The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is undoubtedly a landmark piece of legislation in India's legal framework. Section 25 of the act holds particular significance, as it allows for the alteration, modification, or revocation of orders passed under the Act. However, the scope and limitations of this provision have been subject to varied interpretations, leading to the present case before the Supreme Court.
The case originates from a domestic dispute between S Vijikumari (the appellant-wife) and Mowneshwarachari C (the respondent-husband). S Vijikumari filed a petition under Section 12 of the PWDVA seeking protection and maintenance. The learned Magistrate allowed the petition granting Rs. 12,000 per month as maintenance and Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation. The husband's subsequent appeal against this order was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the grounds of delay, resulting in the Magistrate's order attaining finality.
The husband later filed an application under Section 25 of the PWDVA before the Magistrate. This application sought to set aside the original order and requested a refund of the entire maintenance amount paid, alleging fraud by the wife. The Magistrate dismissed this application, but on appeal the Appellate Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate, directing reconsideration of the Section 25 application. The wife's revision petition to the High Court was dismissed, upholding the Appellate Court's remand order. Aggrieved by these orders, the wife appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
The appellant-wife contended that the application under Section 25 was not maintainable as it sought to set aside a final order rather than alter, modify, or revoke it as permitted by the provision. She argued that the prayers in the husband's application went beyond the scope of Section 25(2) of the PWDVA, which does not allow for setting aside of orders or refund of maintenance. The wife's counsel emphasized that the original maintenance order had attained finality by merging with the appellate order that dismissed the husband's appeal on the grounds of delay. Furthermore, they asserted that Section 25(2) cannot be used to retrospectively challenge orders or seek refunds for periods prior to the application.
On the other hand, the respondent-husband's arguments centered around allegations of fraud. He claimed that the wife had misrepresented her employment status, which went to the root of the maintenance order, thus justifying the application under Section 25. The husband's counsel argued that the discovery of this alleged misrepresentation constituted a change in circumstances warranting reconsideration of the maintenance order.
The Supreme Court, in its nuanced and comprehensive judgment, allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the High Court and Appellate Court. The judgment clarifies that while Section 25(2) allows for alteration, modification, or revocation of orders based on a change in circumstances, these changes must occur after the initial order is passed and cannot relate to a period prior to the order. The Court emphasized that the provision is broad enough to deal with all nature of orders passed under the Act, including maintenance, residence, and protection orders.
A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court's elaboration on the interpretation of the phrase "change in circumstances." Noting that this crucial phrase is not defined in the Act, the Court held that it gives discretion to the Magistrate to interpret based on case specifics. The judgment advocates for a broad interpretation, stating that changes can be of a pecuniary nature (such as income changes) or other significant life changes of either party. Factors such as cost of living, income fluctuations, and other circumstantial changes post the initial order can be considered relevant in determining a change in circumstances.
The Court strongly emphasized the prospective nature of orders under Section 25(2). It clarified that such orders operate prospectively, not retrospectively. The judgment states that alterations can take effect from the date of the application or as specified by the Magistrate.
The Court categorically ruled against using Section 25(2) to seek refunds for maintenance already paid.
This judgment has far-reaching implications for the application of the PWDVA. It provides much-needed clarity on the scope and limitations of Section 25, preventing its misuse to reopen settled matters. By ruling against retrospective revocation and refunds, the judgment safeguards the interests of women who are beneficiaries of maintenance orders.
This Supreme Court of India in a recent judgement addressed two writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioners are the wives of Indian Army officers who sought to quash a First Information Report (FIR) and related proceedings against army personnel, including their husbands. The case stems from a tragic incident on December 4, 2021, in Nagaland, where army personnel from the 21 PARA (SF) unit were involved in a situation that resulted in the death of six civilians. The incident escalated, leading to more civilian casualties and the death of one army personnel. Subsequently, a suo moto FIR was registered against the army personnel under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.
The legal issues revolved around the applicability of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 (AFSPA) in the area where the incident occurred. Section 6 of AFSPA mandates that no prosecution, suit, or other legal proceedings can be instituted against any person for actions done in the exercise of powers conferred by the Act, except with prior sanction from the Central Government. The court noted that as of July 19, 2022, no such sanction had been granted, leading to an interim order staying further proceedings related to the FIR.
