The Supreme Court of India has delivered a significant judgment reinforcing the doctrine of judicial restraint in matters involving complex technical contracts, particularly when courts exercise their powers of judicial review. This ruling resulted from a dispute between Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) and competing bidders, specifically concerning the construction of the 5x800 MW Yadadri Thermal Power Station.
The bench after careful consideration of the facts, issues involved and the competing arguments of the parties held that courts must exercise considerable restraint when reviewing commercial contracts involving complex technical issues, even when the parties involved include a 'State' entity under Article 12 of the Constitution. The bench observed that while the high courts possess writ jurisdiction under Article 226, their role in commercial disputes should be confined to evaluating the decision-making process, particularly for signs of arbitrariness, mala fides, or procedural impropriety, rather than engaging in technical assessments themselves.
The dispute arose when BHEL, acting under a contract from the Telangana State Power Generation Corporation Limited (TSPGCL) to establish the 5x800 MW Yadadri Thermal Power Station, awarded a subcontract to BTL EPC Ltd (the appellant) for the construction of an Ash Handling Plant. The appellant, BTL EPC Ltd, was issued a Letter of Intent (LoI) for a contract valued at Rs. 378.64 crores on September 29, 2022. The rival bidder, Macawber Beekay Pvt Ltd (MBP Ltd), challenged this award on the grounds that the appellant's collaboration with a Chinese company, Fujian Longking Company Ltd, violated a July 2020 Ministry of Finance order concerning bidders from countries sharing land borders with India. This order, issued under Rule 144(xi) of the General Financial Rules 2017, mandates the registration of such bidders with the Competent Authority before participating in government tenders.
The Karnataka High Court, Division Bench, had earlier quashed the LoI awarded to the appellant and directed BHEL to reconsider the bid submitted by MBP Ltd. The High Court held that the consortium agreement between BTL EPC Ltd and Fujian Longking constituted a violation of the Finance Ministry's 2020 procurement order, as the Chinese entity had not been registered with the Competent Authority, which is mandatory for entities from countries sharing land borders with India.
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the High Court’s decision, pointing out several critical factors. The appellant argued that its bid was submitted as a standalone entity, and the Chinese company’s involvement was limited to a service agreement, not a consortium arrangement as defined under clause 7.2 of the pre-qualification requirements. Clause 7.2 mandates that a consortium agreement must involve equity participation by the members of the consortium, with at least 51% of the ownership stake held by one member acting as the lead. The Supreme Court observed that the Chinese company, in this case, had no such equity stake and was only providing technical design support, making the agreement a service arrangement rather than a joint bidding consortium.
The Court emphasized that the Public Procurement Order dated July 23, 2020, was later clarified by an Office Memorandum (OM) issued on February 8, 2021, which stated that the registration requirement for entities from countries sharing land borders with India did not apply to the procurement of services but only to goods and turnkey contracts. Since the Chinese company's role in the project was confined to providing technical support services, and no goods were being procured from it, the registration requirement under the original order did not apply.
The Court reiterated that BHEL, as the tender-inviting authority, is best placed to interpret its own tender conditions and assess whether bidders meet the technical and commercial criteria. In this case, BHEL and TSPGCL had both determined that the appellant’s agreement with the Chinese company was not a violation of the 2020 order and did not constitute a consortium requiring registration. The Supreme Court stressed that judicial intervention should not replace the discretion and technical judgment of tender authorities, especially when no evidence of mala fides or bias is presented.
MBP Ltd offered to match the appellant’s lower bid, but the Supreme Court found that allowing this substitution at an advanced stage of the project would lead to substantial delays and increased costs. BHEL argued that replacing the contractor would necessitate the redesign of the entire project, which was design-intensive, thereby imposing significant additional expenses on the public exchequer. The Court took note of the progress already made, stating that over 80% of the civil work and 72% of the structural work had already been completed, and further delays would be contrary to the public interest.
The Supreme Court established several important principles concerning judicial intervention in technical and commercial contracts. It noted that the Courts should defer to the technical expertise of tender-inviting authorities, which are best placed to assess whether bidders meet the requirements outlined in tender documents. Courts should not act as appellate authorities in such cases. The Court reiterated that judicial review in contractual matters should focus on examining the decision-making process for arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrationality, rather than re-evaluating the merits of technical qualifications. Even in writ appeals, Division Benches should exercise restraint and only interfere with Single Judge rulings when there is clear evidence of perversity or error. The Court highlighted that judicial interference should be avoided where it would result in significant financial loss to the public exchequer or cause delays in projects of national importance.
The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Judge’s decision, emphasizing the principle of judicial restraint in matters involving complex technical contracts. This ruling has broad implications for future cases involving public procurement and technical contracts, especially those involving State entities, reaffirming that courts should not overstep into technical domains unless there is clear evidence of procedural violations.
The Supreme Court has recently upheld the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1962 which bars private entities from obtaining licenses for working on nuclear energy in Sandeep TS v. Union of India Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s).564/2024. The Court was of the belief that these provisions serve a "salutary public purpose" that ensures nuclear energy is used only for peaceful purposes under stringent government control.
