In the present case, Supreme Court overturned order passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (“High Court”) for lacking proper reasoning wherein the High Court had merely affirmed the Single Bench’s decision without providing detailed explanation for its concurrence. The Supreme Court noted that a decision without reasoned judgment cannot be legally sustained.
The State of Uttar Pradesh (“State”) had filed an appeal against judgment passed by the High Court. The High Court’s judgment was in response to an intra-court appeal against a common judgment passed by the Single Judge in a batch of Writ Petitions. The State had issued various Government Orders including one dated 11.12.2020. The State contended that the Allahabad High Court did not adequately consider or address the Government Orders and Circulars issued by them. During the pendency of the matter, the Supreme Court issued a stay order dated 2.9.2022 which was subsequently made absolute on 2.05.2023. The stay order allowed the State to make appointments with teachers, subject to final orders in the appeal. The State further argued that the High Court had not applied its mind to the submissions made by both sides and had simply upheld the Single Judge’s order without proper reasoning. The case involved issues related to teacher appointments in Uttar Pradesh, with subsequent developments occurring after the initial judgments were passed, however the same was not considered.
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court in its impugned judgment, merely placed on record the cases of the Writ Petitioners and Respondents, followed by the findings of the Single Judge. The Supreme Court emphasized that in the absence of any reasoning in the impugned judgment, the same cannot be sustained. Relying on the precedent set in CCT v. Shukla & Bros (2010), the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that reason is the very life of law and that giving reasons furthers the cause of justice while avoiding uncertainty. The Supreme Court observed that the absence of reasons in a judgment leads to frustration of these objectives and introduces an element of uncertainty and dissatisfaction and accordingly directed the High Court to hear the intra court appeal again.
In the instant case, Supreme Court held that an Appellate Court cannot create a new case by framing additional issues and is obligated to decide the issues involved in the suit based on the pleadings of the parties. The Supreme Court referred to Order XLI, Rule 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 that empowers the Appellate Court to frame issues and remand the same for trial to the Court whose decree is appealed from, if necessary.
The Appellants in the present case had filed a suit before the trial court seeking a declaration with regard to the right, title and interest over the scheduled land and for eviction of the Respondents from the said land in question as also seeking permanent injunction. The trial court had decreed the said Suit filed by the Appellants. Being aggrieved, the Respondents preferred two appeals. First Appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondents filed a Second Appeal before the Gauhati High Court. Gauhati High Court allowed the said Second Appeal and set aside the orders passed by the trial court and the Appellate Court. As such, being aggrieved, the Appellants filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court observed that the said substantial questions of law formulated by the High Court were neither raised before the trial court or the Appellate Court. Furthermore, the parties were not given any opportunity to lead evidence on the said issues. The Supreme court criticized the Gauhati High Court and emphasized the role of Appellate Courts and necessity of adhering to procedural rules of CPC. The Supreme Court further held that the Court cannot create any new case at the appellate stage for either of the parties and, the Appellate Court is supposed to decide the issues involved in the suit on the pleadings of the parties. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Hon’ble High Court in the Second Appeal and remanded the case to the Gauhati High Court for deciding the same afresh and in accordance with law.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that if a party's right to file a written statement is forfeited, they cannot indirectly present their case through evidence or written submissions. While such a party may still participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the complainant, they cannot introduce their case indirectly.
The present case relates to the consumer dispute, wherein pursuant to the Supreme Court's order the Respondent/defendant had forfeited his right to file a written statement, however, liberty was granted to him to decide whether to participate in the proceedings or not. According to Order 6 Rule 7 of the CPC, a defendant can only introduce claims consistent with previous pleadings. When previous pleadings are absent due to the forfeiture of the right to file a written statement, the defendant cannot introduce their case indirectly. Despite not presenting a formal case for cross-examination, the defendant proceeded to cross-examine witnesses and submit documentary evidence. The court observed that the defendant should not have been allowed to produce evidence without having first presented a formal case. Consequently, the defendant was restricted to arguing only the legal questions based on existing laws and authorities and addressing issues such as lapses, or non-admissibility of evidence introduced by the appellants.