On March 7, 2024, the court was informed that the competent authority had declined sanction under Section 6 of AFSPA on February 28, 2023. Despite the court's initial inclination to close the matter and quash the FIRs, the Advocate General for the State of Nagaland requested time to file an affidavit, which was granted. The final hearing took place on August 6, 2024.
In its decision, the Supreme Court allowed both writ petitions, effectively closing the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIRs. However, the court made a crucial caveat: if sanction under Section 6 of AFSPA is granted at any future stage, the proceedings may continue in accordance with the law. The court also addressed a separate writ petition (Criminal Diary No. 17297 of 2024) filed by the State of Nagaland challenging the rejection of sanction, acknowledging that if this petition leads to a grant of sanction, the proceedings could be revived.
The court refrained from issuing any directions regarding potential disciplinary proceedings against the officers within the Armed Forces, stating that such decisions fall within the sole discretion of the Armed Forces themselves. This judgment highlights the complex interplay between civilian law enforcement and military operations in areas under special laws like AFSPA, emphasizing the importance of proper sanctions in prosecuting armed forces personnel for actions taken in the line of duty.
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).8535/2024
The Supreme Court of India while dealing with the issue of an accused being called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of documents produced by the prosecution under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) held that that asking an accused to admit or deny the genuineness of documents produced by the prosecution along with the list under Section 294 of CrPC is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The court further clarified that such a requirement does not amount to compelling the accused to be a witness against himself, which is protected under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Article 20(3) of the Constitution protects an individual from being compelled to be a witness against himself. Whereas, Section 294 of CrPC aims to accelerate the pace of the trial proceedings by reading into the relevant piece of evidence in the trial, leaving aside unnecessary material. It states that where the genuineness of any document is admitted or its formal proof is dispensed with, the same may be read in evidence.
The facts that gave rise to the instant suit involved the petitioner challenging an order where the trial court had observed that deliberate denial of the genuineness of documents by the accused could be considered an ‘aggravating circumstance’ while determining the quantum of sentence if convicted. The Supreme Court, while upholding the overall order, directed the deletion of this specific observation made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order. Therefore, the court in the instant case held that calling the accused to admit/deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution will not amount to a violation of the right against self-incrimination. However, the adverse observation recorded against the accused was deleted by the Court.
The court emphasized that the petitioner-accused retains the liberty to raise all legally permissible contentions during the course of the trial. This ruling strikes a balance between the procedural requirements of criminal trials and the constitutional protections afforded to accused persons.
This judgment provides clarity on the application of Section 294 of CrPC in relation to document verification, potentially streamlining trial procedures while safeguarding the rights of the accused.
CRL.A. 578/2024
The Delhi High Court recently provided a possible interpretation for Section 531(2)(a) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) 2023 regarding pending appeals. Justice Bhambhani noted that a plain reading of this section suggests that if an appeal, application, trial, inquiry, or investigation was pending before the BNSS came into force, it should be continued under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). However, the court highlighted a possible interpretation that only appeals pending before the BNSS's enforcement would continue under the CrPC. he further noted that the general principle is that an appeal is considered a continuation of the trial. This principle seems to conflict with the potential interpretation of Section 531(2)(a) BNSS.
Given the complexity of the issue, the court left open the question of whether the present appeal should be entertained under Section 374 of the CrPC or Section 415 of the BNSS for future consideration. The appeal was filed under BNSS, challenging the conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The investigation and trial were conducted under the old CrPC. The court suspended the appellant's sentence when the appeal was pending, considering factors such as his age, health condition, and the nature of the sentence.
This judgment highlights the challenges in transitioning from the old criminal law system to the BNSS. The court's cautious approach in leaving the interpretation question open reflects the complexity of applying new procedural laws to cases that began under the old system.
The court's interpretation of Section 531(2)(a) BNSS, if adopted more broadly, could have significant implications for pending and future appeals. It suggests that the timing of filing an appeal could determine which law applies, potentially creating a complex landscape for cases straddling the transition period.
