The NDA's tenure since 2014 has seen significant economic reforms.

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗹𝗶𝘀𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗶 𝟯.𝟬 𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝗱𝗲𝘀:

𝗖𝗮𝗽𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗹 𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲: Focus on infrastructure investment to stimulate economic growth.
𝗙𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗴𝘆: Long-term fiscal policy with transparency and consistency.
𝗗𝗲𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁: Boosting rural demand, private sector investment, and employment growth.
𝗗𝗲𝗯𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁: Prioritizing debt indicators over deficit indicators.
𝗧𝗮𝘅 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝘀: Broadening the tax base and overhauling tax structures.
𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺: Rationalizing subsidies and streamlining public expenditure.

Together, these initiatives aim to promote efficient, fair, and accountable practices across public procurement, litigation, and economic policy, driving India towards sustainable growth and fiscal stability.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7209789714432745475

Introducing the National Litigation Policy 2024, recently approved by the Union Law Minister, and a key part of the BJP’s 2024 Lok Sabha election manifesto. This policy aims to address the 𝗵𝗶𝗴𝗵 𝘃𝗼𝗹𝘂𝗺𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗴𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗼 𝗮𝗻 𝗲𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁.

Highlights Include

𝗖𝘂𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗦𝗰𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗼: The government is responsible for 73% of Supreme Court cases, with approximately 50 million cases pending.

𝗢𝗯𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲𝘀: Transform the government into an efficient and responsible litigant.

𝗘𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗟𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀: Competent legal representation, focus on core issues, cohesive management, and prioritization of good cases.

𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗟𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗴𝗮𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀: Avoids false pleas, presents correct facts, does not conceal information, and prioritizes welfare legislation.

𝗦𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲: Aims to reduce government litigation in courts, supporting the National Mission for Justice Delivery & Legal Reforms.

Let's work together to promote efficient, fair, and responsible litigation practices.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7209454448727760897

We are delighted to share an insightful document issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Expenditure, outlining the latest Guidelines for 𝗔𝗿𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗲𝗱𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗰 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁.

𝗛𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘀𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝗸𝗲𝘆 𝗵𝗶𝗴𝗵𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀:

𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗱𝘂𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗼 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗚𝘂𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀: A comprehensive overview aimed at improving dispute resolution mechanisms in public procurement.

𝗔𝗱𝘃𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗔𝗿𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: Speed, efficiency, and inclusion of technical expertise are among the benefits, ensuring swift and informed decisions.

𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗽𝘂𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗣𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗿𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀: Unique challenges due to multiple levels of scrutiny and the need for accountability to Parliament.

𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗔𝗿𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝗚𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘀: Addressing issues like long durations, high costs, and the potential for Supreme Court interference.

𝗠𝗲𝗱𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝘀 𝗮𝗻 𝗔𝗹𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗽𝘂𝘁𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗼𝗹𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: Emphasizing the benefits and successful models within government entities under the Mediation Act, 2023.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗚𝘂𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘀: Strategies such as restricting arbitration in large contracts, preferring institutional arbitration, and encouraging amicable settlements.

𝗘𝗻𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗠𝗲𝗱𝗶𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗔𝗺𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗦𝗲𝘁𝘁𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀: Adoption of mediation, formation of High-Level Committees for high-value matters, and processes for negotiation.

𝗔𝗽𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘃𝗮𝗹 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗚𝘂𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀: Authority requirements, relevance of Section 49 of the Mediation Act, 2023, and application flexibility.

𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: Summarizing key points and encouraging efficient, fair, and accountable processes across government ministries and entities.

Let's work together to promote pragmatic and fair decision-making in public procurement.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7209094641441251328

Crucial update from the Delhi High Court regarding disability reservation in nursing education, emphasizing inclusivity and equal opportunities.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗛𝗶𝗴𝗵𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀:

𝗕𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗴𝗿𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱:
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 mandates equal opportunities in education and employment, requiring educational institutions to reserve seats for students with disabilities.

𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘁 𝗢𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿:
The Indian Nursing Council (INC) is directed to consider representations for disability reservation.
Current policies must be evaluated in light of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, with potential amendments to ensure inclusivity.

𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗰𝘁 𝗼𝗻 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗘𝗱𝘂𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻:
Promotion of inclusivity and equal opportunities in nursing programs.
Increased accessibility for students with disabilities, emphasizing diversity and an equitable healthcare workforce.

𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗹:
Review and amend current policies to align with the court directive.
Ensure admission processes accommodate students with disabilities, improving access to nursing education.

𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗢𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲𝘀:
Improved representation of persons with disabilities in the nursing profession.

Enhanced inclusivity and support within nursing education, positively impacting the healthcare sector with a diverse workforce.

This directive underscores the importance of adapting educational policies for inclusivity and the role of the INC in fostering a diverse and equitable healthcare environment.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205949332997443585

Supreme Court's decision to set aside India's first EVM-based election, focusing on legal, technical, and trust issues.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗛𝗶𝗴𝗵𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀:

𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗙𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗲𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗠𝗶𝘀𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴: The Representation of the People Act, 1951, did not authorize the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), rendering the election procedurally invalid without the necessary legal backing.

𝗥𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗯𝗶𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗿𝗻𝘀: Questions about the reliability and accuracy of EVMs were raised, highlighting the need for thorough testing and validation.

𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗗𝗲𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗶𝘁: There was a significant lack of transparency and trust among voters and political parties, emphasizing the need for clear guidelines and regulations to ensure electoral integrity.

𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗲 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘁'𝘀 𝗩𝗲𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗰𝘁:

The election was declared invalid, underscoring the necessity for a robust legal framework and safeguards when implementing new technologies in elections.

Post-decision, amendments to the Representation of the People Act were made to include EVMs, ensuring reliability and transparency through extensive trials and improvements.

𝗘𝗻𝘀𝘂𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗙𝗮𝗶𝗿 𝗘𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀:

The importance of legal and procedural robustness in electoral processes was highlighted, with a focus on legal, technical, and trust safeguards.
Implementing technological advancements in elections must prioritize reliability and public confidence to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

This landmark decision by the Supreme Court reinforces the need for a comprehensive legal framework and transparent procedures to uphold the fairness and trustworthiness of elections.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205931391375597568

Comprehensive update on the Supreme Court's critical role in shaping deportation laws in India.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗛𝗶𝗴𝗵𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀:

𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗙𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗲𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸:

𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟰𝟲: Regulates entry and departure of foreigners.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗮𝘀𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟲𝟳: Governs issuance and revocation of passports, impacting deportation.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗖𝗶𝘁𝗶𝘇𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽 𝗔𝗰𝘁, 𝟭𝟵𝟱𝟱: Defines conditions for acquiring or losing Indian citizenship.

𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗝𝘂𝗱𝗴𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀:

𝗦𝗮𝗿𝗯𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗮 𝗦𝗼𝗻𝗼𝘄𝗮𝗹 𝘃. 𝗨𝗻𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗜𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗮 (𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟱): Emphasizes national security and constitutionality of the Illegal Migrants Act, with the burden of proof on individuals.

𝗛𝗮𝗻𝘀 𝗠𝘂𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝗡𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗴 𝘃. 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝗰𝘆 𝗝𝗮𝗶𝗹 (𝟭𝟵𝟱𝟱): Establishes that deportation is not punishment and the government has inherent power to deport.

𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗔𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗹 𝗣𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗲𝘀𝗵 𝘃. 𝗞𝗵𝘂𝗱𝗶𝗿𝗮𝗺 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗸𝗺𝗮 (𝟭𝟵𝟵𝟰): Prohibits arbitrary deportation without due process, considering humanitarian concerns for long-term residents and refugees.

𝗣𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗽𝗹𝗲𝘀 𝗘𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗱:

𝗗𝘂𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗟𝗮𝘄: Ensures fair opportunity to present the case and decisions made according to legal procedures.

𝗡𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗴𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆: Prioritizes national security in deportation matters.

𝗛𝘂𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: Balances approach for long-term residents and refugees.

𝗕𝘂𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗳: Requires individuals to prove their legal status.

𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗜𝗺𝗺𝗶𝗴𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆:

𝗦𝘁𝗿𝗲𝗻𝗴𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗟𝗲𝗴𝗮𝗹 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗰𝗲𝗱𝘂𝗿𝗲𝘀: Advocates for transparent and fair deportation decisions.

𝗕𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗛𝘂𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗿𝗻𝘀: Promotes effective and compassionate immigration policies.

𝗖𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗕𝘂𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗼𝗳: Emphasizes robust documentation and verification processes.

The Supreme Court's balanced approach ensures the protection of national security while upholding due process and humanitarian considerations, serving as a guiding force for effective immigration policy formulation and implementation.

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7205917004912877570

𝗧𝗮𝘅 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗽𝘂𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗦𝗲𝘁𝘁𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁:

𝗡𝗼 𝗜𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝘀𝘁 & 𝗣𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀: Waived for tax demands (April 2017 – March 2020) if paid by 31 March 2025.
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝗧𝗖 𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲: Until 30 November 2021 for ITC related to April 2017 – March 2021.
𝗔𝗽𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗟𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘀: INR 20 Lakhs for GST Tribunal, INR 1 Crore for High Court, and INR 2 Crores for Supreme Court.

𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗲 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗖𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲:

𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗚𝗦𝗧𝗥-𝟭: Can amend before filing GSTR-3B.
𝗘-𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗲 𝗥𝗲𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗳: Reduced TCS from 1% to 0.5%.
No Interest on Late Tax Payments: If paid by due date from Electronic Cash Ledger.
𝗘𝘅𝘁𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗱 𝗙𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗲: For Composition Dealers to 30 June.

𝗡𝗲𝘄 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀:

𝗡𝗼 𝗜𝗧𝗖 𝗥𝗲𝗳𝘂𝗻𝗱: For goods exported with export duty.
𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗮𝗶𝗹𝗲𝗱 𝗕𝟮𝗖 𝗥𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴: Threshold reduced to INR 1,00,000.

𝗥𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗥𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀:

𝗨𝗻𝗶𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺 𝟱% 𝗜𝗚𝗦𝗧: On parts for aircraft MRO services.
𝟭𝟮% 𝗚𝗦𝗧: For items like milk cans, carton boxes, sprinklers, and solar cookers.
𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 𝗘𝘅𝗲𝗺𝗽𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀: For hostel accommodations and certain railway services.

𝗖𝗹𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀:

𝗣𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗽𝗹𝘆 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗖𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲𝘀: Location of the recipient for FPIs.
𝗖𝗼𝗿𝗽𝗼𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗚𝘂𝗮𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗲 𝗩𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: For related parties.

Stay informed and compliant!

To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :

https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7211704072452661249

The appellant filed an Indian patent application (5808/CHENP/2007) derived from PCT Application No. PCT/US2006/023856, titled "Receptor Antagonists for Treatment of Metastatic Bone Cancer."

The application claimed priority from a US application dated 17 June 2005 and initially had 80 claims.

After examination, objections were raised under Sections 3(c), 3(i), and 3(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, regarding the patentability of the claimed antibodies.

The appellant amended the claims and responded to the objections, asserting that the antibodies were not isolated from nature but were generated using transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains and hybridoma technology.

The appellant explained that paragraphs [00153] and [00154] describe the process in detail wherein it is specified that the antibody was generated by immunizing transgenic mice (engineered mice) that express human gamma heavy and kappa light immunoglobulin (Ig) chains with porcine aortic endothelial (PAE) cells expressing platelet~derived growth factor receptor alpha(PGDFR alpha), which were subsequently boosted with PGDFR alpha extracellular domain (ECD). The appellant further asserted that the material generated in response by such transgenic mice was extracted from the cells of the spleen of the mice, fused with immortal myeloma cells by using hybridoma technology so as to produce the antibody therefrom through the processes of cloning and chromatography. Thus, they asserted that the antibodies were not isolated from nature, as the above-mentioned chain of events does not occur in nature.

In the impugned order, the respondent (Patent Office) rejected the claims, concluding that the antibodies were produced by standard methods and were discoveries of naturally existing substances, thus not patent-eligible under Section 3(c) of the Patents Act. this led to the present appeal in the Madras High Court.

The issue before the High Court was whether the recombinant antibodies targeting PDGFR alpha, claimed in the patent application, are patentable under Section 3(c) of the Patents Act, 1970, or are considered discoveries of naturally occurring substances.

The appellant argued that the antibodies were not isolated from nature but were generated using transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains, immunized with PDGFR alpha-expressing cells, and hybridoma technology, as described in the specification. As per them, this modified antibody wasn't something found naturally because it was created through a complex process involving genetic engineering and selection by using special cells and proteins. The antibodies are not naturally occurring and are genetically modified substances, not excluded by Section 3(c) if they meet other patentability criteria. The appellant pointed out that using these specific components was necessary to prevent interference with natural bodily functions, especially during embryonic development.

Respondents (Patent Office) argued that the antibodies were isolated from human beings, as admitted in the specification (paragraph [0075]) and evident from the sequence listings showing the organism of origin as "Homo sapiens." as per them, the appellant merely generated known and naturally occurring antibodies using standard hybridoma technology, which is not novel. No recombination was seen in the sequence listings. The claimed invention falls squarely within the exclusion of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.

Respondents placed reliance on several judgments of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) for interpreting Section 3(c) of the Patents Act including Biogaia AB v. Controller of Patents and Designs, wherein in paragraph 8 it was highlighted that non-living substances occurring in nature or isolated from nature are not eligible for patents. However, it also emphasized that genetically modified microorganisms or nucleic acid sequences may not be excluded if they meet other criteria such as novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability.

In the University of British Columbia v. Controller of Patents, paragraph 9, it was established that non-human monoclonal antibodies do not fall under the scope of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.

Then in Health Protection Agency v. The Controller General of Patents and another, paragraph 12, stated that substances created with human intervention do not fall within the scope of Section 3(c).

The antibodies claimed in the invention were indeed isolated from human beings as mentioned in paragraph [0075] of the complete specification, where the appellant allegedly admitted that the antibodies and antibody fragments could be obtained from naturally occurring antibodies. Additionally, certain sequence (SEQ) ID numbers specified the organism of origin as Homo sapiens.

The appellant utilized standard hybridoma technology to generate known and naturally occurring antibodies, which lacked novelty. No recombination was evident in the sequence listing.

Regarding previous orders of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and decisions of the Patent Office, the respondent distinguished the IPAB order in the Health Protection Agency, stating it pertained to a biological process indicator not found in nature. Similarly, they differentiated the Patent Office's decisions in Patent Application No.5057/CHENP/2007 and Patent Application No.2569/MUMNP/2008, which allegedly involved mutated antibodies.

In response to these contentions raised by the respondents, the appellant filed a rejoinder clarifying that the antibodies claimed in the invention were not isolated from human beings but were produced using transgenic mice engineered with human genes. These mice were immunized with PAE cells expressing PGDFR alpha, followed by isolation of splenocytes and fusion with myeloma cells to produce the antibodies. Therefore, they argued that these antibodies cannot be considered isolated from human beings which is the reason they do not fall within the scope of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act. To support this interpretation, reference was made to the legislative history of Section 3(c), wherein in the Patents (Second Amendment) Bill, 1999 (Bill No.49) and related parliamentary speeches, it was contended that the above provision (Section 3 (c)) was amended to introduce the third limb, which cannot be interpreted with reference to Section 3(d), which was amended separately.

Further, Delhi High Court in Diamond Star Global Sdn. Bhd. v. Joint Controller of Patents and Designs (Diamond Star), held that "mere" in Section 3(c) also extends to "discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in nature." hence, the instant invention does not fall within the exclusions of Section 3(c) of the Patents Act.

After considering the rival submission of the parties, the court held that the antibodies did not originate from humans based on the sequence listing, as some sequences specified "unidentified" or "artificial" organisms. Hence, they qualify for patent protection under Section 3(c).

Regarding the patentability of the appellant's monoclonal antibodies, the court noted that Antibodies are proteins naturally produced by the human body's immune system to defend against antigens, which include bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins, and allergens. The specific part of the antigen to which an antibody binds is called an epitope. Antibodies consist of four polypeptide chains, two heavy and two light chains, forming a Y-shaped structure. Each chain has a variable region, determining the antibody's specificity, and a constant region. The variable regions contain complementarity-determining regions (CDRs), crucial for binding to epitopes. Polyclonal antibodies are produced by various B cells and can bind to multiple epitopes on the same antigen. In contrast, monoclonal antibodies are produced by identical B cells, binding to a single epitope, and can be classified into non-human, chimeric, humanized, and human categories based on their derivation.

The Court further noted that Section 3(c) excludes the mere discovery of a scientific principle or the formulation of an abstract theory or discovery of any living thing or non-living substance occurring in nature from being considered inventions under the Patents Act. "Mere" relates to only the first limb of Section 3(c) -the discovery of a scientific principle and not the discovery of living or non-living substances. Further, "occurring in nature" applies only to non-living substances, and not to living things. Hence, naturally occurring non-living substances are excluded from patent eligibility, while synthetic or engineered substances could be eligible.

The court placed reliance on a plethora of judgments including Sidney A. Diamond v. Ananda M. Chakrabarty wherein the US Supreme Court established that man-made bacteria are patentable, Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories v. Promotheus Laboratories Inc.(Mayo) wherein the same apex authority held that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable and Association for Molecular Pathology et al v. Myriad Genetics et al wherein naturally occurring DNA was barred from not patent eligibility and cDNA were held patentable due to human intervention.