The Court declined to intervene in the NCDRC's decision, which did not consider the defendant’s written statements, and affirmed that forfeiture of the right to file a written statement precludes indirect case presentation. The defendant can still participate and cross-examine witnesses.
In the instant case, the seven judge Constitution Bench ruled by a majority of 6:1 that sub-classification within the Scheduled Castes (SCs) among reserved categories is permissible for granting separate quotes for more backwards within SC categories.
This decision addresses the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act 2006 (‘the Act’), which allocated 50% of SC reserved vacancies to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs. This provision was challenged and declared unconstitutional by the Punjab and Haryana High Court based on the precedent in E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394, wherein, it was held that SCs cannot be further classified for the purpose of reservation because they constitute an internally homogenous class by virtue of their inclusion in the Presidential list and thus, as a class, groups within the SCs cannot be treated differently and any further classification and consequent preferential treatment were held to violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as it would amount to a constitutionally prescribed ‘micro-classification’.
The Supreme Court revisited the Chinnaiah (supra) case and clarified that sub-classification within SCs is permissible under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, provided that the class is not homogenous for the purpose of the law. It established that sub-classification must meet two criteria: it should have a rational principle of intelligible differentia, and this principle must be related to the purpose of the statute. Thus, the State in exercise of the power under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) can further classify the Scheduled Castes if (a) there is a rational principle for differentiation; and (b) the rational principle has a nexus with the purpose of sub-classification. The Court emphasized that Article 341 Constitution of India does not create a homogenous class, and that sub-classification does not violate it unless it gives exclusive benefits to certain SC groups over all reserved seats. This decision aligns with the broader principles established in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and acknowledges the SCs as a socially heterogeneous class, allowing states to further classify them under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) if justified.
In a landmark development on September 23, 2024, the Supreme Court of India has urged Parliament to amend the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The court has recommended a critical change in terminology: replacing the term ‘child pornography’ with ‘child sexual exploitative material’ to better reflect the gravity of the crime and its exploitative nature.
The new terminology aligns with international standards, addressing the abuse and exploitation involved.
A more robust legal framework to enhance the prosecution of offenders.
The court emphasized the urgent need for public awareness campaigns to combat child exploitation in the digital age.
This proposed amendment is a major step towards strengthening child protection laws in India.
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
Introducing the Deal Value Threshold (DVT) under the Competition Amendment Act 2023 brings India’s merger regulation in line with global standards. This new provision, effective September 10, 2024, will significantly impact Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), particularly in the digital and emerging sectors.
DVT applies to deals exceeding Rs 2,000 crore or where the target company has substantial business operations in India. It aims to capture M&A deals in digital markets, where traditional thresholds may fall short. India now joins the ranks of US, Germany, Austria, and South Korea, which have successfully implemented similar thresholds. This is a critical step forward in ensuring a competitive and fair marketplace, especially in data-driven industries.
Stay tuned as the CCI rolls out further regulations to guide this groundbreaking change!
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
Exciting times ahead as India prepares for groundbreaking AI legislation! Key highlights include:
- New AI law focusing on innovation while avoiding penal consequences.
- AI content labelling for platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube.
- Focus on Indian languages and context-specific AI models.
- Government initiatives to tackle deepfakes and promote public awareness.
Assurance that innovation will not be stifled by regulations.
Stay tuned as India balances regulation and growth in the AI space!
To delve into the specifics, please review the information provided in the following link :
In the instant case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that separate suits can be filed for possession and recovery of dues when the causes of action are different and the Plaintiff has reserved their rights to claim the outstanding amounts separately.
On 25.11.2008, a Leave and License Agreement was entered into between the Uniworld Logistics Private Limited (“Appellant”) and Indev Logistics Private Limited (“Respondent”). The said Leave and License Agreement was superseded by another agreement dated 1.12.2010 whereby the Appellant became the licensee in respect of the warehouse on a monthly license fee of Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs) with an escalation clause.