The Supreme Court in the present case grapples with the intricate balance between procedural compliance and substantive justice, particularly in cases involving grave offenses punishable with life imprisonment or death. The Apex Court addresses a critical issue of whether a conviction stands justified if the accused is not given an opportunity to explain key incriminating circumstances during their Section 313 examination. In addressing this issue, the Court delves deep into the principles of natural justice, the doctrine of prejudice, and the overarching aim of criminal trials.
The Court acknowledged the seriousness of the charge against the appellant, noting that he was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (murder) with the aid of Section 34 (common intention). The Court emphasized that in cases where extreme penalties like death or life imprisonment are imposable, procedural safeguards ensuring the protection of the accused's rights must be stringently followed.
The Court then addressed the core issue of non-compliance with Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) citing the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and referencing the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Company Limited v. Modern Construction and Company[1].
In examining the Section 313 proceedings, the Court found that two crucial incriminating circumstances were indeed not put to the appellant during his examination:
The Court noted that these circumstances formed the very foundation of the charge against the appellant and were central to establishing his common intention under Section 34 IPC. Their omission from the Section 313 examination was deemed a serious lapse. While acknowledging that non-compliance with Section 313 does not automatically vitiate a trial, the Court emphasized that it must be shown to have caused material prejudice to the accused. In this case, the Court found such prejudice existed. It pointed out that the trial court's judgment explicitly relied on these two circumstances to establish the appellant's common intention, yet he was never given an opportunity to explain them.
The Court rejected the State's argument based on State of Punjab v. Swaran Singh (2005) 6 SCC 101, which suggested that if an accused had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses but did not avail the same then omission to question him later under Section 313 would not cause prejudice. The Court distinguished the present case, noting that the very charge framed against the appellant was based on these unquestioned circumstances. Importantly, the Court considered the passage of time since the incident (over 29 years) and the fact that the appellant had already served more than 12 years in prison. Citing its recent decision in Raj Kumar @ Suman v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609, the Court deemed it unjust to remand the case for a fresh Section 313 examination after such a long period.
The Court concluded that the failure to question the appellant on these crucial circumstances was not a curable defect but a patent illegality that vitiated the trial against him. It was held that this omission had resulted in material prejudice and a clear miscarriage of justice. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court in respect of the appellant. The Court acquitted the appellant of all charges against him and ordered his immediate release if not required in connection with any other case. However, the Court was careful to limit the scope of its decision. It explicitly stated that this judgment would not disturb the conviction of the other accused and should not be taken as confirmation of his conviction, leaving open the possibility of a separate appeal by him.
The Court's ruling underscores the necessity of giving accused persons a fair opportunity to explain all incriminating circumstances, failing which the very foundation of a fair trial may be compromised. By prioritizing the right of the accused to explain every incriminating circumstance, the Court has reaffirmed the foundational principles of natural justice and fair trial. The decision is likely to have far-reaching implications for the Indian criminal justice system.
[1] (2014) 1 SCC 648
The Supreme Court in a landmark decision involving an appeal filed by a foreign national prosecuted for offenses under Sections 8, 22, 23, and 29 of the NDPS Act, against bail conditions imposed by the High Court. This judgment addresses two critical issues pertaining to the legality of imposing a condition requiring the accused to "drop a PIN on Google Maps," and the necessity of obtaining a certificate of assurance from the relevant embassy or high commission for foreign nationals.
The case involved the interpretation of Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which allows courts to impose conditions while granting bail "in the interests of justice." The scope of this provision and the extent to which it allows curtailment of an accused's rights was a key issue. Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which places additional restrictions on granting bail in certain NDPS cases, was also relevant. The interplay between the NDPS Act's bail provisions and the general bail provisions in the CrPC needed to be considered. Article 21 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to life and personal liberty, was central to the appellant's arguments against the bail conditions. Previous Supreme Court judgments recognizing that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights were cited to argue that an accused on bail should have even greater protection of their Article 21 rights.
