The issue arising for consideration in the present case was relating to the validity of the High Court’s findings where grounds under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“1951 Act”) were established, warranting invalidation of the election of one Karikho Kri (“Appellant”). Two sets of civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the 1951 Act against the decision of the High Court, which partially allowed an election petition holding the election of the Appellant as void but rejected the prayer of Nuney Tayang (“Respondent”), to declare him as duly elected.
The factual basis of the present case is such that in the year 2019, the Appellant won as an independent Member of Legislative Assembly from Tezu and his victory was challenged by the Respondent , of the Congress party on the ground that the Appellant in his election papers did not disclose certain vehicles in possession, being in occupation of a government-allotted cottage, and further did not provide certificates showing payment of rent, electricity, water, and telephone charges, etc. High Court held that the Appellant did not comply with the rules while submitting his nomination papers, and thereby violated Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and that the Appellant’s nomination papers should have been rejected by the election officer, as per Section 36(2)(b) of the 1951 Act. Consequently, the Appellant’s victory in the election was declared void, under Section 90(a)(c) of the 1951 Act. The Supreme Court while deciding the case observed that the High Court committed an error in concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Section 100 of the 1951 Act to invalidate the election and upheld the candidature of the Appellant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that every defect in filing of the nomination form cannot be termed as a ground to consider the elections as void and every case has its own set of individual facts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary for a candidate to declare each and every item of the movable property that he or his dependent family members owns unless the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be disclosed. The Hon’ble Court further observed that non-disclosure of every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character.
Consequently, the Apex Court rightly held that a candidate’s ‘Right to Privacy’ would still survive in matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. Further, very defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case would have to turn on its own individual facts.