The Petitioner challenged the ban imposed on private entities seeking licenses for nuclear energy purposes under the Atomic Energy Act, of 1962. The court's judgment not only affirmed the legal validity of this restriction but also shed light on the broader implications for India’s nuclear energy policies, and the delicate balance between innovation and security. The court also highlighted the role of governmental control in critical sectors like atomic energy.
The petitioner who is an Indian physicist residing in the United States, developed a technological innovation designed to trigger nuclear fission with minimal radioactive waste, positioning it as an advanced alternative to traditional nuclear fusion reactors. His invention involved producing clean energy, which is a priority for global energy sustainability efforts. However, under Section 14 of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, private entities are prohibited from obtaining a license to work in nuclear energy production or engage in atomic energy-related activities. This provision restricts such licenses only to the Department of the Central Government, government corporations, or government-controlled entities.
The petitioner argued that his technology could significantly contribute to India's clean energy goals. He further argued that the statutory restrictions under the Atomic Energy Act were unjustly prohibitive. They deny him the opportunity to innovate and contribute to the sector. Based on this he sought relief under Article 32 of the Constitution which guarantees enforcement of fundamental rights by the Apex Court.
The primary issue before the court was to determine whether the statutory limitations were necessary to uphold national security and public welfare or if they represented an unjust infringement on individual rights and entrepreneurship.
The petitioner argued that there is a need to strike a balance between state control and private-sector innovation. He argued that the government’s tight control over nuclear energy licensing, as outlined in Section 14 of the Atomic Energy Act, prevented potential innovators like him from contributing to the clean energy transition. His technology was designed to produce cleaner energy with minimal radioactive byproducts compared to traditional methods.
The court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act, of 1962 and dismissed the petitioner’s plea for license authorization.
As far as Section 14 of the Act is considered, it empowers the Central Government to prohibit certain activities related to mines, minerals, and substances unless a license is granted. Prohibited activities are those for which a license is not provided. These include the working of any mine or minerals, being a mine or minerals from which in the opinion of the Central Government any of the prescribed substances can be obtained or the acquisition, production, possession, use, disposal, export or import of Prescribed substances, Specific minerals or substances that can yield prescribed substances, Plants designed for atomic energy production, development, use, or related research, Prescribed equipment.
Licenses for plants related to atomic energy can only be granted to any Departments of the Central Government, Authorities, institutions, or corporations established by the Central Government or Government companies.
This regulation aims to control and restrict activities related to nuclear materials and technology, ensuring that only authorized entities can engage in these sensitive areas. The government maintains strict oversight to prevent misuse and ensure safety and security in the nuclear sector.
At the same time the government is empowered to allow the use for the working of any mine or minerals specified in the order, being a mine or minerals from which in the opinion of the Central Government any of the prescribed substances can be obtained- the acquisition, production, possession, use, disposal, export or import (a) of any of the prescribed substances; or (b) of any minerals or other substances specified in the rules, from which in the opinion of the Central Government any of the prescribed substances can be obtained; or (c) of any plant designed or adopted or manufactured for the production, development, and use of atomic energy or for research into matters connected therewith; or (d) of any prescribed equipment.
The court observed that the restrictions under Section 14 of the Act are not arbitrary. Instead, they serve a critical public function by ensuring that the use of atomic energy is confined to peaceful purposes and remains under the strict control of the state. The title of the Act explicitly outlines that the regulation is in place for the “development, control, and use of atomic energy for the welfare of the people of India” and for other peaceful purposes, emphasizing the importance of stringent safeguards.
The court highlighted the calibrated approach envisaged by the Act, wherein nuclear power can only be exploited under state supervision due to the immense potential for misuse and accidents. Therefore, the prohibition on private licensing was justified as a preventive measure to avoid any potential security risks or environmental disasters. The Court concluded that the petitioner’s fundamental rights were not violated by the provisions of the Act, and hence, the petition did not warrant further consideration under Article 32.
The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed the state's tight control over nuclear energy, which remains a heavily regulated sector in India. While the decision aligns with the global practices of many countries that impose restrictions on nuclear technology, it raises important questions regarding the future role of innovation and private enterprise in the nuclear space.
Countries like France, Russia, and China have long maintained state monopolies over their nuclear energy sectors, with private participation limited to auxiliary roles or heavily regulated collaborations. The risks of nuclear proliferation, accidents, or even potential misuse necessitate state control over atomic energy. However, a public-private partnership in research and innovation in the future could stimulate the sector, provided there is sufficient governmental oversight to prevent any misuse.
The Gauhati High Court ruled GST Notification No. 56/2023 ultra vires due to the absence of a GST Council recommendation and lack of force majeure grounds. This decision is a crucial precedent for taxpayers impacted by extended timelines under invalid notifications.
White and Brief’s Comment:
The judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory procedures under Section 168A of the CGST Act, offering potential relief for affected businesses.
The Indian Government has consistently prioritized renewable energy in its national agenda, aiming to transition towards a more sustainable and resilient energy framework. In the pursuit of becoming a green energy giant, the Government sought to achieve an installed renewable energy capacity of 500 GW by 2030 as per the data of the Ministry of Power.