Regarding the appellant's monoclonal antibodies, the court noted that they are produced using hybridoma technology and transgenic mice expressing human immunoglobulin chains which target specific epitopes of the PDGFR alpha receptor, which is engineered and not naturally occurring. Although the organism specified in the sequence listing is primarily "homo sapiens," some sequences are listed as "unidentified" or "artificial," indicating synthetic origin. It was not the hybridoma technology that was claimed by the appellants as the investigation but the specific engineering of monoclonal antibodies targeting PDGFR alpha was claimed as a unique invention.

In view of the above conclusion, the court directed that the claimed invention be granted on the basis of the current claims, which were submitted in the course of hearings before the respondent.

The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court vide its Order dated 08.04.2024and Order dated 24.02.2023 in Glassco Laboratory Equipments has granted an interim stay qua recovery proceedings in the Writ Petition challenging the restriction under Rule 96(10) of CGST Rules.

Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules places restriction on the exporters from availing dual benefits by simultaneously claiming IGST exemption on imports made under Notification Nos. 78/2017 and 79/2017-Cus both dated 13.10.2017 (“Notification No. 78/79”) and paying IGST on exports through Input Tax Credit with the intention of claiming a refund of the said IGST amount under Section 54 of the CGST Act read with Rule 89 of the CGST Rules. The validity and legality of the restriction under Rule 96(10) has been challenged before various High Courts on the basis that:

• Rule 96(10) violates the provisions in the parent statute because the only prescription in Section 16 of IGST Act and Section 54 of CGST Act was to the extent of outlining the form and manner for claiming refund, but not for restricting refund.
• Rule 96(10) creates fetter on an exporter’s right to claim refund of IGST paid on exports & does not stand the test of legality because the Statute empowers rules to be made for enabling the refund mechanism, but not to restrict refund claims for legitimate exporters.
• Rule 96(10) is also violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India as an arbitrary and unreasonable differential treatment is meted out to EOUs, Advance Authorization license holders and similar assessees.

The Hon’ble Bombay High Court vide its Order dated 27.01.2021 in Prashi Pharma Private Limited, where the vires of the restriction under Rule 96(10) have been challenged, has granted interim relief qua recovery of IGST refund till the next date of hearing. The Writ Petition challenging legality of Rule 96(10) as being violative of Article 14, is also pending consideration before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Watson Pharma Private Limited. Similarly, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court vide its Order dated 08.09.2021 in Mayur Woven Pvt. Ltd. and Order dated 15.09.2021 in Parikh Enterprises has stayed the recovery and coercive actions in the Writ Petitions challenging the vires of Rule 96(10). The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Comstar Automotive Technologies Pvt. Ltd. has also admitted the Writ challenging the arbitrary restriction as ultra vires Section 16 of the IGST Act

W&B Comments: The GST authorities have recently launched investigations in respect of the refunds received by the exporters upon payment of IGST. Upon summons / search / seizure, the said proceedings have been culminated into show cause cum demand notices thereby seeking recovery of the allegedly erroneous refunds. As the first appeal against the adjudication order would necessitate cash payment of pre-deposit equivalent to 10% of duty demand, a Writ Petition may be preferred before the jurisdictional High Court challenging the vires and legality of the restriction imposed under Rule 96(10) of the CGST Rules along with its date of enforcement, as the case may be.

In case of utilization of both IGST-paid and IGST-free imports in manufacture of the exported goods (qua which refund has been received), it is critical that a nexus be established between imported raw materials and export of manufactured goods so as to restrict the applicability of Rule 96(10) to the IGST-free imports only.

The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the captioned matter has held that action of department of penalizing the recipient by confirming reversal of the availed input credit without first conducting an inquiry against the defaulting supplier, is arbitrary. The ignorance of the invoices and Chartered Accountants issued certificates produced by the assess was held to be without jurisdiction.

In the present case the department had issued a show cause notice under Section 73(1) of the CGST/WBGST Act against the Appellant, proposing the reversal of allegedly availed excess input tax credit on the ground that the Appellant had failed to provide proof that its supplier had remitted the tax to the government. Consequently, the Appellant had challenged the adjudicated order in the present appeal on the basis of Suncraft Energy Private Limited.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that where the department has accepted the position that the assessee has made payment of the tax to the supplier against the transaction, then the elementary principle to be adopted is to cause enquiry with the supplier. Non-compliance of so to penalise the appellant is arbitrary. The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court set aside the order and provided clear directions to the department to first proceed against the supplier and only under exceptional circumstances proceedings can be initiated against the appellant as per the CBIC Press Release dated 18.10.2018.

W&B Comments: The present ruling reaffirms the legal position that in case of ITC availed in GSTR-3B but not being reflected in GSTR 2B/2A, the said ITC cannot be disallowed to a bonafide purchaser without undertaking inquiry /recovery against the defaulting supplier. This view has also been echoed by Hon’ble Madras High Court in D.Y. Beathel Enterprises & Hon’ble Kerala High Court in Diya Agencies. Given that a slew of summons/notices are being issued by the GST authorities across the country on account of ITC mismatch, it is critical for the assessees to put forth a strong legal defense to such demands and challenge them before the appropriately forum.

In the case of M/s Prahitha Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court heard and issued notice in the SLP filed against Hon’ble Telangana High Court’s judgement of taxability of transfer of development rights.

The Hon’ble Telangana High Court in the case of Prahitha Construction v. Union of India and Others[1] in its order dated 09.02.2024 held that the transfer of the development rights to real estate developers by way of Joint Development Agreement with the landowners, would fall within the purview of taxable service under GST. The Hon’ble High Court has observed that TDR cannot be brought within the purview of Entry 5 of Schedule-III unless is there is a cogent and substantial material to establish that a right, title and ownership being created in favour of developer.

However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that the Impugned Judgement rendered by the Hon’ble High Court is not stayed, and therefore the Petitioner is required to pay the taxes.

W&B Comments: As there is currently no stay on the matter, the levy remains operational, and GST must be paid upon the transfer of development rights. Historically, there has been a debate about the taxability of such transfers, as taxpayers argue that development rights, being derived from land sales, fall within the definition of immovable property. no service tax was levied in the erstwhile regime.

CESTAT Tribunal Chandigarh in DLF Commercial Projects[2] had observed that “the transfer of development rights in the case in hand is termed as immovable property in terms of Section 3(26) of General Clauses Act, 1897 and no service tax is payable as per the exclusion in terms of Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994.” Nevertheless, taxpayers are currently obligated to pay GST on such transfers until the Hon’ble Supreme Court provides any relief on the issue.

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[1] 2024 (2) TMI 902

[2] 2019 (27) GSTL

The Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the present case has condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation under Section 107(4) of the WBGST Act in filing of appeal.

The Petitioner had failed to lodge an appeal within the statutory 90-day window, including the additional one-month extension. On the basis that the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period, the appellate authority dismissed it. However, the Calcutta High Court intervened, instructing the appellate authority to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, thereby adjudicating the appeal on its merits.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 elucidates that an appeal can be accepted after the stipulated timeframe if the appellant can demonstrate to the court a valid reason for the delay in filing the appeal. The Division Bench of Hon’ble Calcuttaa High Court in the case of S.K. Chakraborty & Sons had observed that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provides that Section 5 shall be applicable unless expressly excluded by a special law and since Section 107 of CGST Act does not have any non obstante clause to make Section 29(2) non-applicable, it is improper to read an implied exclusion thereof.

W&B Comments: Several High Courts, including the Allahabad High Court in M/s Yadav Steels, argue that the GST Law, being a special statute it is implied that the GST Law excludes Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Calcuttaa High Court while taking Yadav Steels into consideration, relied on Hon’ble Supreme Court in Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper. This decision ensures that taxpayers have the opportunity to have their appeals heard and decided on merits, despite procedu

The Central government introduced a new amendment to the Information Technology Amendment Rules, 2023 for Open, Safe, Trusted, and Accountable Internet usage. This amendment empowers the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) to create a "fact check unit" to identify false or misleading content online.

Along with that, if the social media intermediaries fail to prevent users from hosting or publishing flagged information, their "safe harbour" immunity, will be withdrawn which could expose them to criminal prosecution. This can have negative implications for freedom of speech and civil liberties guaranteed by the constitution of India. With the new provisions, the Union government is empowered to determine what information is false and exercise censorship. This may hinder free information as the content can be withdrawn after the Union Government decides it is false.

In the era of digitalization, the spread of misinformation can lead to serious consequences for individuals, communities, and even nations. The government has attempted to address this issue through the instant amendment made to the IT Rules. However, concerns remain about the impact of these amendments on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under the Constitution of India.

Section 79 of the  Information Technology Act, of 2000 deals with immunity to intermediaries, as long as they follow due diligence and state-prescribed guidelines. It states that no person providing any service as a network service provider shall be liable under this Act, rules, or regulations made thereunder for any third-party information or data made available by him if he proves that the offense or contravention was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offense or contravention. For the purposes of this section, "network service provider" means an intermediary, and "third party information" means any information dealt with by a network service provider in his capacity as an intermediary.

