Court emphasized that bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary, or freakish. They should not be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. While courts may impose conditions like periodically reporting to police or seeking permission for international travel, they cannot impose conditions that allow constant surveillance of the accused's movements. The Court further stated that the object of bail conditions cannot be to keep constant vigil on the movements of the accused, as this would infringe on their right to privacy and effectively amount to a form of confinement even after release on bail.
Regarding the condition of furnishing a certificate from the Embassy/High Commission, the Court provided a nuanced interpretation of this condition, originally stemming from the 1994 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee case. The Court clarified that the directions in the 1994 case were meant as one-time measures for pending cases at that time. They were not intended to be mandatory in all future cases involving foreign nationals. It was held that it is not necessary to incorporate this condition in every case where bail is granted to a foreign national in an NDPS case on grounds of long incarceration. The need for such a condition should depend on the facts of each case. Further, the Court recognized that obtaining such a certificate is beyond the control of the accused. Therefore, if the Embassy/High Commission declines or fails to issue the certificate within a reasonable time (suggested as seven days), the Court has the power to dispense with this condition. Emphasis was placed on the point that an accused cannot be denied bail due to non-compliance with a condition that is impossible for them to fulfill. In cases where the certificate is not obtainable, the Court suggested alternative conditions like surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local police station or trial court.
The Court took the opportunity to lay down some broader guidelines on bail conditions:
a) Bail conditions must be within the framework of Section 437(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and consistent with the object of imposing conditions.
b) The constitutional rights of an accused released on bail can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required.
c) Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions, ensuring they do not violate fundamental rights or amount to a form of punishment.
d) The Court reiterated that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights, so accused persons who are presumed innocent should have even stronger protection of their rights.
Consequently, the Court noted that bail was granted to the appellant partly on merits, based on the inadmissibility of certain evidence as per Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1 Given this, the Court found no justification for imposing all the onerous conditions from the 1994 Legal Aid Committee case. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the deletion of both the Google Maps condition and the Embassy certificate condition from the appellant's bail order. They declined to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the 1994 judgment and instead provided a clarified interpretation of how those guidelines should be applied in current cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is particularly noteworthy as it intersects with contemporary concerns about digital privacy and the use of technology in law enforcement. By examining these issues through the lens of constitutional rights and established legal principles, the Court has set a precedent that is likely to have far-reaching implications for bail proceedings, especially those involving foreign nationals and technologically enabled surveillance. This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India offers a nuanced and progressive view on bail conditions, particularly for foreign nationals accused under the NDPS Act.
The present case deals with the complications during the renewal of passport due to the on account of pending legal proceedings. The facts of the instant case are such that, Sharath Chandrasekhar (Petitioner), a dual-qualified lawyer registered with the Bar Council of Karnataka and the New York State Bar was seeking the court’s intervention for the renewal of his passport, which was due to expire. The passport in question, was issued by the Regional Passport Office in Bengaluru and was valid until April 4, 2023. The Petitioner had applied for renewal six months before the expiry date, as per the standard procedure. During the police verification process, it was found that the Petitioner was involved in three legal proceedings; a matrimonial case initially filed in Bengaluru but transferred to Lucknow by the Supreme Court, a maintenance case filed by his wife under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and a case filed by his wife under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2012.
The court observed that the pending legal proceedings, particularly the matrimonial disputes, should not unduly prejudice the Petitioner’s right to have his passport renewed. The Court emphasized that the legal proceedings mentioned should not automatically serve as a bar to the renewal of the passport. The court referred to previous judgments stating that the right to travel abroad is a part of the fundamental right to personal liberty. Therefore, the Court held that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and proportionate to the purpose it seeks to achieve.
Directive for Discretion: The court directed the passport authorities to exercise their discretion judiciously while considering the Petitioner’s application for passport renewal. It instructed the authorities to take into account the nature of the legal proceedings, the Petitioner’s need to travel, and his track record of compliance with legal mandates.