Thereafter, the Appellant defaulted on the payment of storage charges. As such, vide its notice dated 27.11.2014, (“Termination Notice”) the Respondent terminated the said license claiming dues towards storage charges, damages and directing the Appellant to vacate the warehouse premises within a period of two (2) months from the date of the receipt of the said notice. Vide its letter dated 18.12.2014, the Appellant replied to the aforesaid Termination Notice and refuted the claims and allegations made therein. Consequently, the Respondent filed a suit before the Court of District Munsif, Sriperumbudur (“Trial Court”) for permanent injunction and possession of the warehouse premises, reserving its right to claim the outstanding dues separately.
Subsequently, Respondent sought leave under Order II Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”) to file a separate suit for the recovery of the arrears which was granted by the Ld. Trial Court by its order dated 24.11.2015. Thereafter, the Appellant challenged the said order dated 24.11.2015 (granting leave) in the Hon’ble Madra High Court contending that the second suit was barred under Order II Rule 2(2) of CPC. However, the Ld. Trial Court and the Hon’ble Madras High Court found that the two suits were based on different causes of action and that the Respondent neither relinquished its claim nor omitted to seek relief.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on its judgment in the matter of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited V. ATM Constructions Private Limited and held that a suit for possession and a suit for claiming damages for use and occupation of the property are based on different causes of action. Furthermore, Respondent had reserved its rights regarding its claim for outstanding dues in the first suit and had obtained leave to filed a separate suit. Hence, the second suit filed by the Respondent was maintainable. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal.
In the instant case, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has held that the WhatsApp Chats are inadmissible evidence in the absence of any proper certification to that effect.
The facts of the present case are that on 19.09.2022, one Mr. Adeel Feroze (“Respondent No. 1”), had filed a Consumer Complaint against the Dell International Services India Private Limited (“Petitioner”) before the Hon’ble District Commission. On 16.11.2022, the Hon’ble District Commission issued summons. The said summons was received by the Petitioner on 23.12.2023. The Petitioner’s contention was that the documents received by it were incomplete. Ultimately, on 31.01.2023, the Petitioner filed its Written Statement on the basis of the documents received by it. As there was delay in filing the said Written Statement, the Petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay of seven (7) days in filing the said Written Statement. Thereafter, vide its order dated 04.07.2023, the Hon’ble District Commission refused to take on record the Written Statement filed by the Petitioner on the ground that the same was filed beyond the statutory time limit. Thereafter, being aggrieved, the Petitioner filed a Revision Petition No. 51 of 2023 before the Hon’ble Delhi State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (“State Commission”) and challenged the order dated 04.07.2023 passed by the Hon’ble District Commission. Vide its order dated 12.12.2023, the Hon’ble State Commission upheld the order passed by the Hon’ble District Commission and refused to exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner approached the Hon’ble Delhi Court.
In the proceedings before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, the Petitioner attempted to use the WhatsApp chats to demonstrate that the complete set of documents with the summons had not been received by it. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court held that under the Evidence Act, 1872, electronic records such as WhatsApp chats require a certificate under Section 65B to be admissible in the Court. In the instant case, the Petitioner failed to provide the necessary Section 65B certification. Therefore, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court ruled that the WhatsApp chats cannot be considered as valid evidence. The Hon’ble Court further concluded that the Petitioner did not present the said chats before the Hon’ble State Commission and the order passed by the Hon’ble State Commission was also silent as regards the presence of the said WhatsApp Chats. Hence, introducing completely new evidence at a belated stage of the proceedings especially in a Writ Petition, and the same not being a part of the earlier proceedings before the Hon’ble State Commissions and without proper certification, undermines the judicial process and procedural fairness.
Hence, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court dismissed the Writ Petition, upholding the decision of the Hon’ble District Commission and the State Commission.
In an effort to simplify and harmonize the Goods and Services Tax (GST) framework, the 53rd GST Council meeting proposed significant amendments to Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017. These amendments, including the insertion of a new Section 74A, aim to standardize the time limits for issuing demand notices and orders, regardless of whether fraud or willful misstatement is involved. Additionally, the Council recommended extending the time limit for taxpayers to avail of reduced penalty benefits.