The Information Technology Act, of 2000 was amended in 2008 to provide an exemption to intermediaries from liability for any third-party information. After that, the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 under the IT Act specified the due diligence requirements for intermediaries to claim such exemption. Later on, Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 replaced the 2011 Rules. In April 2023, the Government introduced the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023.

The most debated provision regarding the new rules is the power of the union government to remove any online content that it deems false or misleading. In such a situation, social media platforms and intermediaries will be deprived of the protection of the “safe harbour” if they do not comply with government orders. The issue is regarding “in respect of any business” which is not defined anywhere and is very large in its scope. It can have a negative effect on the right to freedom of speech and expression.

The Rules require the “social media intermediary and significant social media intermediary” (such as Twitter, Facebook, etc.) and Online Gaming Intermediary to inform their users not to 'host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, store any information which is 'identified as fake or false or misleading by a fact check unit of the Central Government' in respect of any business of the Central Government.

If the information has been flagged as false or misleading, intermediaries need to take down the content. The fact check unit of the Central Government can instruct intermediaries (including social media sites) not to host such false or misleading content.

Further, online gaming Platforms will have to register with a Self-Regulatory Body (SRB) that will determine whether the game is permissible. After receiving such permission, the online gaming intermediary has to display a demonstrable and visible mark of verification of such online game by the online gaming self-regulatory body on such permissible online real money game. It is the responsibility of the platform to ensure that online games do not involve any gambling or betting elements and that compliance with legal requirements, standards, and safety precautions such as parental controls shall also be ensured.

The Supreme Court of India’s Cognizance

The Supreme Court of India has taken cognisance of the issue in the case of Kunal Kamra v. Union of India^[1] wherein the issue before the apex court is:

1. Does the formation of a fact-check unit under the IT Rules, 2023 violate Article 14 for being arbitrary?
2. Does a fact-check unit restrict the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19?^[2]

The challenge in the instant case is with respect to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2023 (IT Rules 2023) notified by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology which direct social media intermediaries (such as Facebook, Twitter, etc.) to remove any news related to the “business of the Central Government” that is deemed “fake, false, or misleading” by a fact-checking unit established by the Union Government.^[3] It is further challenged that the formation of a fact-check unit contradicts Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) which protects social media intermediaries from liability of user-generated content.

Reliance was placed on Shreya Singhal v Union of India^[4], where the Supreme Court mandated that notifications to take down content should be issued through a court order however, the IT Rules 2023 enables the Union Government to address the social media intermediary directly by acting both “the Judge and the Prosecutor.” the petition further claims that the IT Rules 2023 violate Articles 14,19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution for running afoul of principles of natural justice, freedom of speech, and prevent from engaging in political satire.

The Union responded to the instant petition stating that the Rules are issued in “public interest” to prevent the spread of “false news.” As far as FCU is concerned, they argued that the same will be carried out based on evidence. The aggrieved persons can approach a court if they feel their information is wrongfully flagged and taken down.

The petitions filed in the Bombay High Court by the Association of Indian Magazines (AIM) and the Editors Guild of India challenging the same IT Rules 2023 were clubbed with Kamra’s petition.

Bombay High Court judgment

Bombay High Court delivered a divided ruling on the petition challenging the notification for establishing a fact-check unit under the amended IT Rules.^[5] The bench, comprising Justices Gautam Patel and Dr. Neela Gokhale, issued a split verdict on January 31, 2024. Justice Patel expressed concerns over the broad powers granted to the government's fact-check unit, which he termed as the "sole authority" to determine the truth or falsity of information. He highlighted the subjective nature of concepts like "misleading" and the lack of absolute truths in human history. Patel argued that social media intermediaries, being a "vulnerable segment," would likely comply with takedown requests from the government's fact-check unit, risking the suppression of opposing viewpoints. On the other hand, Justice Gokhale disagreed, stating that intermediaries would not lose their safe harbour protection unless they failed to remove content falling within the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. She emphasized that aggrieved parties could seek remedies from competent courts, making them the "sole arbiter" and not the government. Gokhale dismissed concerns of bias against the fact-checking unit solely because it was appointed by the government, considering the challenge premature based on the anticipation of potential abuse. Following the split verdict, Kunal Kamra approached the Bombay High Court seeking an interim stay on the notification of the fact-check unit. However, Justice A.S. Chandurkar declined to grant a stay, on the ground that notifying the unit would not create an irreversible situation, as any action taken would be subject to the validity of the amendment which is still undecided due to the split verdict. Aggrieved by this, Kamra approached the Supreme Court against this decision of the single judge. Meanwhile,  the Union notified the fact check unit. The bench of Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud with Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra has put a stay on the Union’s notification establishing the fact check unit. Hence, this matter remains sub jucide.

Effect on Online Gaming

MeitY has been designated as the nodal ministry for online gaming. However, Online gaming was not previously regulated under the IT Act, 2000. These are now regulated under the 2023 Rules. The definition of "online gaming intermediaries" remains very broad, leading to ambiguity. The term "wagering" used in the criteria for "permissible online real money game" is not elaborated upon, leaving the classification up to the interpretation of the self-regulatory body.

Online gaming intermediaries that enable access to permissible online real money games are required to display a visible verification mark from an online gaming self-regulatory body for such games. While informing users about rules, privacy policy, terms of service, etc., these intermediaries must include specific information for each permissible online real money game like the policy on withdrawal/refund of deposits, determination and distribution of winnings, fees and charges payable by the user.

Before accepting any deposits from users for permissible online real money games, online gaming intermediaries must identify and verify the user's identity following the procedures applicable to entities regulated by the Reserve Bank of India for customer identification like Know-Your-Customer. Importantly, online gaming intermediaries enabling access to such games cannot directly finance or enable third-party financing for the purpose of playing these online real-money games.

Further, as per Section 4A, the Ministry can designate self-regulatory bodies to verify online real money games. These bodies must be companies registered under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013, with membership representing the gaming industry and promoting responsible gaming. Their boards must include experts from various fields, and their articles must ensure conflict-free operations, member accountability, clear membership criteria, and Ministry-approved amendments. These bodies must have financial capacity. They can declare a game permissible if it does not involve wagering and complies with relevant laws, initially relying on applicant information for up to three months. They must publish verified games and member lists online. Verification can be suspended or revoked if rules are not followed. The bodies must publish frameworks for protecting sovereignty, user safety, child safeguards, and preventing addiction and financial harm. The Ministry may require information disclosure and consider published verification details before issuing directions under section 69A of the Act. A grievance redressal framework must be published, with complaints acknowledged within 24 hours and resolved within 15 days. The Ministry can direct rectifications for non-conformities and suspend or revoke designations if necessary, with interim directions for user access to games.^[6]

The 2023 amendment raises several concerns due to its failure to define various terms like “fake news” and "any business". Further, the act allows the government's fact-check unit immense powers to declare the veracity of any news "in respect of any business" as invalid. The use of undefined words gives the government unchecked power to decide what content should be available on internet. The rules come face to face with the protections provided under Article 19(2). A lawfully enacted statute should adopt less restrictive alternatives to removing misinformation. In the guise of misinformation and the fear of facing a penalty, Intermediaries will remove information deemed false by the Fact Check Unit. The new regulation gives the government the power to decide what is fake or false. The rights of the press and individuals to speak truth will be curtailed along with civil liberties. This wrong was undone by the Supreme Court's Judgment in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India wherein the Supreme Court held that a law that limits speech should not be vague nor over-broad. In this situation, it becomes pertinent for the Supreme Court to step in one more time for Balancing Misinformation and Free Speech of individuals. The case of Kunal Kamra can be an appropriate occasion for the court to balance these two important facets of free speech i.e. government’s initiative to curb misinformation and citizen’s right to freedom of speech and expression.

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^[1] SLP(C) No. 6871-6873/2024

^[2] Supreme Court Observer, “Challenge to the IT Rules 2023”, available at https://www.scobserver.in/cases/challenge-to-the-it-rules-2023/

^[3] Supreme Court Observer, “Challenge to the IT Rules 2023”, available at https://www.scobserver.in/cases/challenge-to-the-it-rules-2023/  

^[4] AIR 2015 SC 1523

^[5] Information Technology Amendment Rules, 2023

^[6] Gazette Notification for IT Amendment Rules, 2023, available at https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/244980-Gazette%20Notification%20for%20IT%20Amendment%20Rules%2C%202023-%20relating%20to%20online%20gaming%20%26%20false%20information%20about%20Govt.%20business.pdf

The real estate sector has been facing a multitude of challenges and disputes, especially post-GST implementation. This often leaves buyers, promoters, and developers entangled in legal battles seeking redressal for various grievances. Post the implementation of GST, consumer courts have witnessed a surge in real estate disputes. Complaints against developers have surged post-GST implementation, regarding issues of hidden costs, poor quality work, ownership delays, illegal construction, and contract violations.