With an allocation of INR 19,100 crore, the Union Budget 2024 (“Budget”) underscores the Government's commitment to the development of the renewable energy sector, which remains crucial to India’s Sustainable Development Goal (“SDGs”) of becoming a net-zero economy by 2070. For instance, in the Interim Budget, presented in February 2024, Finance Mister Nirmala Sitharaman provided a small but much-needed boost to green energy via the announcement of the PM-Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana which aims to incentivize citizens to install solar rooftops in households. This scheme also covers viability gap funding for harnessing offshore wind energy potential with an initial capacity of one gigawatt.
The aim is to hereby analyze the practicality of the ambitious targets set-forth by the Budget vis-à-vis the renewable energy sector of India.
One of the key highlights of the Budget has been the introduction of Pumped Storage Projects. In order to address the stagnation of renewable energy sources, the Budget proposed, “pumped hydro storage” as an effective solution that enables continuous generation of power. As a result, this project will help in meeting the peak energy demand and will support the growing renewable energy infrastructure.
Further, the Budget smartly recognized the potential of small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) as a clean energy source. For this purpose, collaboration with the private sector to develop Bharat Small Reactors is a forward-looking initiative that could diversify India's energy mix and support the production of green hydrogen.
The Budget moreover introduced a new climate finance taxonomy aimed at facilitating access to preferential financing for green projects. This can mitigate the risks of greenwashing and attract international climate investments.
Lastly, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy has been allocated Rs 19,100 crore, an increase of 143% over the revised estimate for 2023-24. This boost is primarily due to the introduction of the PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana (PM-SGMBY), which aims to increase the penetration of rooftop solar (RTS) installations.
Despite the significant increase in funding, challenges persist. Firstly, in the RTS sector. These include delays in subsidy disbursement, issues with net-metering regulations, and the financial health of power distribution companies (DISCOMS). The Budget has been silent on any further specific initiatives for RTS (apart from PM-SGMBY). This raises concerns about future challenges and their redressal.
Secondly, although the budget has unlocked the potential of this sector in many ways, there have been certain missed opportunities. For example, despite its potential, the bioenergy sector did not receive significant attention in this year’s Budget. The Government had previously laid the groundwork for expanding the use of Compressed Biogas (CBG) with an ambitious target of 750 CBG projects by 2028–29. However, the Union Budget 2024-25 did not introduce any significant new measures for bioenergy. This raises concerns among the industry stakeholders about the sector's future growth.
Thirdly, another notable missed opportunity is the lack of support for bio-slurry, a by-product of CBG production, which could enhance the economic viability of bioenergy projects. The Budget did not address the need for biomass banks as well, which are essential for ensuring a year-round supply of feedstock. The absence of these measures may cause the bioenergy sector to face challenges in achieving its full potential.
India's dependence on imported critical minerals, essential for renewable energy technologies, has been a concerning issue. The Budget's announcement of an exemption from Basic Customs Duty (BCD) on imports of 25 critical minerals is a strategic move to secure these vital resources. However, this measure alone may not be sufficient to address the broader challenges of developing a self-reliant supply chain for critical minerals.
The wind energy sector, despite its potential, did not receive the boost that many industry stakeholders had hoped for in this budget, which the sector deserves. There were no new allocations or capacity additions announced, leaving the sector in a state of uncertainty. This is particularly concerning because of the challenges the sector has faced, including policy inconsistencies and aging infrastructure. The budget allocations could have been utilized for investment in repowering older wind turbines, more efficient models that could significantly increase energy production. However, the lack of supportive policies and the existing constraints from state utilities like TANGEDCO continue to hinder progress.
We import over 80% of oil needs, making it vulnerable to global price fluctuations and geopolitical tensions. India's solar capacity growth to 85 GW in 2023 has already started reducing our dependence on fossil fuel imports. It is also useful because of its Economic Competitiveness. As per December 2020 data, Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam's (GUVNL) (Phase XI) auction for 500 MW of solar projects made a record for the lowest tariff of ₹1.99 (~USD0.025)/kWh. This sector holds the capability of addressing unique challenges including water crisis since
Thermal power plants require significant water resources. Maharashtra's push for solar power is partly driven by recurring droughts affecting thermal power generation capacity. Global investors are increasingly prioritizing Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) factors. This makes it pertinent that the future is renewable energy and India must make efforts now to compete with the world in the future. The budget was “A Mixed Bag with Potential” that addressed various issues but failed to recognize several fruitful regimes. We saw significant allocations to solar energy, critical minerals, and energy storage solutions. However, the lack of targeted support for sectors like bioenergy and wind energy left the sector vulnerable in various aspects. This may have an effect on the overall coherence of the renewable energy strategy.
Regardless of the missed opportunities, the measures outlined in this Budget will play a crucial role in shaping the country's energy landscape. However, to fully realize this vision, the Government will need to address the gaps identified in this Budget and ensure that all segments of the renewable energy sector receive the support they need to thrive. While the exemption is a welcome step for the short term, in the long term, we must focus on becoming self-sufficient as the dependency on imports cannot be a solution forever. For this, the Government needs to complement the importing capacity with increased investments in domestic research and development, as well as initiatives to recycle and reuse materials from end-of-life products. Establishing a robust recycling ecosystem could not only reduce India's dependence on imports but also create significant job opportunities. This way it will lead to multiplier effects.