The Supreme Court delivered a detailed decision addressing the two main issues raised regarding the bail conditions imposed on Frank Vitus. Regarding the condition of dropping a PIN on Google Maps, the Court found this condition to be problematic and ultimately ordered its deletion. They reasoned that:
Imposing any bail condition that enables constant tracking of an accused's movements would violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Based on the affidavit submitted by Google LLC, the Court noted that dropping a PIN on Google Maps does not actually enable real-time tracking of a user or their device. The user has full control over sharing PINs, and the pinned location is static, not dynamic. Therefore, the condition as imposed was technically ineffective and redundant. The Court emphasized that bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary, or freakish. They should not be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. While courts may impose conditions like periodically reporting to police or seeking permission for international travel, they cannot impose conditions that allow constant surveillance of the accused's movements. The Court further stated that the object of bail conditions cannot be to keep constant vigil on the movements of the accused, as this would infringe on their right to privacy and effectively amount to a form of confinement even after release on bail.
Regarding the condition of furnishing a certificate from the Embassy/High Commission, the Court provided a nuanced interpretation of this condition, originally stemming from the 1994 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee case. The Court clarified that the directions in the 1994 case were meant as one-time measures for pending cases at that time. They were not intended to be mandatory in all future cases involving foreign nationals. It was held that it is not necessary to incorporate this condition in every case where bail is granted to a foreign national in an NDPS case on grounds of long incarceration. The need for such a condition should depend on the facts of each case. Further, the Court recognized that obtaining such a certificate is beyond the control of the accused. Therefore, if the Embassy/High Commission declines or fails to issue the certificate within a reasonable time (suggested as seven days), the Court has the power to dispense with this condition. Emphasis was placed on the point that an accused cannot be denied bail due to non-compliance with a condition that is impossible for them to fulfill. In cases where the certificate is not obtainable, the Court suggested alternative conditions like surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local police station or trial court.
The Court took the opportunity to lay down some broader guidelines on bail conditions:
a) Bail conditions must be within the framework of Section 437(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and consistent with the object of imposing conditions.
b) The constitutional rights of an accused released on bail can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required.
c) Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions, ensuring they do not violate fundamental rights or amount to a form of punishment.
d) The Court reiterated that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights, so accused persons who are presumed innocent should have even stronger protection of their rights.
Consequently, the Court noted that bail was granted to the appellant partly on merits, based on the inadmissibility of certain evidence as per Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1 Given this, the Court found no justification for imposing all the onerous conditions from the 1994 Legal Aid Committee case. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the deletion of both the Google Maps condition and the Embassy certificate condition from the appellant's bail order. They declined to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the 1994 judgment and instead provided a clarified interpretation of how those guidelines should be applied in current cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is particularly noteworthy as it intersects with contemporary concerns about digital privacy and the use of technology in law enforcement. By examining these issues through the lens of constitutional rights and established legal principles, the Court has set a precedent that is likely to have far-reaching implications for bail proceedings, especially those involving foreign nationals and technologically enabled surveillance. This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India offers a nuanced and progressive view on bail conditions, particularly for foreign nationals accused under the NDPS Act.
The present case deals with the complications during the renewal of passport due to the on account of pending legal proceedings. The facts of the instant case are such that, Sharath Chandrasekhar (Petitioner), a dual-qualified lawyer registered with the Bar Council of Karnataka and the New York State Bar was seeking the court’s intervention for the renewal of his passport, which was due to expire. The passport in question, was issued by the Regional Passport Office in Bengaluru and was valid until April 4, 2023. The Petitioner had applied for renewal six months before the expiry date, as per the standard procedure. During the police verification process, it was found that the Petitioner was involved in three legal proceedings; a matrimonial case initially filed in Bengaluru but transferred to Lucknow by the Supreme Court, a maintenance case filed by his wife under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and a case filed by his wife under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2012.
The court observed that the pending legal proceedings, particularly the matrimonial disputes, should not unduly prejudice the Petitioner’s right to have his passport renewed. The Court emphasized that the legal proceedings mentioned should not automatically serve as a bar to the renewal of the passport. The court referred to previous judgments stating that the right to travel abroad is a part of the fundamental right to personal liberty. Therefore, the Court held that any restriction on this right must be reasonable and proportionate to the purpose it seeks to achieve.
Directive for Discretion: The court directed the passport authorities to exercise their discretion judiciously while considering the Petitioner’s application for passport renewal. It instructed the authorities to take into account the nature of the legal proceedings, the Petitioner’s need to travel, and his track record of compliance with legal mandates.