The court concluded that the Petitioner’s involvement in legal proceedings, in itself, should not be the sole ground for denying the renewal of his passport. It mandated the passport authorities to consider the renewal application on its own merits and in accordance with the principles laid down by the court. The court’s observations and the subsequent directive reflect a balancing act between the state’s interest in regulating the issuance of passports and an individual’s right to freedom of movement. It stressed that while the state may have legitimate concerns regarding the flight risk of individuals involved in legal proceedings, these concerns must be balanced against the individual’s rights.
In the present case, two applications were presented before Hon’ble Bombay High Court to invoke the power of Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”) seeking a relief of quashing of an order dated 22/03/2022, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court at Andheri, Mumbai, for committing the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”).
Amongst the two applicants, one Applicant is Salman Khan (“Accused 1”) who is a well- known cine artist and is a part of the Indian film and entertainment industry and the other is his bodyguard (“Accused 2”). The complainant is the journalist who reported in D.N Nagar Police station that at around 4.40 p.m. on 24/04/2019, he noticed Accused 1 riding a bicycle and Accused 2 escorting him on bike. Being a journalist, he was tempted to ask Accused 2, whether he can video shoot Accused 1 and once consent was accorded, he started the recording. This, however, irked Accused 1 and at his indication, Accused 2 jumped on the car of the complainant and assaulted him. Even Accused 1 participated in the assault. A complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court at Andheri, Mumbai, seeking a direction under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., to hold a detailed inquiry into the incident and alternative relief, to issue process against the accused persons under Sections 324, 392, 426, 506(II) read with Section 34 of IPC, the learned Magistrate turned down the request for issuance of directions under Section 156(3). Instead, he directed the complainant to furnish verification statement under Section 200 and further directed an inquiry to be conducted under Section 202 by D.N. Nagar Police Station and submit the report.
The Bombay High Court observed that the allegations levelled against the accused persons in the complaint, apart from being an after thought, in no case met the necessary ingredients of Sections 504 and 506, which would have warranted the Magistrate to take cognizance upon a complaint. The essential ingredients so as to constitute an offence under Section 504 and 506 of IPC were laid out in the said case, making the said case a note-worthy precedent. Additionally, it was held that unless examination of the complainant was made under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate could not exercise the power under Sections 202, 203 or 204 and in this case, by surpassing the said procedure, the Magistrate had issued the process against the accused persons. Hence, the impugned order was set aside, since the said complaint had not been in compliance of Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and since no offence lied under Section 504 and 506 of IPC, the impugned order was quashed and set aside.
Supreme Court has Laid Down Detailed Guidelines on Requirements for Police Reports/Chargesheets under Section 173(2) CrPC
The Supreme Court in Dablu Kujur v. The State Of Jharkhand (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 197) has issued comprehensive guidelines specifying the mandatory requirements that police officers must comply with while submitting the police report/chargesheet under Section 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code after completing an investigation.
The instant case came to the Supreme Court through an appeal filed by the appellant-accused challenging the High Court's dismissal of his bail application in a murder case. The appellant-accused challenged the impugned judgment and order dated 17.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, whereby the High Court dismissed his bail application in respect of FIR for offenses under Sections 302, 120-B/34 of IPC and Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act. On 17.07.2023, a Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi passed an order observing that the chargesheet submitted by the police was bereft of details and particulars. The Court directed the Director General of Police (DGP), Jharkhand to examine whether the chargesheet complied with the law and take appropriate steps if such chargesheets were being filed. Similar directions were issued to the DGPs of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, as the Court was informed that similar chargesheets lacking details were being filed in these states as well. In compliance with the Supreme Court's order, affidavits were filed on behalf of the states of Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar regarding the steps taken/being taken for submitting chargesheets/police reports in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court deemed it necessary to elaborately deal with various aspects of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pertains to the police officer's report on the completion of the investigation.
The Supreme Court elaborately dealt with various aspects of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pertains to the police officer's report on the completion of the investigation. The Court observed that the police report is a crucial document that allows the accused to prepare a defense in front of the court. Hence, it is necessary for the investigating officer to strictly comply with the requirements of this provision. The Court noted that the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) is prescribed by the State Government, and each State has its own Police Manual to be followed by police officers. However, the mandatory requirements to be complied with by such officers in the police report/chargesheet are laid down in Section 173, particularly sub-section (2)
The Court highlighted that the police report submitted under Section 173(2) forms the basis for the competent court to take cognizance of the offense. It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court regarding an offense committed or not committed by the accused.