In analyzing the legal landscape, it becomes evident that the jurisdiction of consumer forums, such as the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), extends to adjudicating disputes arising from deficiencies in real estate services. Section 2(o) of the CP Act^[1] defines 'service,' encompassing construction activities undertaken by developers. Furthermore, Section 2(g) of the CP Act defines “deficiency” as any fault, imperfection, shortcoming, or inadequacy in the quality, nature, and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.

These provisions are often used by the consumer forum to award compensation to aggrieved purchasers falling within the category of “consumer” under clause 2(d) of the CP Act. For instance, the Supreme Court, in the case of Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta^[2], affirmed that inordinate delays in delivering possession constitute a deficiency in service, awarding compensation to the purchasers. Also, the court in Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Sushma Ashok Shiroor^[3] held that interest on compensation shall accrue from the dates of deposits made by the consumer and not from the date of the last deposit, ensuring restitution for delays.

However, the intricacies surrounding the award of compensation, particularly in the form of compound interest, necessitate a nuanced understanding of legal principles and precedents. Furthermore, the introduction of GST has introduced additional complexities in real estate transactions, with issues such as tax implications, valuation methodologies, and contractual terms coming under scrutiny. Consumer forums are confronted with disputes ranging from excessive GST levies to contractual terms that are perceived as one-sided and oppressive to consumers.

One of the contentious issues in real estate disputes pertains to the award of compensation, particularly in the form of compound interest, under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CP Act)^[4]. Supreme court in a case of M/s Suneja Towers Private Limited & Anr. v. Anita Merchant^[5] stated that Compound Interest cannot Be Awarded Casually As Compensation by Consumer Forums in Real Estate Disputes. The Court further clarified that compound interest can be awarded in situations after taking into account relevant factors which would include uncertainties of the market and several other imponderables. After placing reliance on appropriate provisions of CPA, the Court highlighted that the Forum is empowered to grant punitive damages as per the proviso to Section 14(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act of 1986, (Act) if it deems fit.

In this case, the purchaser Anita Merchant (respondent) booked three residential flats of a residential project, namely Siddharth Shila Apartments at Ghaziabad. Respondent made payment up to 6th installment but, defaulted thereafter and did not make the remaining payment despite numerous reminders. She later issued a notice to the appellants M/s Suneja Towers Pvt. Ltd. (Siddharth Shila Apartments), stating that even after 16 years, the possession has not been delivered. To which the they replied stating that there was only provisional allotment and no agreement as such was executed between the parties.

Moreover, the allotment had been canceled due to default on the purchaser’s part. Consequently, a cheque of Rs. 10,68,031/- was sent as a refund to them. The District Forum dismissed the complaints on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. State Commission was approached which based on Manjeet Kaur Monga v. K.L. Suneja^[6], (‘Dr. Monga’s Case’), directed respondents to refund the amount deposited by the respondent with ‘compound interest at the rate of 14% from the date of deposit’. National Commission was approached which dismissed the petition and refused to interfere with State Forum’s judgement. Therefore, the consumer approached the Supreme Court.

Sc held that Dr. Monga’s Case pertained to claiming compensation under the MRTP Act, whereas the present case was related to claiming compensation under the Consumer Protection Act, of 1986. Hence, Dr. Monga’s Case cannot be read in support of the principle that compensation under the Consumer Protection Act, of 1986 could also be in the form of compound interest. The Act of 1986 has empowered the Consumer Forums to direct payment of compensation to the consumers for any loss or injury suffered due to the negligence of the opposite party. However, there is no hard and fast rule as to how much interest should be granted and it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.  Claim for compensation by way of compound interest is to be declined if it does not have any nexus with the commercial realities of the prevailing market as has been held in IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna,^[7] (‘Ireo Grace’). The Court observed that to determine the compensation, the Consumer Forum must examine the time value for money along with an in-depth and thorough analysis of all the facts and material surrounding factors, including realities and uncertainties of the market. As far as the award of compound interest in the instant case was concerned, SC noted that the same was without examining any factor which has led to serious inconsistencies. The State Commission straightaway jumped to the conclusion of awarding compound interest at the rate of 14%, without considering the refund Rs. 10,68,031/- on 08.11.2005 by the respondents, and without even specifying the period of such operation of compounding of interest. The Court viewed that if at all compounding of interest is allowed, that could not run beyond 08.11.2005, at least in regard to the said sum of Rs. 10,68,031/-, and the said interest does not exceed the amount of Rs. 2,48,52,000/-, which has already been received by the respondent pursuant to the order passed by the Court. Considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, as an extraordinary measure, the respondent was allowed to retain the received amount.

This judgment highlighted one of the most significant issues faced by the consumer courts while awarding compensation in real estate disputes under the Consumer Protection Act, of 1986. It clarifies that compound interest should not be awarded casually by consumer forums and must be grounded in the specifics of each case, considering market realities and the time value of money. This judgment emphasizes the necessity for a detailed and nuanced evaluation of all relevant factors before deciding on compensation. It also reinforces the consumer forums' mandate to ensure that awards are fair and proportionate, balancing the interests of both consumers and developers in real estate transactions. This ruling provides clearer guidelines, ensuring that compensation decisions are not arbitrary and are based on sound legal and economic principles.

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^[1] Consumer Protection Act, 1986

^[2] 1994 AIR 787

^[3]  2022 SCC OnLine SC 416

^[4] Consumer Protection Act, 1986

^[5] 2023 SCC OnLine SC 443

^[6] (2018) 14 SCC 679

^[7] (2021) 3 SCC 241

India Being the Fifth Largest Economy and Highest Population-Based Economies in the World.^[1] With an estimated GDP of more than ₹293.90 lakh crore generated by a population of over 1 billion, India is expected to grow at 7.6.% in 2023-24, making its economic growth the fastest among major economies.^[2] To make itself a compelling investment destination, India has made various efforts to ease the trade and business regime, including promoting a favorable business climate and improving infrastructure. Total FDI inflows in the country in FY 2023-24 stood at $971.521 billion (April 2000 to December 2023), and total FDI equity inflows were $666.477 billion (April 2000 to December 2023), according to the Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Government of India.^[3]

India which is making endeavors to make its economy vibrant by making itself an attractive business destination is sure to make dispute resolution efficient and expeditious. In order to ease the doing of business, India has been actively promoting arbitration as an effective means of dispute resolution. Arbitration offers several advantages that contribute to India's economic growth and make it an attractive investment destination. It acts as an alternative to the already overburdened court system of the country which might lead to delays and pendency in resolving disputes, something that business entities might prefer to avoid. Arbitration is already a widely recognized neutral and efficient method of resolving commercial disputes in international business transactions. Promoting arbitration, creates a favorable environment for foreign investors and multinational companies, thereby encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth. Another aspect that makes arbitration a preferred mode of dispute resolution is the enforceability of the awards. Arbitral awards are generally easier to enforce across jurisdictions compared to court judgments as they are backed by international conventions like the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards to which India is a party along with other 171 states. This enforceability aspect makes arbitration an attractive option for parties involved in cross-border transactions. Arbitration also provides liberty to the parties to choose arbitrators. Hence, they can choose arbitrators with specific expertise in the subject matter of the dispute, leading to more informed and specialized decision-making compared to traditional court proceedings. As a result of this, an emerging trait in new-age contracts can be witnessed wherein arbitration and/or mediation clauses are included to ensure cost and time-efficient mechanisms for the resolution of disputes.

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) inserted via the Amendment Act of 2015 which came into effect on 23.10.2015, introduces a time limit for the completion of arbitration proceedings. It prescribes a statutory period of twelve months for the completion of proceedings from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon reference.

Thereafter, this prescribed time limit was amended via the Amendment Act of 2019 which came into force on 30.08.2019 and the statutory limit was set as twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings with an option of another extension of six months by mutual consent of the parties.

However, another flexibility is provided under sub-section (4) wherein the parties can file an application to the court for an extension if the award is not passed in terms of Section 29A(1) or within the extended period.

Whether Section 29A and the provisions set out therein are applicable to international as well as domestic commercial arbitrations alike became a bone of contention. Another issue that emerged was whether the amended provision which came into effect on 30.08.2019 will be applied retrospectively or prospectively.