The court concluded that the Petitioner’s involvement in legal proceedings, in itself, should not be the sole ground for denying the renewal of his passport. It mandated the passport authorities to consider the renewal application on its own merits and in accordance with the principles laid down by the court. The court’s observations and the subsequent directive reflect a balancing act between the state’s interest in regulating the issuance of passports and an individual’s right to freedom of movement. It stressed that while the state may have legitimate concerns regarding the flight risk of individuals involved in legal proceedings, these concerns must be balanced against the individual’s rights.
In the present case, two applications were presented before Hon’ble Bombay High Court to invoke the power of Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”) seeking a relief of quashing of an order dated 22/03/2022, passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court at Andheri, Mumbai, for committing the offences punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 (“IPC”).
Amongst the two applicants, one Applicant is Salman Khan (“Accused 1”) who is a well- known cine artist and is a part of the Indian film and entertainment industry and the other is his bodyguard (“Accused 2”). The complainant is the journalist who reported in D.N Nagar Police station that at around 4.40 p.m. on 24/04/2019, he noticed Accused 1 riding a bicycle and Accused 2 escorting him on bike. Being a journalist, he was tempted to ask Accused 2, whether he can video shoot Accused 1 and once consent was accorded, he started the recording. This, however, irked Accused 1 and at his indication, Accused 2 jumped on the car of the complainant and assaulted him. Even Accused 1 participated in the assault. A complaint was filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court at Andheri, Mumbai, seeking a direction under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., to hold a detailed inquiry into the incident and alternative relief, to issue process against the accused persons under Sections 324, 392, 426, 506(II) read with Section 34 of IPC, the learned Magistrate turned down the request for issuance of directions under Section 156(3). Instead, he directed the complainant to furnish verification statement under Section 200 and further directed an inquiry to be conducted under Section 202 by D.N. Nagar Police Station and submit the report.
The Bombay High Court observed that the allegations levelled against the accused persons in the complaint, apart from being an after thought, in no case met the necessary ingredients of Sections 504 and 506, which would have warranted the Magistrate to take cognizance upon a complaint. The essential ingredients so as to constitute an offence under Section 504 and 506 of IPC were laid out in the said case, making the said case a note-worthy precedent. Additionally, it was held that unless examination of the complainant was made under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate could not exercise the power under Sections 202, 203 or 204 and in this case, by surpassing the said procedure, the Magistrate had issued the process against the accused persons. Hence, the impugned order was set aside, since the said complaint had not been in compliance of Section 200 of Cr.P.C. and since no offence lied under Section 504 and 506 of IPC, the impugned order was quashed and set aside.
Supreme Court has Laid Down Detailed Guidelines on Requirements for Police Reports/Chargesheets under Section 173(2) CrPC
The Supreme Court in Dablu Kujur v. The State Of Jharkhand (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 197) has issued comprehensive guidelines specifying the mandatory requirements that police officers must comply with while submitting the police report/chargesheet under Section 173(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code after completing an investigation.
The instant case came to the Supreme Court through an appeal filed by the appellant-accused challenging the High Court's dismissal of his bail application in a murder case. The appellant-accused challenged the impugned judgment and order dated 17.01.2023 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, whereby the High Court dismissed his bail application in respect of FIR for offenses under Sections 302, 120-B/34 of IPC and Section 25(1-B) of the Arms Act. On 17.07.2023, a Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi passed an order observing that the chargesheet submitted by the police was bereft of details and particulars. The Court directed the Director General of Police (DGP), Jharkhand to examine whether the chargesheet complied with the law and take appropriate steps if such chargesheets were being filed. Similar directions were issued to the DGPs of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, as the Court was informed that similar chargesheets lacking details were being filed in these states as well. In compliance with the Supreme Court's order, affidavits were filed on behalf of the states of Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar regarding the steps taken/being taken for submitting chargesheets/police reports in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court deemed it necessary to elaborately deal with various aspects of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pertains to the police officer's report on the completion of the investigation.