Considering the significance of compliance with Section 173(2), the Supreme Court issued the following guidelines for police officers submitting chargesheets/police reports. The police report shall contain:
(i) Prescribed details like names of parties, nature of information, acquainted persons, offense details, accused's custody status, etc.
(ii) If no sufficient evidence against the accused, a clear statement on compliance with Section 169 CrPC.
(iii) All documents/extracts as per Section 173(5) if Section 170 CrPC is applicable.
In addition to this, the court emphasized that Investigating officers must strictly comply with Section 173(2) requirements as the report forms the basis for the court to take cognizance. Further, Partial chargesheets and delayed submission of documents under 173(5) can be grounds for default bail claims.
This decision provides clear and extensive guidelines to ensure full compliance by investigating agencies with the statutory requirements for police reports under Section 173(2) CrPC. moreover, it also strengthens the position of the accused by realizing their right to be able to present his case and also to be eligible for default bail in case of Partial chargesheets submissions, delayed submission of documents under 173(5)
Supreme Court in Naeem v. State Of Uttar Pradesh [Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 169] Acquited Two in Murder Case and Upheld Conviction of Prime Accused Based on Dying Declaration.
The Court allowed the appeals of the two accused, acquitting them due to the lack of specific roles attributed to them in the dying declaration. However, the court upheld the conviction of the prime accused, relying solely on the cogent and reliable dying declaration of the deceased.
Facts that gave rise to the instant dispute were, On 1st December 2016, Shahin Parveen sustained severe burn injuries and gave a statement alleging that her brother-in-law Pappi @ Mashkoor (Accused No. 1), his wife Naeema (Accused No. 2), and Naeema's brother Naeem (Accused No. 3) had set her on fire. Shahin Parveen's dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) was recorded by Raj Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib Tehsildar, on the same day between 8:48 pm and 9:15 pm. In her dying declaration, Shahin Parveen stated that she had a dispute with Pappi @ Mashkoor over the partition of their shared residence. On the day of the incident, Pappi @ Mashkoor poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, aided by Naeema and Naeem. Shahin Parveen succumbed to her injuries on 2nd December 2016 at Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi. Based on the dying declaration, the trial court convicted all three accused under Sections 302 (Punishment for murder) and 34 (act done in furtherance of the common intention) of the IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preffrerd the present appeals.
Issue before the court in the instant appeals was whether the conviction based solely on the dying declaration is sustainable, and if so, whether the conviction of all three accused is tenable. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court, and the court is satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination. The court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings that the dying declaration was true, free from any effort to induce a false statement, coherent, and consistent. Regarding the conviction of Accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, the court upheld the conviction based solely on the cogent, trustworthy, and reliable Dying declaration, which attributed the specific roles of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze to him. However, for Accused No. 2 Naeema and Accused No. 3 Naeem, the dying declaration only stated that they aided Pappi @ Mashkoor without specifying their roles. The court held that in the absence of any specific role attributed to them, they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals of Naeema and Naeem, acquitting them of all charges, while dismissing the appeal of Pappi @ Mashkoor, upholding his conviction and life sentence.
The High Court of Delhi, while dealing with a case titled Magnum Steels Ltd v. Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd held that the proceedings under SARFAESI Act and RDDB Act are complementary to each other and the proceedings for both can continue parallelly.
The court further opined that since the two proceedings are complimentary, the principle of election of remedies will not be applicable, and the secured creditor can enjoy both the remedies together.
The issue in the instant case arose when the Petitioner took a loan of Rs. 2,97,00,000/- from the Respondent-Bajaj Finance Limited, against a mortgage of secured asset. Later, the account of the petitioner was declared as Non Performing Asset (‘NPA’).