This issue is put to rest by the Supreme Court of India (“Supreme Court”) in its recent judgment in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Siva Industries and Holding Ltd and Ors.^[4] wherein the court held that the time limit of twelve months provided under the amended Section 29A (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) for rendering an award is not applicable to ‘international commercial arbitrations’

Article 29A^[5] in its true and original form sets out that…….”The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23:

Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23

Tata Sons Private Limited ("Applicant"), Tata Tele Services Limited ("TTSL"), and NTT Docomo Inc. ("Docomo") entered into agreements wherein Docomo acquired equity shares of TTSL from Siva Industries and Holdings Ltd. ("Respondent No. 1"). The Applicant, TTSL, Docomo, and Respondent No. 1, along with C. Sivasankaran (promoter and guarantor of Respondent No. 1, "Respondent No. 2"), executed an inter se agreement according to which the Respondents can acquire TTSL's shares proportionately if Docomo exercised its sale option. Disputes arose between Docomo and the Applicant, leading to an arbitral award directing the Applicant to acquire Docomo's TTSL shareholding. Pursuant to this, the Applicant called upon the Respondents to acquire Docomo's shares under the inter se agreement. Disputes ensued between the Applicant and Respondents, resulting in the matter being referred to arbitration. The applicant issued a notice of arbitration to the first respondent and to the second respondent (a foreign party, being a resident of Seychelles) and nominated an arbitrator but the respondents did not appoint their nominee arbitrator despite the service of the arbitration notice.

The applicant filed a petition before the Supreme Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act^[6] for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in international commercial arbitration. The Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration petition since the proposed arbitration between the applicant and the respondents, of whom the second respondent is a foreign party, was an international commercial arbitration in terms of Section 2(1)(f)^[7] of the Arbitration Act. As Respondent No. 2 was a foreign party, the Supreme Court appointed Mr Justice S N Variava as a sole arbitrator.

The arbitrator entered upon the reference on 14 February 2018. On 21 March 2018, during a preliminary meeting, the parties agreed to a six-month extension for rendering the award, if the arbitral proceedings could not be completed within a period of twelve months commencing from the date the arbitral tribunal entered reference. Hence, the time to deliver the award stood extended until 14 August 2019.

During the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, IDBI Bank Ltd initiated insolvency proceedings against the first respondent under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. Hence, by an order of the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai a moratorium was placed on all proceedings against the first respondent, including the arbitral ones. However, the moratorium was lifted on June 3, 2022. The extension of six months agreed upon by the parties expired on 14 August 2019.

Applicant filed an interlocutory application contending that as a result of the amendment of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with effect from 30 August 2019, the arbitration proceedings before the sole arbitrator should, be allowed to automatically continue in view of the amendment of the statute.

The Applicant was basically seeking the continuation of the arbitral proceedings, arguing that the amended Section 29A rendered the time limit for international commercial arbitrations inapplicable retrospectively.

Respondent No. 2 however contended that accepting the Applicant's arguments would imply the statutory time limits under Section 29A is entirely inapplicable to international commercial arbitrations.

The Supreme Court allowed the application and held that the time limit for passing an arbitral award under amended Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not applicable to international commercial arbitrations.

Regarding the criticism of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act as it stood prior to its

amendment by the international arbitral institutions on the ground that the provision allowed intervention by the court for extending the limit for rendering an award in international commercial arbitrations, the court noted that the amendment of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act in 2019  is intended to meet the criticism. The amendment being remedial in nature should be applicable to all pending arbitral proceedings as on the effective date i.e., 30 August 2019. It carves out international commercial arbitrations from the rigour of the timeline of six months time limits envisaged in Section 29A of the Arbitration Act.

The expression “in matters other than an international commercial arbitration” makes it abundantly clear that the timeline of twelve months which is stipulated in the substantive part of Section 29A(1), as amended, does not apply to international commercial arbitrations. This is further reaffirmed in the proviso to Section 29A(1) which stipulates that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration “may be made as expeditiously as possible” and that an “endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of 12 months” from the date of the completion of pleadings.

Hence, an international commercial arbitration, the arbitral tribunal is required to endeavour, that is, make an effort to render the arbitral award within a period of twelve months or in a timely manner.

In domestic arbitration, Section 29A(1) stipulates a mandatory period of twelve months for the arbitrator to render the arbitral award. In contrast, the substantive part of Section 29A(1) clarifies that the period of twelve months would not be mandatory for international commercial arbitration. Hence, post amendment, the time limit of twelve months as prescribed in Section 29A is applicable to only domestic arbitrations and the twelve-month period is only directory in nature for an international commercial arbitration.

To answer, whether the amended Section 29A would apply prospectively or retrospectively, the court placed reliance on the Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd,^[8] and held that Section 29A was procedural in nature. Procedural law establishes a mechanism for determining the rights and liabilities of a party and a machinery for enforcing them.^[9] Generally, procedural laws are presumed to be retrospective, unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the legislature,^[10] or the procedural law imposes new obligations qua transactions already concluded or creates new rights or liabilities.^[11] Since the 2019 Amendment Act does not contain any provision evincing a legislative intent making the application of the amended provision perspective, the time limit prescribed under the amended Section 29A will apply retrospectively to all pending arbitral proceedings from its effective date i.e., August 30, 2019.

Consequently, the Supreme Court concluded that the sole arbitrator is empowered to pass appropriate procedural directions for extension of time while endeavoring to expeditiously conclude the arbitration.

As a consequence of this judgment, the long-debated confusion has been put to rest. It has been made clear by the Apex Court that the twelve-month time limit as prescribed in Section 29A is applicable only to domestic arbitrations and is a directory for international commercial arbitration.

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^[1] Clear tax, “World GDP Ranking 2024 List” (April 29 2024), available at https://cleartax.in/s/world-gdp-ranking-list 

^[2] MoSPI, “Second Advance Estimates Of National Income 2023-24, Quarterly Estimates Of Gross Domestic Product For The Third Quarter (October-December) Of 2023-24” (29 February 2024), available at https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/press_release/PressNote_onGDP_SAE_Q3_FRE_SRE_TRE01032024.pdf 

^[3] Invest India, “Why India?” (May 08, 2024), available at https://www.investindia.gov.in/why-india

^[4] Miscellaneous Application No 2680 of 2019 in Arbitration Case (Civil) No 38 of 2017

^[5] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

^[6] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996

^[7] "international commercial arbitration" means an arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as commercial under the law in force in India and where at least one of the parties is—

(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country other than India; or

(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country other than India; or

(iii)an association or a body of individuals whose central management and control is exercised in any country other than India; or

(iv) the Government of a foreign country;

^[8]  (2018) 6 SCC 287

^[9] Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd v. Union of India (2011) 6 SCC 739

^[10] Jose Da Costa and Anr. v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim, (1976) 2 SCC 917; Gurbachan Singh v.

Satpal Singh (1990) 1 SCC 445; Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (D) by Lrs, (2000) 8 SCC 99

^[11] Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602

Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd.

The Supreme Court, in response to a curative petition filed by the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) challenging a previous judgment, declared that the decision to overturn the Division Bench's ruling and restore the arbitral award constituted a miscarriage of justice.^[1] As a result of this latest happening, DMRC will not have to pay ₹7687-crore arbitral award to DAMPEL. The initial Division Bench decision, based on Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, provided that the arbitral award was flawed.^[2] However, the Supreme Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution, upheld the validity of the award. Initially, the review petition of DMRC against the judgment of the Supreme Court was dismissed.^[3] Now, the events have taken a dramatic term wherein, the SC has corrected its mistake in a curative petition filed to cure the defects of its earlier judgment in the same case. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to established legal principles and cautioned against the routine use of curative jurisdiction to revisit arbitral awards. Consequently, the Court reverted the parties to their pre-judgment positions and discontinued execution proceedings related to the arbitral award. With this, the arbitral award which asked DMRC to pay ₹7687 crore to DAMPEL will not come into effect.

What Is The Curative Petition?

A curative petition is a legal remedy available in the Indian judicial system to rectify a gross miscarriage of justice that may have occurred due to an error in the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is the last judicial resort available for redressal after the exhaustion of all other legal remedies. A curative petition can only be filed after a review petition against the Supreme Court's judgment has been dismissed. It is heard by a bench of the three senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, along with the judges who delivered the impugned judgment, if available.

The concept of the curative petition was introduced by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and another^[4], wherein the court was addressing the question of whether an aggrieved party could seek relief against the final judgment or order of the Supreme Court, even after the dismissal of a review petition. The objectives of the curative petition are two-fold: to prevent miscarriage of justice and to deter the abuse of the legal process.

The constitutional basis for the curative petition is provided by Article 137 of the Indian Constitution, which grants the Supreme Court the power to review any judgment or order pronounced by it in matters concerning laws and rules made under Article 145. According to the procedure, a curative petition can be filed within 30 days from the date of the judgment or order, after the dismissal of a review plea against the final conviction.

For a curative petition to be entertained, the petitioner must demonstrate that there was a violation of the principles of natural justice and that they were not allowed to be heard by the court before the order was passed. It is emphasized that curative petitions should be rare exceptions rather than regular occurrences.