53rd GST Council meeting recommended an amendment to Rule 142 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Rules. This amendment introduces a mechanism for adjusting amounts paid towards a demand through Form GST DRC-03 against the pre-deposit amount required for filing an appeal.
Under GST, appellants must pay 100% of admitted tax and a percentage of disputed tax as pre-deposit when filing appeals. This is typically done at the time of filing of Form GST APL-01 on the GST portal. Issues arise when taxpayers make payments during audits or face technical problems with APL-01 hence making them resort to Form GST DRC-03. Earlier the CBIC has clarified in CBIC-240137/14/2022-Service Tax Section-CBIC, dated 28.10.2022 that pre-deposits are neither duty nor arrears, and that DRC-03 is not a valid form for making pre-deposits. Later, vide CBIC-240137/14/2022-Service Tax Section-CBEC dated 18.04.2023 it was clarified that aforementioned restriction was exclusively intended for the cases of appeals belonging to the Central Excise/Service Tax only and not for appeals under GST. The Courts have also been addressing cases where appeals were rejected due to payment of pre-deposit made through Form GST DRC-03 in the case of technical error on the portal (Manjunatha Oil Mill v. Assistant Commissioner (ST) (FAC) [2024] 159 taxmann.com 514). These situations underscored the need for clearer guidelines and flexibility in the appeal process to address genuine technical challenges.
Rule 142 of the CGST Rules outlines the process for issuing demand notices and recovering dues from taxpayers. Form GST DRC-03 is used by taxpayers to voluntarily make payments towards tax, interest, penalty, and other amounts before or after the issuance of a show-cause notice. There is no provision for adjusting amounts paid through Form GST DRC-03 against the pre-deposit required for filing an appeal. This often leads to duplication of payments and financial strain on taxpayers.
The recommended amendment to Rule 142 and the issuance of a circular aim to address this issue by prescribing a mechanism for such adjustments. Accordingly, vide the Circular No. 224/18/2024 - GST dated 11.07.2024, a new mechanism is provided. Notification No. 12/2024- CT dated 10.07.2024, vide which sub-rule (2B) of Rule 142 and Form GST DRC-03A have been inserted to the CGST Rules, provides mechanism for cases where an assessee to pay tax, interest and penalty under relevant provisions (Section 52, 73, 74, 76, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, 130 of CGST Act) inadvertently through Form GST DRC-03 under sub-rule (2) of Rule 142.
Such assessee will have to file an application in Form GST DRC-03A, electronically on the GST portal, and the amount so paid and intimated through the Form GST DRC-03 will be adjusted as if the said payment was made towards the said demand on the date of such intimation through Form GST DRC-03. The amount so paid shall also be liable to be adjusted towards the amount required to be paid as pre-deposit under Section 107 and Section 112 of the CGST Act, if and when the taxpayer files an appeal against the said demand, before the appellate authority or the appellate tribunal, and the remaining amount of confirmed demand as per the order of the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be, will stand stayed as per Section 107 (6) and Section 112 (9) of CGST Act.
As the abovementioned functionality for filing of an application in Form GST DRC-03A, is currently unavailable on the GST portal, the assesses will have to intimate the proper officer about the same, and on such intimation, the proper officer shall not pursue any recovery till the time the said functionality of Form GST DRC-03A is made available on the GST portal.
Once the functionality of Form GST DRC-03A is made available on the GST portal, the assessee will have to file the application in Form GST DRC-03A, on the portal at the earliest, and on doing so, the amount paid vide Form GST DRC-03 will be adjusted against the pre-deposit under section 107 or section 112 of the CGST Act.
The recommendation to amend Rule 142 of the CGST Rules and introduce a mechanism for adjusting payments made through Form GST DRC-03 against pre-deposit amounts for appeals is a progressive step towards refining the GST framework. The amendment specifically addresses and provides a mechanism for adjusting amounts paid through Form GST DRC-03 against the pre-deposit required for filing an appeal. Therefore, taxpayers who have not utilized Form GST DRC-03 to make such payments will not benefit from this adjustment mechanism. They will need to follow the standard procedures and use the prescribed forms, such as Form GST APL-01, for making pre-deposits.
In a significant move to address the long-standing demands of the real estate sector, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, during its 53rd meeting, announced the exemption of statutory collections made by the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) from GST.[1] This exemption, which aligns with entry 4 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated June 28, 2017, is expected to have far-reaching implications for real estate developers, agents, homebuyers, and the broader regulatory framework. The decision to exempt RERA collections has been in demand for a long time. Stakeholders in real estate were often served notices for payment of GST on statutory levies, which they argue should not attract GST. For example, the indirect tax department has demanded GST on license fees paid by companies for government schemes such as Advance Authorization and Export Promotion for Capital Goods (EPCG).[2] They contend that this increases the financial burden on the already stressed real estate sector. There was ambiguity regarding GST on statutory fees collected by RERA, prompting frequent requests for clarification and relaxation. The recent GST exemption for RERA collections might set a precedent for other sectors and regulatory authorities to seek similar exemptions, as other statutory levies, such as license fees for telecom spectrum, and mining activities remain subject to GST.