Thereafter, the respondent issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) seeking repayment of the alleged debt with interest, Section 19 of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘RDDB Act’) for the recovery of the amount and Section 14 of SARFAESI Act seeking appointment of receiver to take possession of the secured asset.
The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) allowed the application of the respondent filed under Section 19 of RDDB Act and directed petitioner to pay the loan amount. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the order as well as the maintainability of the proceedings under both the Act together.
The High Court while deciding the issue, placed reliance on Supreme Court judgements including Transcore v. Union of India and Another (2008) 1 SCC 125, Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar and Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 610, M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Hero Fincorp Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 741.
The Court stated that in Transcore (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the application of provisions of RDDB Act and SARFAESI Act are complementary to each other.
In Mathew Varghese (supra) as well this issue was discussed and the Supreme Court held that a closer reading of the acts indicate that SARFAESI Act or the Rules framed thereunder will be in addition to the provisions of the RDDB Act.
Subsequently, in M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court, yet again reiterated that the RDDB Act and SARFAESI Act are thus, complementary to each other and hence no question of election of remedy can arise.
After holding that the SARFAESI Act and RDDB Act are complementary to each other, court further emphasized that there is no question of election of remedy hence the remedy under both the acts can be availed by the petitioners. Accordingly the court dismissed the petition.
As per a recent Supreme Court judgment when an accused is charged with food adulteration under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC"), and Food Safety and Standards Act FSSA, them the proceedings cannot continue under the IPC due to the overriding effect of Section 89 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 ("FSSA").
With this, SC overturned the judgment of the High Court, wherein it refused to dismiss the criminal charges against the accused. Court noted that simultaneous prosecution under the IPC and FSSA is not allowed. This is because Section 89 of the FSSA takes precedence over the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC.
The Supreme Court further stated that when the accused is charged with crimes under Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is also attracted.
The issue in the present case arose after a First Information Report was lodged by a food inspector against the petitioner alleging the commission of offences under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. The allegation was that, the appellant did not possess a licence to sell the commodity of mustard oil, but he continued to sell the same. Another allegation was that the petitioner had adulterated the mustard oil, edible oil and rice brine oil. The accused approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR, however, the High Court refused to quash the FIR, hence the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.
The supreme court accepted the submissions made by the appellanta nd held that by virtue of Section 89 of the FSSA, Section 59 will override the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC.
Court further accepted that the title of FSSA suggests that the FSSA is meant to have a major impact on all laws related to food. However, in the main section, there is no specific limitation to only food-related laws. It states that the rules of the FSSA will still be valid even if they conflict with any other current law.
In light of the argument advanced by the contending parties, the Supreme Court quashed the pending criminal case against the appellant accused under IPC and gave the option to the concerned authorities to initiate proceedings against the appellant under FSSA for offences punishable under Section 59 of the FSSA.
The Supreme Court, in its ruling on April 10, 2024, emphasized the responsibility of each party to discharge the burden of proof specific to them. Regarding insurance contracts, it highlighted that the insurer bears the burden of proving any alleged non-disclosure of material facts, especially if fraudulent, rather than shifting this burden onto the insured or any other party.
…….the burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts the same. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom burden lies has been able to discharge his burden.
The court in the instant revision petition overturned the 2019 decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and instructed the insurance company to honor the appellant, Mahakali Sujatha's claim under both policies. The amounts due, totaling Rs 7,50,000 and Rs 9,60,000 respectively, were to be paid with an interest rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing the complaint until fully settled.
The case involved insurance claims denied for the appellant's father following his death in a train accident in 2011. The deceased had two policies from Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Limited. The company alleged the deceased had withheld information about existing life insurance policies from other insurers, citing fifteen policies from various insurers besides theirs. However, the court found the evidence presented insufficient to validly reject the claim.
The court stressed the fundamental principles of burden and onus of proof, asserting that the burden rests on the party making the claim until adequately discharged. It criticized the NCDRC for accepting the insurer's claims without demanding substantial evidence and relying solely on a table indicating fifteen policies bought by the deceased.