The Supreme Court elaborately dealt with various aspects of Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which pertains to the police officer's report on the completion of the investigation. The Court observed that the police report is a crucial document that allows the accused to prepare a defense in front of the court. Hence, it is necessary for the investigating officer to strictly comply with the requirements of this provision. The Court noted that the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) is prescribed by the State Government, and each State has its own Police Manual to be followed by police officers. However, the mandatory requirements to be complied with by such officers in the police report/chargesheet are laid down in Section 173, particularly sub-section (2)
The Court highlighted that the police report submitted under Section 173(2) forms the basis for the competent court to take cognizance of the offense. It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court regarding an offense committed or not committed by the accused.
Considering the significance of compliance with Section 173(2), the Supreme Court issued the following guidelines for police officers submitting chargesheets/police reports. The police report shall contain:
(i) Prescribed details like names of parties, nature of information, acquainted persons, offense details, accused's custody status, etc.
(ii) If no sufficient evidence against the accused, a clear statement on compliance with Section 169 CrPC.
(iii) All documents/extracts as per Section 173(5) if Section 170 CrPC is applicable.
In addition to this, the court emphasized that Investigating officers must strictly comply with Section 173(2) requirements as the report forms the basis for the court to take cognizance. Further, Partial chargesheets and delayed submission of documents under 173(5) can be grounds for default bail claims.
This decision provides clear and extensive guidelines to ensure full compliance by investigating agencies with the statutory requirements for police reports under Section 173(2) CrPC. moreover, it also strengthens the position of the accused by realizing their right to be able to present his case and also to be eligible for default bail in case of Partial chargesheets submissions, delayed submission of documents under 173(5)
Supreme Court in Naeem v. State Of Uttar Pradesh [Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 169] Acquited Two in Murder Case and Upheld Conviction of Prime Accused Based on Dying Declaration.
The Court allowed the appeals of the two accused, acquitting them due to the lack of specific roles attributed to them in the dying declaration. However, the court upheld the conviction of the prime accused, relying solely on the cogent and reliable dying declaration of the deceased.
Facts that gave rise to the instant dispute were, On 1st December 2016, Shahin Parveen sustained severe burn injuries and gave a statement alleging that her brother-in-law Pappi @ Mashkoor (Accused No. 1), his wife Naeema (Accused No. 2), and Naeema's brother Naeem (Accused No. 3) had set her on fire. Shahin Parveen's dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) was recorded by Raj Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib Tehsildar, on the same day between 8:48 pm and 9:15 pm. In her dying declaration, Shahin Parveen stated that she had a dispute with Pappi @ Mashkoor over the partition of their shared residence. On the day of the incident, Pappi @ Mashkoor poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze, aided by Naeema and Naeem. Shahin Parveen succumbed to her injuries on 2nd December 2016 at Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi. Based on the dying declaration, the trial court convicted all three accused under Sections 302 (Punishment for murder) and 34 (act done in furtherance of the common intention) of the IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants preffrerd the present appeals.
Issue before the court in the instant appeals was whether the conviction based solely on the dying declaration is sustainable, and if so, whether the conviction of all three accused is tenable. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court, and the court is satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and the statement was not the result of tutoring, prompting, or imagination. The court found no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings that the dying declaration was true, free from any effort to induce a false statement, coherent, and consistent. Regarding the conviction of Accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, the court upheld the conviction based solely on the cogent, trustworthy, and reliable Dying declaration, which attributed the specific roles of pouring kerosene and setting the deceased ablaze to him. However, for Accused No. 2 Naeema and Accused No. 3 Naeem, the dying declaration only stated that they aided Pappi @ Mashkoor without specifying their roles. The court held that in the absence of any specific role attributed to them, they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals of Naeema and Naeem, acquitting them of all charges, while dismissing the appeal of Pappi @ Mashkoor, upholding his conviction and life sentence.
The High Court of Delhi, while dealing with a case titled Magnum Steels Ltd v. Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd held that the proceedings under SARFAESI Act and RDDB Act are complementary to each other and the proceedings for both can continue parallelly.
The court further opined that since the two proceedings are complimentary, the principle of election of remedies will not be applicable, and the secured creditor can enjoy both the remedies together.
The issue in the instant case arose when the Petitioner took a loan of Rs. 2,97,00,000/- from the Respondent-Bajaj Finance Limited, against a mortgage of secured asset. Later, the account of the petitioner was declared as Non Performing Asset (‘NPA’).