Entry 4 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) provides an exemption to services provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory, or local authority where the consideration for such services does not exceed Rs. 5,000. RERA, established under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, collects various fees and charges from real estate developers and agents. These collections, being statutory in nature, are mandated by law and do not constitute commercial transactions.
The GST Council's decision to exempt RERA's statutory collections underscores RERA's role as a regulatory body rather than a commercial entity. This aligns with the broader intent of the GST framework to exclude statutory payments from the GST purview, thereby preventing additional tax burdens on regulated entities.
In the exercise of the powers conferred under section 168(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and on the recommendations of the 53rd GST Council in its meeting held on 22nd
June 2024, the Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue issued clarifications. The ministry clarified that RERA, established under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, of 2016, performs regulatory functions for real estate development and construction. RERA is classified as a 'governmental authority' and falls under the exemption scope of entry at Sl. No. 4 of notification No. 12/2017-CT(R) dated 28.06.2017. Thus, as recommended by the 53rd GST Council, it is hereby clarified that statutory collections made by RERA are covered under the Sl. No. 4 of notification No. 12/2017-CT(R) dated 28.06.2017.
The GST exemption on statutory collections made by RERA, as announced in the 53rd GST Council Meeting, represents a significant development for the real estate sector. It reduces the compliance burden on developers, encourages regulatory compliance, and promotes a more transparent and accountable industry. Homebuyers stand to benefit from potential cost savings and a more robust regulatory environment. While the decision is a positive step, careful implementation and monitoring are essential to fully realize its intended benefits. The GST Council's move aligns with the broader goal of fostering a transparent and efficient real estate sector, ultimately contributing to the industry's growth and development. This decision paves the way for exemption to other institutions performing statutory functions. It might also set a precedent for other sectors and regulatory authorities to seek similar exemptions, and other statutory levies, such as license fees for telecom spectrum, and mining activities which still remain subject to GST.
The Apex Court in the present case marks a significant milestone in the interpretation of consumer rights, particularly in the context of insurance disputes involving corporate entities. This case brings the questions about the scope of consumer protection laws, the rights of corporate policyholders, and the procedural fairness in insurance claim settlements. The Supreme Court's decision clarifies the applicability of consumer protection laws to companies and underscores the importance of transparency and fairness in the insurance claim process.
The Court first addressed the preliminary objections raised by the insurer-respondent regarding the maintainability of the complaint before the National Commission. These objections were: that a 'company' is not covered within the definition of 'person' under Section 2(1)(m) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, and, that the insured-appellant, having taken the policy for commercial purposes, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the National Commission.
Regarding the first objection, the Court held that the definition of 'person' in the Act of 1986 is inclusive and not exhaustive. Emphasizing that the Consumer Protection Act is beneficial legislation requiring liberal interpretation, the Court noted that the inclusion of 'body corporate' in the definition of 'person' in the 2019 Act indicates that the legislature recognized and rectified an incongruity in the earlier provision. Thus, the Court rejected the argument that a company was not covered under the 1986 Act's definition of 'person'.
As for the second objection concerning commercial purposes, the Court relied on Shrikant G. Mantri v. Punjab National Bank and National Insurance Company v. Harsolia Motors and Ors. The Court observed that, unlike those cases which dealt with insurance policies taken for straightforward commercial purposes, the policy in question was specifically a 'Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy (Material Damage)' covering only the risk of fire and related perils. The claim was filed to indemnify losses from a fire accident at the insured premises, not for general commercial activities. Consequently, the Court rejected both preliminary objections raised by the insurer-respondent.
Moving to the merits of the case, the Court focused on a crucial point raised by the insured-appellant in their appeal. The appellant contended that they were not provided timely copies of the surveyor's report and the investigators' reports, thus depriving them of a proper opportunity to rebut these findings. The Court noted that this allegation was not specifically refuted by the insurer-respondent in their counter-affidavit, with only a formal denial offered. Hence, the Court determined that the ends of justice required the insured-appellant to have a proper opportunity to file rebuttal or objections to the affidavits and reports submitted by the insurer-respondent before the National Commission. The Court felt that the complaint should be reconsidered on its merits after providing such an opportunity to the appellant.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order issued by the National Commission. The Court remitted the matter back to the National Commission with specific directions. It ordered that the appellant should be permitted to file a rebuttal or rejoinder affidavit before the National Commission, limited to the contents of the reports in question. Following this, the National Commission was directed to rehear the matter and decide it afresh on its merits.
The Supreme Court's decision focused on ensuring procedural fairness and a comprehensive examination of all relevant evidence. By allowing the appellant to respond to crucial reports that they claim were not previously available to them, the Court aimed to facilitate a more thorough and equitable consideration of the case. The beneficiaries of this judgment, ‘companies’ can indeed be considered 'persons' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. This broadens the avenue for businesses to seek redressal through consumer forums, potentially leading to more efficient resolution of disputes. Earlier in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das 4 SCC 225, the Supreme Court held that a company, as an entity, could file a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act if it falls within the definition of a "consumer" under the Act. The Court emphasized that the services availed by the company must be for a purpose that is not linked to its commercial activities. In Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute 3 SCC 583, the Supreme Court clarified that a corporate entity can be a "consumer" if the goods or services are not purchased for resale or for any commercial purpose. It was held that services availed for commercial purposes are excluded from the purview of the Act unless they are used exclusively for the purposes of earning livelihood by means of self-employment.