The different time limits for issuance of show cause notices and adjudication of demands have led to confusion and legal disputes. There have been instances where notices issued under Section 74 (fraud cases) beyond the three years but within the five-year limit have been challenged. If the charges of fraud or suppression were not sustained, these notices had to be dropped as time-barred, resulting in legal uncertainty and numerous court cases. Garg Rice Mills v. State of Punjab [2024] challenged the legality of extending the due date for issuing notices under Section 73, arguing it was time-barred. In Titan Company Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST & Central Excise [2024] where the department has issued show cause notices by bunching up notices for multiple assessment years, for a period for the time limit is already exhausted, the Hon’ble Madras High Court emphasized that the limitation period is applicable separately for each assessment year. The challenge in K. R. Pulp Papers Ltd. v. Goods and Services Tax Council [2024] regarding the extension of time for issuing notices reflects issues similar to those addressed by the proposed amendment.
Under the current provisions, Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act govern the issuance of demand notices and orders for tax, interest, and penalties:
The GST Council has recommended the following key changes:
The proposed amendments to Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, along with the introduction of Section 74A, represent a significant step towards simplifying the GST framework. With the amended provisions, the proper officer can determine fraudulent intent during proceedings. The recommendation is only to align the time limit of both provisions, however, it will bring a genuine taxpayer and a fraudulent one at par which is inconsistent with the legislative intent. A similar provision is also included in the Central Excise Bill, 2024. The time limit for taxpayers to avail reduced penalties is proposed to increase from 30 to 60 days, providing more time for compliance. It must be noted that Taxpayers with cases from financial years before 2024-25 will not benefit from the new common timeline and will be subject to the existing time limits. Taxpayers with notices already time-barred under the current law will not gain retroactive benefits from the new provisions. Taxpayers against whom fraud, suppression, or willful misstatement is proven will still face the prescribed penalties and consequences.
The Apex Court in the present case revisited the scope & application of Sec. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“Succession Act”). The present case involves an issue over the ownership of a property & the right of Kailas Chand (“Plaintiff”) being legal heir of Hindu widow to enforce her right of succession in the unpartitioned Joint Hindu Family property by virtue of Section 14(1) of Succession Act.
The property in dispute is the unpartitioned Hindu Joint Family Property (“Property”) which was came in the possession of Mukatlal (“Defendant”) through a Will executed by the Defendant’s father (“Will”). The deceased widowed mother of the Plaintiff had filed a suit in the Civil Court seeking declaration of title and possession over the Property contending that the same was joint Hindu family property and the Will allegedly executed by Defendant’s father was illegal. The Court dismissed the suit while recognizing the right of widow only to the extent of receiving maintenance from the property, which was not challenged by her any further. The Defendant on attaining the age of majority preferred an appeal against the aforementioned judgement, which was allowed by the Senior Civil Judge. Being aggrieved by the order of the Senior Civil Judge, the Plaintiff’s mother preferred a Second appeal before the Single Judge of the High Court and during the pendency of the case, she passed away and her legal heir (the Plaintiff) was taken on record. The Single Judge restored the Civil Court’s judgment to the extent of the Plaintiff’s mother’s right to be maintained by the Property. Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed Revenue Suit for partition of the Property before the Revenue Court claiming his mother was entitled to a rightful share in the Property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Succession Act. The appeal from the said Revenue Suit seeking partition culminated in the impugned judgment.
The Court reiterated that the issue regarding title and possession over the Property was concluded against the Plaintiff’s mother and that she was never in possession of the Property was an admitted position from the record which was never challenged. The Hon’ble Court placed reliance on Munni Devi v. Rajendra, wherein, the widow was actually residing in the suit property during the time the coparcener was alive and even after his death, she continued to reside in the said house and used to collect the rents from the tenants who were occupying the suit property, the Court after taking into consideration the pre-existing right of the female to maintenance from the estate of the HUF of her husband and her exclusive settled possession over the suit property concluded that she had acquired the suit property in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintenance and that she had held the suit property as the full owner and not limited owner by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Succession Act.
Regarding the question that whether in absence of even a semblance of possession either actual or legal over the suit property, the Plaintiff being the legal heir of his widowed mother, would beentitled to institute a Revenue Suit for partition of the Property based on the succession rights of the widow on the HUF property, the Hon’ble Court referred to Ram Vishal v. Jagan Nath, wherein, it was held that, a pre-existing right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property, but she must have acquired the property.