If the Bench determines at any stage that the petition lacks merit, it may impose penalties on the petitioner. A curative petition can be rejected by the bench at any stage if it lacks substantive merit or fails to demonstrate a violation of natural justice.

The Supreme Court of India’s Special Powers

The Supreme Court of India holds special powers endowed by the Constitution, as the apex judicial body in the nation. Article 131, confers exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising between the Centre and one or more States, or among States themselves, about legal rights. Additionally, Article 136 bestows discretionary jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, empowering it to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, or order issued by any court or tribunal within India, except military tribunals and court-martials. Furthermore, the Court exercises advisory jurisdiction under Article 143, whereby the President of India can seek the Court's opinion on specific matters of law. The Supreme Court can initiate contempt proceedings under Articles 129 and 142 to punish for contempt of itself, either suo motu or upon petition by others. Article 145 empowers the Supreme Court to formulate rules governing its practice and procedure for reviewing judgments, determining costs, granting bail, staying proceedings, and conducting inquiries, subject to the President's approval. Through these diverse powers, the Supreme Court plays a pivotal role in upholding the rule of law and dispensing justice across the Indian judicial landscape.

Recently, the Supreme Court of India utilized its "extraordinary powers" through a curative petition to reverse its previous judgment whereby it upheld an arbitral award ordering the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) to pay nearly Rs 8,000 crore to Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited (DAMEPL).

A partnership between DMRC and DAMEPL was entered into to construct, operate, and maintain the Delhi Airport Metro Express. However, disputes arose, leading to DAMEPL terminating the agreement in 2013, citing safety concerns and operational issues.

The arbitration panel ruled in favor of DAMEPL, directing DMRC to pay nearly Rs 8,000 crore. DAMEPL pursued the matter with the Supreme Court, which initially upheld the arbitral award in 2021. However, in the recent judgment, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of DMRC, citing a "fundamental error" in its previous judgment.

It ordered the refund of amounts deposited by the petitioner and any amount paid as part of coercive action. However, the court emphasized that the use of curative jurisdiction should not become routine, cautioning against opening floodgates for excessive court intervention in arbitral awards.

The judgment criticized the 2021 verdict of the Supreme Court, which upheld an Arbitral Tribunal’s award, as a grave miscarriage of justice. It described the decision as a misappreciation of law and facts, resulting in the restoration of a patently illegal award. The bench pointed out that the division bench of the Delhi High Court had provided more than adequate reasons to conclude that the arbitral award suffered from perversity and patent illegality.

Analyses

I. Curative Jurisdiction:

The Supreme Court's curative jurisdiction allows it to rectify gross miscarriages of justice even after the dismissal of a review petition. The jurisdiction aims to prevent abuse of the court's process and remedy serious injustices. In the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra, the court emphasized that justice should prevail over the principle of finality of judgments in exceptional cases where declining to reconsider a judgment would perpetuate irremediable injustice. The court outlined that a curative petition may be entertained to prevent abuse of process and correct miscarriages of justice, including violations of natural justice or situations where there's a risk of bias. However, the court noted that the grounds for entertaining a curative petition cannot be exhaustively enumerated.

II. Scope of Interference with Arbitral Awards:

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act allows courts to set aside arbitral awards on specific grounds, including conflicts with public policy or patent illegality. Patent illegality arises when the arbitrator's decision is irrational, perverse, or beyond the scope of their authority. Courts have endorsed the principle that arbitral awards can be set aside if they violate fundamental principles of natural justice or contravene the arbitration statute. The judgment on setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 is appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. However, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 to grant Special Leave to Appeal against decisions rendered in appeal under Section 37 is discretionary and exceptional. The Court must interfere sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist, ensuring that the correct tests are applied to assail the award.

III. The Award Was Patently Illegal

The Court pointed out the Tribunal's failure to consider vital evidence, such as the joint application to CMRS and the CMRS certificate, and its inability to reconcile inconsistencies in the evidence presented.

By setting aside the Division Bench's judgment, the Supreme Court effectively reinstated an award that was deemed to be patently illegal, imposing a significant and unjust burden on a public utility. Consequently, a grave miscarriage of justice ensued, warranting the invocation of the curative jurisdiction under Article 142. As a result, the curative petitions have been allowed, restoring the parties to their pre-judgment positions as per the Division Bench's decision. Execution proceedings to enforce the arbitral award are to be discontinued, and any amounts deposited by the petitioner according to the Supreme Court's judgment are to be refunded. Additionally, any amounts paid by the petitioner as a result of coercive action are liable to be restored. Supreme Court erred in interfering with the Division Bench's decision, which was based on a correct application of the law. The interference by the Supreme Court led to the reinstatement of an illegal award, resulting in a serious miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the curative petitions are allowed in the terms outlined, and any pending applications are disposed of accordingly.

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^[1] Curative Petition (C) Nos.108-109 of 2022

^[2] DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd., OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) No. 145 of 2021 (DHC)

^[3] DMRC v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 522

^[4] [2002] 2 S.C.R. 1006

The Supreme Court of India in  Dr. Kavita Yadav v The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department & Ors.^[1] ruled in favor of a contractual employee who was denied maternity benefits extending beyond her contract period. The Court determined that the benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, should continue even after the termination of her employment contract.

The appellant was employed on a contract basis from June 12, 2016, to June 11, 2017. She applied for maternity benefits on May 24, 2017, seeking leave starting from June 1, 2017. The employer granted only 11 days of maternity leave, citing the end of her contract on June 11, 2017. The appellant's claim for 26 weeks of maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, of 1961, was rejected by both the Central Administrative Tribunal and the High Court.

The reasoning adopted by the High Court while rejecting maternity benefit to the appellant in its judgment delivered on 19th August 2019 was based on Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.

Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, of 1961 deals with the right to payment of maternity benefits. As per the provisions of this section, every woman shall be entitled to, the payment of maternity benefits at the rate of the average daily wage for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for the six weeks immediately following that day and the employer is mandated to ensure the compliance of this provision.

Explanation embedded in the section states that the average daily wage should mean the average of the woman’s wages payable to her for the days on which she has worked during the period of three calendar months immediately preceding the date from which she absents herself on account of maternity, or one rupee a day, whichever is higher.

Subclause (2) further states that no woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit unless she has actually worked in an establishment of the employer from whom she claims maternity benefit for a period of not less than one hundred and sixty days in the twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery: however, the qualifying period of one hundred and sixty days shall not apply to a woman who has immigrated into the State of Assam and was pregnant at the time of the immigration.

For the purpose of calculating the days on which a woman has actually worked in the establishment, the days for which she has been laid off during the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of her expected delivery shall be taken into account. The maximum period for which any woman shall be entitled to maternity benefit shall be twelve weeks, ti.e., six weeks up to and including the day of her delivery and six weeks immediately following that day.

In case the woman dies during this period, the maternity benefit shall be payable only for the days up to and including the day of her death, and in case where a woman after the delivery dies, during her delivery, or during the period of six weeks immediately following the date of her delivery, the employer shall be liable for the maternity benefit for the entire period of six weeks immediately following the day of her delivery but if the child also dies during the said period, then for the days up to and including the day of the death of the child.

High Court Judgment

As per the High Court, the petitioner's reliance on Section 5(2) of the relevant Act to claim maternity benefits after her contract ended on 11.6.2017 is irrelevant. Regarding the issue of whether she was entitled to the benefit after her employment contract expired, the court noted that Section 5(1) of the Act provides for maternity benefit for the "period of her actual absence", which presupposes that for the maternity leave, the woman employee would remain present at work.

However, where the employment contract is time-bound and ends during the pregnancy or after childbirth, there is no question of her remaining "actually absent" because she would not be expected to remain present after the contract termination. As per the court, the purpose of the Act is not to extend the period of an employee's contract, and granting 180 days maternity leave despite the contract expiring a few days after leave began would be tantamount to an unintended extension of the contractual employment period.

Supreme Court Judgment

This judgment was appealed before the Supreme Court. The issue before the Apex Court was whether a contractual employee is entitled to maternity benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, of 1961, beyond the period of her contractual employment.

The appellant argued that under Section 5(2) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, she was entitled to maternity benefits for a period of 26 weeks, as she had served more than 180 days continuously before the expected delivery date. On the other hand, the respondent-employer contended that maternity benefits should not extend beyond the contractual period of employment. They argued that the contractual term could not be notionally extended to grant full maternity benefits.

After considering the rival submission of the parties, the Supreme Court while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, ruled in favor of the appellant, directing the employer to provide full maternity benefits.

The court interpreted the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and emphasized that the Act aims to protect the dignity of motherhood by ensuring a woman's employment is not terminated due to pregnancy. Further, Section 5(2) clearly grants maternity benefits to women who have worked for 180 days prior to the expected date of delivery, irrespective of the term of the contract. Further Section 5(2) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 specifies eligibility criteria for maternity benefits. Court reproduced the provisions of Section   12(2)(a)   of the   1961 Act^[2] wherein continuation of maternity benefits which is inbuilt in the statute itself is made clear.