Thereafter, the respondent issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) seeking repayment of the alleged debt with interest, Section 19 of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘RDDB Act’) for the recovery of the amount and Section 14 of SARFAESI Act seeking appointment of receiver to take possession of the secured asset.
The Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) allowed the application of the respondent filed under Section 19 of RDDB Act and directed petitioner to pay the loan amount. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the order as well as the maintainability of the proceedings under both the Act together.
The High Court while deciding the issue, placed reliance on Supreme Court judgements including Transcore v. Union of India and Another (2008) 1 SCC 125, Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar and Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 610, M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Hero Fincorp Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 741.
The Court stated that in Transcore (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the application of provisions of RDDB Act and SARFAESI Act are complementary to each other.
In Mathew Varghese (supra) as well this issue was discussed and the Supreme Court held that a closer reading of the acts indicate that SARFAESI Act or the Rules framed thereunder will be in addition to the provisions of the RDDB Act.
Subsequently, in M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Pvt. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court, yet again reiterated that the RDDB Act and SARFAESI Act are thus, complementary to each other and hence no question of election of remedy can arise.
After holding that the SARFAESI Act and RDDB Act are complementary to each other, court further emphasized that there is no question of election of remedy hence the remedy under both the acts can be availed by the petitioners. Accordingly the court dismissed the petition.
As per a recent Supreme Court judgment when an accused is charged with food adulteration under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC"), and Food Safety and Standards Act FSSA, them the proceedings cannot continue under the IPC due to the overriding effect of Section 89 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 ("FSSA").
With this, SC overturned the judgment of the High Court, wherein it refused to dismiss the criminal charges against the accused. Court noted that simultaneous prosecution under the IPC and FSSA is not allowed. This is because Section 89 of the FSSA takes precedence over the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC.
The Supreme Court further stated that when the accused is charged with crimes under Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is also attracted.
The issue in the present case arose after a First Information Report was lodged by a food inspector against the petitioner alleging the commission of offences under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. The allegation was that, the appellant did not possess a licence to sell the commodity of mustard oil, but he continued to sell the same. Another allegation was that the petitioner had adulterated the mustard oil, edible oil and rice brine oil. The accused approached the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR, however, the High Court refused to quash the FIR, hence the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court.
The supreme court accepted the submissions made by the appellanta nd held that by virtue of Section 89 of the FSSA, Section 59 will override the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC.
Court further accepted that the title of FSSA suggests that the FSSA is meant to have a major impact on all laws related to food. However, in the main section, there is no specific limitation to only food-related laws. It states that the rules of the FSSA will still be valid even if they conflict with any other current law.
In light of the argument advanced by the contending parties, the Supreme Court quashed the pending criminal case against the appellant accused under IPC and gave the option to the concerned authorities to initiate proceedings against the appellant under FSSA for offences punishable under Section 59 of the FSSA.
The Supreme Court, in its ruling on April 10, 2024, emphasized the responsibility of each party to discharge the burden of proof specific to them. Regarding insurance contracts, it highlighted that the insurer bears the burden of proving any alleged non-disclosure of material facts, especially if fraudulent, rather than shifting this burden onto the insured or any other party.
…….the burden of proving a fact always lies upon the person who asserts the same. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom burden lies has been able to discharge his burden.
The court in the instant revision petition overturned the 2019 decision of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) and instructed the insurance company to honor the appellant, Mahakali Sujatha's claim under both policies. The amounts due, totaling Rs 7,50,000 and Rs 9,60,000 respectively, were to be paid with an interest rate of 7% per annum from the date of filing the complaint until fully settled.
The case involved insurance claims denied for the appellant's father following his death in a train accident in 2011. The deceased had two policies from Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Limited. The company alleged the deceased had withheld information about existing life insurance policies from other insurers, citing fifteen policies from various insurers besides theirs. However, the court found the evidence presented insufficient to validly reject the claim.
The court stressed the fundamental principles of burden and onus of proof, asserting that the burden rests on the party making the claim until adequately discharged. It criticized the NCDRC for accepting the insurer's claims without demanding substantial evidence and relying solely on a table indicating fifteen policies bought by the deceased.