The NDA's tenure since 2014 has seen significant economic reforms.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗹𝗶𝘀𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗶 𝟯.𝟬 𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝗱𝗲𝘀:
𝗖𝗮𝗽𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲: Focus on infrastructure investment to stimulate economic growth.
𝗙𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆: Long-term fiscal policy with transparency and consistency.
𝗗𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁: Boosting rural demand, private sector investment, and employment growth.
𝗗𝗲𝗯𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁: Prioritizing debt indicators over deficit indicators.
𝗧𝗮𝘅 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝘀: Broadening the tax base and overhauling tax structures.
𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺: Rationalizing subsidies and streamlining public expenditure.
Together, these initiatives aim to promote efficient, fair, and accountable practices across public procurement, litigation, and economic policy, driving India towards sustainable growth and fiscal stability.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7209789714432745475
Introducing the National Litigation Policy 2024, recently approved by the Union Law Minister, and a key part of the BJP’s 2024 Lok Sabha election manifesto. This policy aims to address the 𝗵𝗶𝗴𝗵 𝘃𝗼𝗹𝘂𝗺𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗼 𝗮𝗻 𝗲𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁.
𝗖𝘂𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼: The government is responsible for 73% of Supreme Court cases, with approximately 50 million cases pending.
𝗢𝗯𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲𝘀: Transform the government into an efficient and responsible litigant.
𝗘𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗟𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀: Competent legal representation, focus on core issues, cohesive management, and prioritization of good cases.
𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗟𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀: Avoids false pleas, presents correct facts, does not conceal information, and prioritizes welfare legislation.
𝗦𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲: Aims to reduce government litigation in courts, supporting the National Mission for Justice Delivery & Legal Reforms.
Let's work together to promote efficient, fair, and responsible litigation practices.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7209454448727760897
Crucial update from the Delhi High Court regarding disability reservation in nursing education, emphasizing inclusivity and equal opportunities.
𝗕𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱:
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 mandates equal opportunities in education and employment, requiring educational institutions to reserve seats for students with disabilities.
𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘁 𝗢𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿:
The Indian Nursing Council (INC) is directed to consider representations for disability reservation.
Current policies must be evaluated in light of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, with potential amendments to ensure inclusivity.
𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗘𝗱𝘂𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻:
Promotion of inclusivity and equal opportunities in nursing programs.
Increased accessibility for students with disabilities, emphasizing diversity and an equitable healthcare workforce.
𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗹:
Review and amend current policies to align with the court directive.
Ensure admission processes accommodate students with disabilities, improving access to nursing education.
𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗢𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘀:
Improved representation of persons with disabilities in the nursing profession.
Enhanced inclusivity and support within nursing education, positively impacting the healthcare sector with a diverse workforce.
This directive underscores the importance of adapting educational policies for inclusivity and the role of the INC in fostering a diverse and equitable healthcare environment.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205949332997443585
Supreme Court's decision to set aside India's first EVM-based election, focusing on legal, technical, and trust issues.
𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗙𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗲𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗠𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴: The Representation of the People Act, 1951, did not authorize the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), rendering the election procedurally invalid without the necessary legal backing.
𝗥𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗿𝗻𝘀: Questions about the reliability and accuracy of EVMs were raised, highlighting the need for thorough testing and validation.
𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗗𝗲𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝘁: There was a significant lack of transparency and trust among voters and political parties, emphasizing the need for clear guidelines and regulations to ensure electoral integrity.
The election was declared invalid, underscoring the necessity for a robust legal framework and safeguards when implementing new technologies in elections.
Post-decision, amendments to the Representation of the People Act were made to include EVMs, ensuring reliability and transparency through extensive trials and improvements.
𝗘𝗻𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗮𝗶𝗿 𝗘𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀:
The importance of legal and procedural robustness in electoral processes was highlighted, with a focus on legal, technical, and trust safeguards.
Implementing technological advancements in elections must prioritize reliability and public confidence to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.
This landmark decision by the Supreme Court reinforces the need for a comprehensive legal framework and transparent procedures to uphold the fairness and trustworthiness of elections.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205931391375597568
Comprehensive update on the Supreme Court's critical role in shaping deportation laws in India.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟰𝟲: Regulates entry and departure of foreigners.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟲𝟳: Governs issuance and revocation of passports, impacting deportation.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝗶𝘇𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟱𝟱: Defines conditions for acquiring or losing Indian citizenship.
𝗦𝗮𝗿𝗯𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗮 𝗦𝗼𝗻𝗼𝘄𝗮𝗹 𝘃. 𝗨𝗻𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮 (𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟱): Emphasizes national security and constitutionality of the Illegal Migrants Act, with the burden of proof on individuals.
