The Supreme Court in a landmark decision involving an appeal filed by a foreign national prosecuted for offenses under Sections 8, 22, 23, and 29 of the NDPS Act, against bail conditions imposed by the High Court. This judgment addresses two critical issues pertaining to the legality of imposing a condition requiring the accused to "drop a PIN on Google Maps," and the necessity of obtaining a certificate of assurance from the relevant embassy or high commission for foreign nationals.
The case involved the interpretation of Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which allows courts to impose conditions while granting bail "in the interests of justice." The scope of this provision and the extent to which it allows curtailment of an accused's rights was a key issue. Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which places additional restrictions on granting bail in certain NDPS cases, was also relevant. The interplay between the NDPS Act's bail provisions and the general bail provisions in the CrPC needed to be considered. Article 21 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to life and personal liberty, was central to the appellant's arguments against the bail conditions. Previous Supreme Court judgments recognizing that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights were cited to argue that an accused on bail should have even greater protection of their Article 21 rights.
The Supreme Court delivered a detailed decision addressing the two main issues raised regarding the bail conditions imposed on Frank Vitus. Regarding the condition of dropping a PIN on Google Maps, the Court found this condition to be problematic and ultimately ordered its deletion. They reasoned that:
Imposing any bail condition that enables constant tracking of an accused's movements would violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Based on the affidavit submitted by Google LLC, the Court noted that dropping a PIN on Google Maps does not actually enable real-time tracking of a user or their device. The user has full control over sharing PINs, and the pinned location is static, not dynamic. Therefore, the condition as imposed was technically ineffective and redundant. The Court emphasized that bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary, or freakish. They should not be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. While courts may impose conditions like periodically reporting to police or seeking permission for international travel, they cannot impose conditions that allow constant surveillance of the accused's movements. The Court further stated that the object of bail conditions cannot be to keep constant vigil on the movements of the accused, as this would infringe on their right to privacy and effectively amount to a form of confinement even after release on bail.
Regarding the condition of furnishing a certificate from the Embassy/High Commission, the Court provided a nuanced interpretation of this condition, originally stemming from the 1994 Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee case. The Court clarified that the directions in the 1994 case were meant as one-time measures for pending cases at that time. They were not intended to be mandatory in all future cases involving foreign nationals. It was held that it is not necessary to incorporate this condition in every case where bail is granted to a foreign national in an NDPS case on grounds of long incarceration. The need for such a condition should depend on the facts of each case. Further, the Court recognized that obtaining such a certificate is beyond the control of the accused. Therefore, if the Embassy/High Commission declines or fails to issue the certificate within a reasonable time (suggested as seven days), the Court has the power to dispense with this condition. Emphasis was placed on the point that an accused cannot be denied bail due to non-compliance with a condition that is impossible for them to fulfill. In cases where the certificate is not obtainable, the Court suggested alternative conditions like surrendering the passport and regularly reporting to the local police station or trial court.
The Court took the opportunity to lay down some broader guidelines on bail conditions:
a) Bail conditions must be within the framework of Section 437(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and consistent with the object of imposing conditions.
b) The constitutional rights of an accused released on bail can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required.
c) Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions, ensuring they do not violate fundamental rights or amount to a form of punishment.
d) The Court reiterated that even convicted prisoners retain certain fundamental rights, so accused persons who are presumed innocent should have even stronger protection of their rights.
Consequently, the Court noted that bail was granted to the appellant partly on merits, based on the inadmissibility of certain evidence as per Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 4 SCC 1 Given this, the Court found no justification for imposing all the onerous conditions from the 1994 Legal Aid Committee case. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the deletion of both the Google Maps condition and the Embassy certificate condition from the appellant's bail order. They declined to refer the matter to a larger bench for reconsideration of the 1994 judgment and instead provided a clarified interpretation of how those guidelines should be applied in current cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case is particularly noteworthy as it intersects with contemporary concerns about digital privacy and the use of technology in law enforcement. By examining these issues through the lens of constitutional rights and established legal principles, the Court has set a precedent that is likely to have far-reaching implications for bail proceedings, especially those involving foreign nationals and technologically enabled surveillance. This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India offers a nuanced and progressive view on bail conditions, particularly for foreign nationals accused under the NDPS Act.