No officer of any other insurance company was examined to corroborate the table of policies said to have been taken by the deceased policy holder, father of the appellant herein. Moreover, the table produced is incomplete and contradictory as far as the date of birth of the insured is concerned. Therefore, in our view, the NCDRC could not have relied upon the said tabulation and put the onus on the appellant to deal with that issue in her complaint and thereby considered the said averment as proved or proceeded to prove the stance of the opposite party.
Furthermore, the court deemed the insurer's repudiation of the policy unjustified, lacking a factual basis. It concluded that the insurer failed to sufficiently demonstrate fraudulent suppression of information about existing policies by the insured.
The court stated that any documentary evidence on which the respondent relies, should have been produced before the District Forum but it was not done. Further no oral or documentary evidence was produced by the respondents to prove their assertion. Their application to annex certain documents to support their claim before the state commission was also declined because of the unauthenticated nature of the documents. In the views of court, this all proves that the respondents have failed to adequately prove the fact that the insured-deceased had fraudulently suppressed the information about the existing policies with other insurance companies while entering into the insurance contracts with the respondents herein in the present case. Hence, the repudiation of the policy was without any basis or justification.
Referring to the legal principle of "Uberrimae fidei" governing insurance contracts, the court highlighted the reciprocal duty of full disclosure between both parties. It emphasized the importance of complete disclosure to enable informed decision-making and fair contract formation, cautioning against the suppression of material facts affecting the insured risk and decision-making process. However, not every question can be said to be material fact and the materiality of a fact has to be adjudged as per the rules stated in the aforementioned judgment.
Accordingly, the Court, while setting aside the order passed by the NCDRC, directed the Insurance Company to pay the insurance claim to the Nominee of the deceased insured person along with interest.
The Supreme Court in a recent case of Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., has held that for the application of Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) the presence of two or more groups or communities is necessary.
The issue in the present case arises when the complainant formed a trust, by the name Savara Foundation. He is the founder and also the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.
The complainant wanted a foundation stone laying ceremony of Matra Ashraya-A collection museum to be done by the Hon’ble Chief Minister of Uttarakhand.
However, the appellant published a news article in the e-newspaper, wherein it was stated that the proposed to be laid was Government land which had been unlawfully occupied/encroached upon by the complainant. As per the complainant even the invitation was published in the defamatory way with the intent and knowledge that the same would irreparably tarnish the reputation of the complainant and his standing in the public domain. The complainant asserted that the sole objective of the publication was to incite breach of peace.
Lack of proper research and fact-finding exercise has resulted into this inappropriate information by which the accused has caused serious damage to the goodwill, reputation and standing of the complainant in the society. Hence, the complainant invoked Sections 153A, 500, 501, 504 read with Sections 34 and 120B IPC. When the appellant came to know about the same, he filed a Criminal Writ Petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand claiming to be completely innocent and taking a plea that the allegations made under Section 153A of the IPC did not disclose commission of any cognizable offence.
The High Court proceeded to dismiss the criminal writ petition filed by the appellant. Thereafter, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court which was later allowed. After hearing the rival contention of the parties, the Supreme court bench was of the believe that as per the language of Section 153A IPC, in order to constitute such offence, the prosecution must must prove that the words ‘spoken’ or ‘written’, created enmity or bad blood between different groups on the ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., or that the acts so alleged were prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony.
Thereafter, upon careful perusal of the offending news article, the court found no reference to any group or groups of people. Rather the essence of the publication was found on imputing that the respondent had encroached upon public land where the foundation stone laying ceremony was proposed. Court could not find the words to have any connection whatsoever with a group or groups of people or communities. Hence, it held that the foundational facts essential to constitute the offence under Section 153A IPC are totally lacking from the allegations.
Court placed reliance on Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (2007) 5 SCC 1, wherein it was held that for the application of Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential, whereas in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article.
As far as Section 504 IPC is concerned. Court further rejected the invocation of the same stating that the said offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. There is no such allegation made by the complainant thatowing to the alleged offensive post he was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence.
Accordingly, the other allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC were also held to be non est.
Placing reliance on the State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Court held that allowing the continuance of the proceedings against the appellant will result in gross abuse of the process of lawfue to the fact that the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients for any cognizable offence. The appeal is allowed accordingly and the pending criminal case against the appellant was quashed.