Hence, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that, for establishing full ownership on the undivided joint family estate under Section 14(1) of the Succession Act, the Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property and such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or be her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription.
The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the present case deliberated over the question of whether land reserved for public purpose under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (“MRTP Act”) can be acquired by granting TDR/FSI as compensation.
The Petitioner is a registered Public Charitable Trust who approached the Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking directions to the Respondents to adhere to the due process of law in acquiring its land according to the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ("2013 Act").
The Petitioner owns land adjacent to the Mandapeshwar Caves, which the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) claims ownership of, based on a declaration that the land is vested in the Government of India. Despite an order from the City Civil Court in 2001 restraining the ASI from disturbing the Petitioner’s possession, the Municipal Corporation requested the Petitioner to hand over the land for developing a public garden, offering Transferable Development Rights (TDR) in lieu of monetary compensation. The Petitioner, however, refused the TDR, insisting on monetary compensation as per the provisions of the 2013 Act.
The Petitioner in this case expressed willingness to transfer the land, if monetary compensation is provided according to the law. The Municipal Corporation rejected this request, maintaining that TDR could be offered instead of monetary compensation under the MRTP Act. This led to the present writ petition, where the Petitioner seeks a direction that any acquisition of its land should follow the procedure outlined in the 2013 Act if there is no agreement on TDR/FSI.
The primary legal issue for consideration is whether land reserved for public purposes under the MRTP Act, can be acquired by granting TDR or FSI as compensation or whether it must follow the 2013 Act if the landowner rejects TDR/FSI. Sections 125 and 126 of the MRTP Actstipulate that land required for public purposes is deemed needed for such purposes under the 2013 Act. Section 126 of the MRTP Act further provides that such land can be acquired by agreement (by paying an agreed amount or granting TDR/FSI) or by applying to the State Government for acquisition under the 2013 Act if no agreement is reached.
A careful reading of Section 126 of the MRTP Act reveals that TDR or FSI can only be granted based on an agreement between the parties. Without such an agreement, the reserved land must be acquired under the 2013 Act. This interpretation aligns with the decision passed by a full bench of this Hon’ble Court in Shree Vinayak Builders and Developers, Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra, where the Court emphasized that acquisition under Section 126(1)(a) and (b) of the MRTP Act must be by mutual agreement, not unilaterally imposed by the acquiring authority.
The court, after considering the submissions from both the parties, held that in the absence of an agreement between the Petitioner and the planning authority/development authority, the land reserved for public purposes can only be acquired by following the procedure under Section 126(1)(c) of the MRTP Act, which involves the 2013 Act. Consequently, the Respondents cannot compel the Petitioner to accept TDR/FSI and must adhere to the land acquisition process under the 2013 Act.
Accordingly, the court directed that any acquisition of the Petitioner’s land by the Municipal Corporation must comply with Section 126(1)(c) of the of the MRTP Act, by following the 2013 Act procedures if there is no mutual agreement on TDR/FSI.
The government has taken initiatives to ensure that India becomes a preferred destination in terms of doing business and getting disputes resolved efficiently. To make arbitration a preferred mode of dispute resolution by making it more user-friendly, and cost-effective, and ensuring timely disposal of cases, the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Then in 2015, the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 was enacted. To make arbitration process time efficient, a time limit of 12 months for the completion of arbitration proceedings was introduced. The 2019 Amendment established the Arbitration Council of India (ACI) for grading arbitral institutions and accreditation of arbitrators. Despite government efforts and the active role of the judiciary in ensuring the effectiveness of arbitration, the ground realities pose a concerning picture. As per a report, the Majority of the companies in India (91% of the companies surveyed in India), that have a dispute resolution policy, include arbitration (not litigation) for the resolution of future disputes.[1] However, the data for 2022[2] shows that of the pending arbitration cases in India, a majority of around 48 percent were pending for more than a year. Around 23 percent of cases stay pending for ten to twenty years. Nevertheless, Arbitration remains one of the most preferred ways of resolving disputes and the one that is evolving.