𝗛𝗮𝗻𝘀 𝗠𝘂𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗴 𝘃. 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗝𝗮𝗶𝗹 (𝟭𝟵𝟱𝟱): Establishes that deportation is not punishment and the government has inherent power to deport.
𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗔𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗹 𝗣𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗲𝘀𝗵 𝘃. 𝗞𝗵𝘂𝗱𝗶𝗿𝗮𝗺 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗸𝗺𝗮 (𝟭𝟵𝟵𝟰): Prohibits arbitrary deportation without due process, considering humanitarian concerns for long-term residents and refugees.
𝗗𝘂𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗟𝗮𝘄: Ensures fair opportunity to present the case and decisions made according to legal procedures.
𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗴𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆: Prioritizes national security in deportation matters.
𝗛𝘂𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: Balances approach for long-term residents and refugees.
𝗕𝘂𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗳: Requires individuals to prove their legal status.
𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗜𝗺𝗺𝗶𝗴𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆:
𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗴𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝗲𝗱𝘂𝗿𝗲𝘀: Advocates for transparent and fair deportation decisions.
𝗕𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗛𝘂𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗿𝗻𝘀: Promotes effective and compassionate immigration policies.
𝗖𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗕𝘂𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗳: Emphasizes robust documentation and verification processes.
The Supreme Court's balanced approach ensures the protection of national security while upholding due process and humanitarian considerations, serving as a guiding force for effective immigration policy formulation and implementation.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205917004912877570
𝗡𝗼 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 & 𝗣𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀: Waived for tax demands (April 2017 – March 2020) if paid by 31 March 2025.
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝗧𝗖 𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲: Until 30 November 2021 for ITC related to April 2017 – March 2021.
𝗔𝗽𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗟𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘀: INR 20 Lakhs for GST Tribunal, INR 1 Crore for High Court, and INR 2 Crores for Supreme Court.
𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗚𝗦𝗧𝗥-𝟭: Can amend before filing GSTR-3B.
𝗘-𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗳: Reduced TCS from 1% to 0.5%.
No Interest on Late Tax Payments: If paid by due date from Electronic Cash Ledger.
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗙𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗲: For Composition Dealers to 30 June.
𝗡𝗼 𝗜𝗧𝗖 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝘂𝗻𝗱: For goods exported with export duty.
𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗕𝟮𝗖 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴: Threshold reduced to INR 1,00,000.
𝗨𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝟱% 𝗜𝗚𝗦𝗧: On parts for aircraft MRO services.
𝟭𝟮% 𝗚𝗦𝗧: For items like milk cans, carton boxes, sprinklers, and solar cookers.
𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 𝗘𝘅𝗲𝗺𝗽𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: For hostel accommodations and certain railway services.
𝗣𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗽𝗹𝘆 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗖𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲𝘀: Location of the recipient for FPIs.
𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗽𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗲 𝗩𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: For related parties.
Stay informed and compliant!
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7211704072452661249
The appellant filed an Indian patent application (5808/CHENP/2007) derived from PCT Application No. PCT/US2006/023856, titled "Receptor Antagonists for Treatment of Metastatic Bone Cancer."
The application claimed priority from a US application dated 17 June 2005 and initially had 80 claims.
After examination, objections were raised under Sections 3(c), 3(i), and 3(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, regarding the patentability of the claimed antibodies.
The appellant amended the claims and responded to the objections, asserting that the antibodies were not isolated from nature but were generated using transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains and hybridoma technology.
The appellant explained that paragraphs [00153] and [00154] describe the process in detail wherein it is specified that the antibody was generated by immunizing transgenic mice (engineered mice) that express human gamma heavy and kappa light immunoglobulin (Ig) chains with porcine aortic endothelial (PAE) cells expressing platelet~derived growth factor receptor alpha(PGDFR alpha), which were subsequently boosted with PGDFR alpha extracellular domain (ECD). The appellant further asserted that the material generated in response by such transgenic mice was extracted from the cells of the spleen of the mice, fused with immortal myeloma cells by using hybridoma technology so as to produce the antibody therefrom through the processes of cloning and chromatography. Thus, they asserted that the antibodies were not isolated from nature, as the above-mentioned chain of events does not occur in nature.
In the impugned order, the respondent (Patent Office) rejected the claims, concluding that the antibodies were produced by standard methods and were discoveries of naturally existing substances, thus not patent-eligible under Section 3(c) of the Patents Act. this led to the present appeal in the Madras High Court.
The issue before the High Court was whether the recombinant antibodies targeting PDGFR alpha, claimed in the patent application, are patentable under Section 3(c) of the Patents Act, 1970, or are considered discoveries of naturally occurring substances.
The appellant argued that the antibodies were not isolated from nature but were generated using transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains, immunized with PDGFR alpha-expressing cells, and hybridoma technology, as described in the specification. As per them, this modified antibody wasn't something found naturally because it was created through a complex process involving genetic engineering and selection by using special cells and proteins. The antibodies are not naturally occurring and are genetically modified substances, not excluded by Section 3(c) if they meet other patentability criteria. The appellant pointed out that using these specific components was necessary to prevent interference with natural bodily functions, especially during embryonic development.