Section   12(2)(a) deals with dismissal during absence or pregnancy. It protects women from wrongful deductions made in her salary by the actions of her employer. As per this section, in the case where a woman is absent from work in accordance with the provisions of the 1961 Act, her employer cannot discharge or dismiss her or give notice of discharge or dismissal and if he does so, the same would be considered unlawful. This section protects women by holding actions of the employer unlawful which are taken at her disadvantage just because she was absent as per the provisions of the 1961 Act.

As a consequence of this, if the woman is discharged or dismissed at any time during her pregnancy, she would be entitled to maternity benefits or a medical bonus. She can be deprived of maternity benefits, medical bonus or both if the dismissal is for any prescribed gross misconduct communicated to the woman in writing. Any woman deprived of maternity benefit or medical bonus or both can appeal to an appropriate authority within sixty days from the date on which the order of such deprivation is communicated to her and the decision of the authority will be final.

Based on this section, the court concluded that Section 12(2)(a) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 Protects women from dismissal or discharge during pregnancy, hence the benefits would survive and continue despite the cessation of employment.

The court opined that Section 27 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 Provides overriding effect to the Act over any inconsistent agreement or contract. For this reason, the High Court erred in law in holding that the appellant was not entitled to maternity benefits beyond 11th June 2017.

After placing reliance on Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Female Workers (Muster Roll) & Anr.^[3], the Court held that maternity benefits are not co-terminus with the term of employment and can extend beyond the contractual period.

Consequently, the court noted that a combined reading of these provisions in the factual context of this case would lead to the conclusion that once the appellant fulfilled the entitlement criteria specified in Section 5(2) of the Act(180 days of service), she became eligible for full maternity benefits even if such benefits exceed the duration of her contract.  Any attempt to enforce the contract duration term within such period by the employer would constitute “discharge” and attract the embargo specified in Section 12(2)(a) of the 1961 Act.  The law creates a fiction in such a case by treating her to be in employment for the sole purpose of availing maternity benefits under the 1961 Act.

The Supreme Court’s judgment is pivotal in interpreting and reinforcing the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. The purpose of this act has always been to ease the working environment for women. A recent amendment to the act “the Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017”^[4] increased paid maternity leave from 12 weeks to 26 weeks, with not more than eight weeks preceding the expected delivery date, and introduced the possibility of working from home based on mutual agreement between the employer and the employee. This highlights the attempts made at improving women’s participation in the labor force and enhancing the quality of their employment through legislative measures, including the Code on Social Security, 2020,^[5] which mandates crèche facilities in establishments with 50 or more employees and allows women to work night shifts with adequate safety measures.

The Supreme Court’s ruling is significant as it clarifies the judicial interpretation of key provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, particularly for women engaged in non-standard contracts, such as fixed-term contracts. This decision lays a beneficial foundation for improved maternity protections at the workplace and sets a precedent for future cases, as evidenced by the Delhi High Court’s reliance on this ruling in Govt. of NCT Delhi v. Rehmat Fatima^[6] to grant maternity benefits post-contract expiry. It highlights the need for employers to acknowledge the financial responsibility of extending maternity benefits beyond the contract term.

It could potentially affect cases where a woman has not started availing maternity benefits before her contract ends. This decision, thus, ensures that women who begin availing maternity benefits during their employment can continue to receive these benefits even after their contractual engagement ends, promoting fairness and addressing the genuine expectations of modern working women.

By ensuring that maternity benefits extend beyond the contractual period, the Court has aligned Indian practices with other national jurisdictions. In other countries including Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Somalia, and Tajikistan, the employer has a responsibility to find alternative employment to the employee after the expiry of fixed-term contracts. During the period in which alternative employment is being sought, wages are paid for three months from the day on which the fixed employment contract expires.^[7]

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^[1] 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1067.

^[2] Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

^[3] (2000) 3 SCC 224

^[4] PIB, “Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017”, (13 FEB 2023), available at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1898874#:~:text=Vide%20Section%205%20of%20the,the%20date%20of%20expected%20delivery.

^[5]  PIB, “Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017”, (13 FEB 2023), available at https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1898874#:~:text=Vide%20Section%205%20of%20the,the%20date%20of%20expected%20delivery.

^[6] 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1749

^[7] International Labour Organisation, “Maternity and Paternity at work: law and practice across the world”, )2014), available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/public

In times when the real estate developers face financial trouble and they are unable to finish building homes, the homebuyers are left in a tough situation. The emotional stress and financial burdens faced by homebuyers in such situations cannot be overstated. Consider the case of the Amrapali Group in India (Bikram Chatterji v. Union of India, (2019) 19 SCC 161), where the Supreme Court canceled the developer's registration and ordered the attachment of its properties to ensure the completion of unfinished housing projects and the refund of investments made by homebuyers. In this article, we explore the rights and protections available to homebuyers in insolvency proceedings.

Who are homebuyers?

As per the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('IBC'), homebuyers are financial creditors. A 'financial creditor' is a person to whom a financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred to. In other words, a financial creditor is someone who’s money is not yet paid by the person who owes the repayment. Homebuyers under IBC are treated as financial creditors. Their status as operational creditors has been reversed.

Homebuyers, who have invested in residential projects but have yet to receive possession of their homes, are typically classified as financial creditors. They have already paid advance money for the possession and are awaiting the same.  They are given priority in insolvency proceedings. Operational creditors are those contractors, suppliers, or service providers who have provided goods or services necessary for project construction but have not been paid.

Understanding Insolvency Proceedings:

When a company or person is unable to repay their debts, it's called a situation of insolvency. In the real estate sector, insolvency occurs when developers cannot finish projects or deliver homes within a stipulated timeline because they have run out of finances. Insolvency cases in the Indian real estate sector have affected thousands of homebuyers, which highlights the prevalence and gravity of the issue.

Homebuyers' Rights in Insolvency:

As a homebuyer, you are not left helpless by the legal system. You are bestowed certain rights. Here's what you're entitled to if you've bought a home from a developer facing financial problems:

Priority Status: As a homebuyer whose money is owed by a developer, you have the advantage of being prioritized to receive your money back. This special treatment was established following the landmark IDBI Bank v. Jaypee Infratech Limited 2017 LawSuit (NCLT) 5069, which granted homebuyers the position of financial creditors under the IBC.

Asset Protection: You have the right to stake a claim on any property or assets owned by the developer in order to recover your funds.

Legal Assistance: Additionally, you have the option to pursue legal action against the developer to retrieve your money, compel them to complete the construction, or terminate the agreement and receive a refund.

Regulatory Support: Government agencies like the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) in India is empowered step in to help complete the building projects or find new developers to take over, as seen in the Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. and Anr. V. Union of India Writ Petition (Civil) NO. 43 OF 2019.

Challenges and Considerations:

Delays: When a company is insolvent, it can be a lengthy process before a resolution is reached, causing delays. It is important to address these issues promptly, as seen in the Pioneer Urban Land case.

Limited Funds: In situations where there is not enough money to cover all debts, you may not receive full repayment.

Legal Expenses: The costs associated with legal proceedings can be substantial, therefore it is wise to review the risks and the costs involved. Obtaining guidance from seasoned legal professionals is key.

Market Influences: The completion of projects may be impacted by economic factors. Market is subject to various factors including cost of various raw materials, taxations, loan interest etc. It is the situation of the market which will determine the completion of the project with sufficient economic resources.

Homebuyers cannot be treated different from other ‘financial creditors’

Recently, the Supreme Court in Vishal Chelani and others v. Debashis Nanda, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 894 held that homebuyers cannot be treated different from other ‘financial creditors’ under the IBC only because they have secured favorable orders from the authority under RERA.

Court also overruled a National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) order which held that the beneficiary RERA orders should be treated differently from other home buyer allottees. It further stated that it is only home buyers that can approach and seek remedies under RERA – no one esle. In such circumstances, to treat a particular segment of homebuyers differently from another segment, on the ground that one had taken back the deposits with interest as ordered by RERA, would be highly inequitable.

Conclusion

With the rising economy of a developing nation like India, real estate sector is at an all-time boom. With the continued interest in the sector, real estate projects are also growing significantly. Hence, it becomes pertinent to know what are your rights as homebuyers. If you find yourself in a situation where your developer is facing insolvency, stay informed about the insolvency proceedings and any developments related to your housing project. Explore legal options and file appropriate claims or petitions to assert your rights as a homebuyer. Cooperate with regulatory authorities like RERA and provide all necessary documentation to support your case. It is imperative to choose the right course of action whether litigation or alternate dispute resolution to resolve the matter efficiently.