The case of Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/S BSC & C and C JV[3], has brought into sharp focus the interpretation of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This landmark case not only challenges the conventional understanding of court jurisdiction in arbitration matters but also promises to reshape the contours of arbitral proceedings across India's diverse judicial landscape. As India continues its ascent as a preferred destination for international arbitration, the outcome of this case could have far-reaching implications for the country's arbitration regime. It raises pivotal questions about the powers vested in different levels of courts, particularly in regions where High Courts lack ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
On May 13, 2024, the Supreme Court of India deliberated on a significant case that brought to the forefront crucial questions about the interpretation and application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, of 1996. The case, arising from Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10544/2024, was heard by a division bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan. This petition challenged an order dated April 22, 2024, passed by the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong in CRP No. 2/2024.
The petitioner, in this case, was the Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads). The respondent, M/S BSC & C and C JV. At the heart of this legal dispute lies the interpretation and application of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, of 1996. This section, which deals with time limits for arbitral awards, was introduced to ensure the speedy resolution of arbitration proceedings.
"29A. The time limit for the arbitral award.—(1) The award in matters other than international commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.
Provided that the award in the matter of international commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously as possible and endeavor may be made to dispose of the matter within a period of twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as the parties may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period specified in sub-section (1) for making the award for a further period not exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this subsection, if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order a reduction of fees of the arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five percent. for each month of such delay:
Provided further that where an application under sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an opportunity to be heard before the fees is reduced.
(5) The extension of the period referred to in subsection (4) may be on the application of any of the parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in subsection (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material.
(7) In the event of the arbitrator(s) being appointed under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days from the date of service of notice on the opposite party."
This comprehensive section outlines several key aspects of arbitration proceedings. It sets a 12-month time limit for making awards in non-international commercial arbitrations, starting from the completion of pleadings. It allows for a 6-month extension by mutual consent of the parties. It empowers the Court to extend the time period if the award is not made within the specified or extended time. It gives the Court the authority to substitute arbitrators while extending the time. It allows the Court to reduce arbitrators' fees for delays attributable to the arbitral tribunal. It ensures that if arbitrators are substituted, the proceedings continue from the existing stage. It empowers the Court to impose actual or exemplary costs on any party. It directs courts to dispose of extension applications within 60 days.
The crux of the dispute in this case revolves around the interpretation of the term "Court" as used in Section 29A, particularly in relation to the powers vested under sub-sections (4) and (6). To understand this, it's essential to refer to Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, which defines "Court" as:
"Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.
The petitioner's argument, as presented by the senior counsel, centered on this definition. They contended that since the High Court of Meghalaya does not have ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it lacks the power under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act to extend the time for making the arbitral award.
Furthermore, the petitioner argued that the power to substitute arbitrators under Section 29A(6) is only a consequential power vesting in the Court that is empowered to extend the time. They maintained that this power should be exercised only by the Court empowered to extend time as provided in Section 29A(4).
The Supreme Court's analysis centered on determining which "Court" has the power to extend time limits and replace arbitrators under Section 29A. The court clarified that this power vests in the "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act. According to this definition, the Court refers to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, which can include a High Court, but only if that High Court has ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Hence, in this particular case, the High Court of Meghalaya does not possess ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Supreme Court emphasized that the power under Section 29A(6) to replace and substitute arbitrators is a consequential power that can only be exercised by the Court empowered to extend the time under Section 29A(4).
The Court's interpretation implies that the authority to extend time limits for arbitral awards and to replace arbitrators in case of delays rests with the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district, not with the High Court in this instance. This interpretation formed the basis for the Supreme Court's conclusion that there was no merit in the Special Leave Petition filed by the Chief Engineer.
As a result of this reasoning, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition.
The judgment is significant as it provides clear guidance on the interpretation of Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, particularly in determining which court has the authority to extend time limits and replace arbitrators in arbitration proceedings. The outcome of this case could have significant implications for the arbitration landscape in India. It may affect how time extensions are granted and arbitrators are appointed or substituted in regions where the High Court does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction.