Respondents (Patent Office) argued that the antibodies were isolated from human beings, as admitted in the specification (paragraph [0075]) and evident from the sequence listings showing the organism of origin as "Homo sapiens." as per them, the appellant merely generated known and naturally occurring antibodies using standard hybridoma technology, which is not novel. No recombination was seen in the sequence listings. The claimed invention falls squarely within the exclusion of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.
Respondents placed reliance on several judgments of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) for interpreting Section 3(c) of the Patents Act including Biogaia AB v. Controller of Patents and Designs, wherein in paragraph 8 it was highlighted that non-living substances occurring in nature or isolated from nature are not eligible for patents. However, it also emphasized that genetically modified microorganisms or nucleic acid sequences may not be excluded if they meet other criteria such as novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability.
In the University of British Columbia v. Controller of Patents, paragraph 9, it was established that non-human monoclonal antibodies do not fall under the scope of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.
Then in Health Protection Agency v. The Controller General of Patents and another, paragraph 12, stated that substances created with human intervention do not fall within the scope of Section 3(c).
The antibodies claimed in the invention were indeed isolated from human beings as mentioned in paragraph [0075] of the complete specification, where the appellant allegedly admitted that the antibodies and antibody fragments could be obtained from naturally occurring antibodies. Additionally, certain sequence (SEQ) ID numbers specified the organism of origin as Homo sapiens.
The appellant utilized standard hybridoma technology to generate known and naturally occurring antibodies, which lacked novelty. No recombination was evident in the sequence listing.
Regarding previous orders of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and decisions of the Patent Office, the respondent distinguished the IPAB order in the Health Protection Agency, stating it pertained to a biological process indicator not found in nature. Similarly, they differentiated the Patent Office's decisions in Patent Application No.5057/CHENP/2007 and Patent Application No.2569/MUMNP/2008, which allegedly involved mutated antibodies.
In response to these contentions raised by the respondents, the appellant filed a rejoinder clarifying that the antibodies claimed in the invention were not isolated from human beings but were produced using transgenic mice engineered with human genes. These mice were immunized with PAE cells expressing PGDFR alpha, followed by isolation of splenocytes and fusion with myeloma cells to produce the antibodies. Therefore, they argued that these antibodies cannot be considered isolated from human beings which is the reason they do not fall within the scope of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act. To support this interpretation, reference was made to the legislative history of Section 3(c), wherein in the Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999 (Bill No.49) and related parliamentary speeches, it was contended that the above provision (Section 3 (c)) was amended to introduce the third limb, which cannot be interpreted with reference to Section 3(d), which was amended separately.
Further, Delhi High Court in Diamond Star Global Sdn. Bhd. v. Joint Controller of Patents and Designs (Diamond Star), held that "mere" in Section 3(c) also extends to "discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in nature." hence, the instant invention does not fall within the exclusions of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.
After considering the rival submission of the parties, the court held that the antibodies did not originate from humans based on the sequence listing, as some sequences specified "unidentified" or "artificial" organisms. Hence, they qualify for patent protection under Section 3(c).
Regarding the patentability of the appellant's monoclonal antibodies, the court noted that Antibodies are proteins naturally produced by the human body's immune system to defend against antigens, which include bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, and allergens. The specific part of the antigen to which an antibody binds is called an epitope. Antibodies consist of four polypeptide chains, two heavy and two light chains, forming a Y-shaped structure. Each chain has a variable region, determining the antibody's specificity, and a constant region. The variable regions contain complementarity-determining regions (CDRs), crucial for binding to epitopes. Polyclonal antibodies are produced by various B cells and can bind to multiple epitopes on the same antigen. In contrast, monoclonal antibodies are produced by identical B cells, binding to a single epitope, and can be classified into non-human, chimeric, humanized, and human categories based on their derivation.
The Court further noted that Section 3(c) excludes the mere discovery of a scientific principle or the formulation of an abstract theory or discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in nature from being considered inventions under the Patents Act. "Mere" relates to only the first limb of Section 3(c) -the discovery of a scientific principle and not the discovery of living or non-living substances. Further, "occurring in nature" applies only to non-living substances, and not to living things. Hence, naturally occurring non-living substances are excluded from patent eligibility, while synthetic or engineered substances could be eligible.
The court placed reliance on a plethora of judgments including Sidney A. Diamond v. Ananda M. Chakrabarty wherein the US Supreme Court established that man-made bacteria are patentable, Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories v. Promotheus Laboratories Inc.(Mayo) wherein the same apex authority held that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable and Association for Molecular Pathology et al v. Myriad Genetics et al wherein naturally occurring DNA was barred from not patent eligibility and cDNA were held patentable due to human intervention.
Regarding the appellant's monoclonal antibodies, the court noted that they are produced using hybridoma technology and transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains which target specific epitopes of the PDGFR alpha receptor, which is engineered and not naturally occurring. Although the organism specified in the sequence listing is primarily "homo sapiens," some sequences are listed as "unidentified" or "artificial," indicating synthetic origin. It was not the hybridoma technology that was claimed by the appellants as the investigation but the specific engineering of monoclonal antibodies targeting PDGFR alpha was claimed as a unique invention.
In view of the above conclusion, the court directed that the claimed invention be granted on the basis of the current claims, which were submitted in the course of hearings before the respondent.