No officer of any other insurance company was examined to corroborate the table of policies said to have been taken by the deceased policy holder, father of the appellant herein. Moreover, the table produced is incomplete and contradictory as far as the date of birth of the insured is concerned. Therefore, in our view, the NCDRC could not have relied upon the said tabulation and put the onus on the appellant to deal with that issue in her complaint and thereby considered the said averment as proved or proceeded to prove the stance of the opposite party.
Furthermore, the court deemed the insurer's repudiation of the policy unjustified, lacking a factual basis. It concluded that the insurer failed to sufficiently demonstrate fraudulent suppression of information about existing policies by the insured.
The court stated that any documentary evidence on which the respondent relies, should have been produced before the District Forum but it was not done. Further no oral or documentary evidence was produced by the respondents to prove their assertion. Their application to annex certain documents to support their claim before the state commission was also declined because of the unauthenticated nature of the documents. In the views of court, this all proves that the respondents have failed to adequately prove the fact that the insured-deceased had fraudulently suppressed the information about the existing policies with other insurance companies while entering into the insurance contracts with the respondents herein in the present case. Hence, the repudiation of the policy was without any basis or justification.
Referring to the legal principle of "Uberrimae fidei" governing insurance contracts, the court highlighted the reciprocal duty of full disclosure between both parties. It emphasized the importance of complete disclosure to enable informed decision-making and fair contract formation, cautioning against the suppression of material facts affecting the insured risk and decision-making process. However, not every question can be said to be material fact and the materiality of a fact has to be adjudged as per the rules stated in the aforementioned judgment.
Accordingly, the Court, while setting aside the order passed by the NCDRC, directed the Insurance Company to pay the insurance claim to the Nominee of the deceased insured person along with interest.
The Supreme Court in a recent case of Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., has held that for the application of Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) the presence of two or more groups or communities is necessary.
The issue in the present case arises when the complainant formed a trust, by the name Savara Foundation. He is the founder and also the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.
The complainant wanted a foundation stone laying ceremony of Matra Ashraya-A collection museum to be done by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Uttarakhand.
However, the appellant published a news article in the e-newspaper, wherein it was stated that the proposed to be laid was Government land which had been unlawfully occupied/encroached upon by the complainant. As per the complainant even the invitation was published in the defamatory way with the intent and knowledge that the same would irreparably tarnish the reputation of the complainant and his standing in the public domain. The complainant asserted that the sole objective of the publication was to incite breach of peace.
Lack of proper research and fact-finding exercise has resulted into this inappropriate information by which the accused has caused serious damage to the goodwill, reputation and standing of the complainant in the society. Hence, the complainant invoked Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504 read with Sections 34 and 120B IPC. When the appellant came to know about the same, he filed a Criminal Writ Petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand claiming to be completely innocent and taking a plea that the allegations made under Section 153A of the IPC did not disclose commission of any cognizable offence.
The High Court proceeded to dismiss the criminal writ petition filed by the appellant. Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court which was later allowed. After hearing the rival contention of the parties, the Supreme court bench was of the believe that as per the language of Section 153A IPC, in order to constitute such offence, the prosecution must must prove that the words ‘spoken’ or ‘written’, created enmity or bad blood between different groups on the ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., or that the acts so alleged were prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony.
Thereafter, upon careful perusal of the offending news article, the court found no reference to any group or groups of people. Rather the essence of the publication was found on imputing that the respondent had encroached upon public land where the foundation stone laying ceremony was proposed. Court could not find the words to have any connection whatsoever with a group or groups of people or communities. Hence, it held that the foundational facts essential to constitute the offence under Section 153A IPC are totally lacking from the allegations.
Court placed reliance on Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2007) 5 SCC 1, wherein it was held that for the application of Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential, whereas in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article.
As far as Section 504 IPC is concerned. Court further rejected the invocation of the same stating that the said offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. There is no such allegation made by the complainant thatowing to the alleged offensive post he was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence.
Accordingly, the other allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC were also held to be non est.
Placing reliance on the State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court held that allowing the continuance of the proceedings against the appellant will result in gross abuse of the process of lawfue to the fact that the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients for any cognizable offence. The appeal is allowed accordingly and the pending criminal case against the appellant was quashed.