[1] PWC “Corporate Attitudes & Practices towards Arbitration in India”, accessed on 21/7/2024, available at: https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2013/corporate-attributes-and-practices-towards-arbitration-in-india.pdf
[2] Statista “Age wise pendency of arbitration cases in India 2022”, Dec 14, 2023, available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/1356526/india-age-wise-pendency-of-arbitration-cases/
[3] 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 425
The present Appeal before the Supreme Court assailed the correctness of the order passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which upheld the correctness of an order passed by the Family Court. The Family Court dismissed a petition instituted by the Appellant herein under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 seeking dissolution of marriage by way of a decree of divorce.
The Appellant & the Respondent were married in 1991. It was alleged that the Wife ill-treated the Husband, and constantly acted against the Husband at the behest of her parents. On the other hand, the Wife alleged cruelty and torture at the hands of the Husband. The parties were adamant on parting ways citing irretrievable breakdown of marriage and submitted that the marriage be dissolved on the aforesaid ground.
The parties relied on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544., wherein it was observed that a marriage may be dissolved on the ground of an irretrievable breakdown in exercise of the jurisdiction of SC under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court delineated various factor(s) to be considered by this Court whilst exercising such jurisdiction which included., Court should be fully convinced and satisfied that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation and, therefore, dissolution of marriage is the right solution and the only way forward, the marriage has irretrievably broken down is to be factually determined and firmly established. It includes:
1. Period of time the parties had cohabited after marriage
2.When the parties had last cohabited
3. The nature of allegations made by the parties against each other and their family members
4. The orders passed in the legal proceedings from time to time
5. Cumulative impact on the personal relationship;
6. Whether, and how many attempts were made to settle the disputes by intervention of the court or through mediation, and when the last attempt was made, etc.
7. The period of separation should be sufficiently long, and anything above six years or more would be a relevant factor.
The Supreme Court noted that these facts have to be evaluated keeping in view the economic and social status of the parties, including their educational qualifications, whether the parties have any children, their age, educational qualification, and whether the other spouse and children are dependent, in which event how and in what manner the party seeking divorce intends to take care and provide for the spouse or the children. Question of custody and welfare of minor children, provision for fair and adequate alimony for the wife, and economic rights of the children and other pending matters, if any, are relevant considerations.).
The factors stated are to be taken as codified in nature and are rather illustrative and worthy of consideration as mentioned by the SC in the Shilpa Sailesh (Supra). In the current case SC believed that the prima – facie had satisfied them of the parameters. The undisputed fact is that the parties separated 22 (twenty-two) years ago, having cohabited last in January 2002. The children are now majors and gainfully employed. Keeping in view the circumstances, the SC established that the marriage between the parties has broken down and that there is no possibility that the parties would cohabit together in the future & hence the appeal was allowed.
In the present case an application under Order XXII Rule 3 was filed by the present Respondent seeking to be impleaded as Plaintiff in place of his deceased father in a Suit seeking enforcement of personal and non-hereditary rights. The point to be adjudicated was whether, upon the demise of the original Plaintiff, the present Respondent being the legal representative of the original Plaintiff could be impleaded in the Suit under Order XXII Rule 3.
On 12.05.1997, Rev. John H. Caleb (“deceased Plaintiff”) was appointed by the present Petitioner to serve as the resident priest of the Green Park Free Church, starting 31.05.1997. He was provided accommodation in the Church Parsonage, Green Park Free Church. The deceased Plaintiff retired in March 2001 but continued to serve on an ad-hoc basis until 2005, receiving superannuation benefits, including gratuity. On 16.11.2007, he was re-appointed as Resident Pastor and allowed to remain in the Suit premises until 14.05.2018, whereby he was informed that his services were no longer needed and that he must vacate the premises for the new Priest. The Bishop of Diocese of Delhi-CNI requested Rev. Caleb to vacate the premises and further denied Rev. Caleb’s request for alternate accommodation and offered house rent until January 2019, urging him to vacate immediately. Deceased Plaintiff filed a Suit seeking to prevent his eviction. During the Suit's pendency the deceased Plaintiff passed away on 30.08.2021. The Respondent then applied to substitute his name for his deceased father in the Suit.
The Supreme Court in Puran Singh v. State of Punjab held that a personal action dies with the death of the person and quoted the maxim "action personalis moritur cum persona". Further it was stated that, the right to sue does not survive as the enforcement of personal rights which are extinguished with the death of the person concerned and does not devolve upon the legal representatives or successors. The Suit became moot upon the death of the deceased Plaintiff and that the Respondent had no independent right or interest in the Suit premises as such he cannot be impleaded.
Accordingly, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court allowed the present Civil Revision petition, thereby holding that the original Suit for permanent injunction abates due to the death of the Plaintiff and as such comes to an end.
In the present case, the Supreme Court delivered a significant judgement addressing the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act (“CP Act”) to legal services.
The Respondent in the present case, hired the Appellant's services to file a complaint against for dishonouring a cheque. The sum to be paid was delivered to the Appellant but did not reach the Respondent. Moreover, the Appellant filed a suit claiming that the sum was due to him as his fees.
In the complaint filed before the District Consumer Forum, the Appellant argued that the forum had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. However, the District Forum decided in the favour of the Respondent. The appeal before the State Commission was allowed holding that the services of advocates did not fall within the ambit of a ‘Service’ defined under Section 2(1) of the CP Act. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”) held inter alia that if there was any deficiency in service rendered by the Advocates/Lawyers, a complaint under the CP Act would be maintainable.
The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the legislature never intended to include professions or services rendered by professionals under the CP Act. This contradicts a 28-year-old judgement in Indian Medical Association v. VP Shantha, which held medical professionals fall within the CP Act. The court addressed procedural propriety issues and observed that the decision of this case deserves to be revisited. Additionally, the court observed that the legal profession is not commercial in nature but is essentially a service oriented, noble profession, therefore the profession is sui generis i.e. unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other profession.
The Supreme Court held that the services rendered by an advocate do not fall within the ambit of the CP Act and that they come under the “a contract of personal service” as opposed to a “contract for service”. The Supreme Court ruling underscores the importance of maintaining high standards of professional ethics and conduct within the legal system. It highlights the procedure and principles governing the disciplinary actions against advocates.
The issue arising for consideration in the present case was relating to the validity of the High Court’s findings where grounds under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“1951 Act”) were established, warranting invalidation of the election of one Karikho Kri (“Appellant”). Two sets of civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the 1951 Act against the decision of the High Court, which partially allowed an election petition holding the election of the Appellant as void but rejected the prayer of Nuney Tayang (“Respondent”), to declare him as duly elected.
The factual basis of the present case is such that in the year 2019, the Appellant won as an independent Member of Legislative Assembly from Tezu and his victory was challenged by the Respondent , of the Congress party on the ground that the Appellant in his election papers did not disclose certain vehicles in possession, being in occupation of a government-allotted cottage, and further did not provide certificates showing payment of rent, electricity, water, and telephone charges, etc. High Court held that the Appellant did not comply with the rules while submitting his nomination papers, and thereby violated Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and that the Appellant’s nomination papers should have been rejected by the election officer, as per Section 36(2)(b) of the 1951 Act. Consequently, the Appellant’s victory in the election was declared void, under Section 90(a)(c) of the 1951 Act. The Supreme Court while deciding the case observed that the High Court committed an error in concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Section 100 of the 1951 Act to invalidate the election and upheld the candidature of the Appellant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that every defect in filing of the nomination form cannot be termed as a ground to consider the elections as void and every case has its own set of individual facts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary for a candidate to declare each and every item of the movable property that he or his dependent family members owns unless the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be disclosed. The Hon’ble Court further observed that non-disclosure of every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character.
Consequently, the Apex Court rightly held that a candidate’s ‘Right to Privacy’ would still survive in matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. Further, very defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case would have to turn on its own individual facts.
In the present case, the Apex Court discussed the legal implications of a promotional trailer of a movie and determined whether such trailer can create any contractual relationship and/or obligation leading to consumer dispute for deficiency of service and unfair trade practice.
The Respondents filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Redressal Forum against the Appellants, a well-known producer, for not containing the song ‘jabra fan’ in their movie, ‘Fan’. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds that there is no relationship of consumer and service provider. Against the said order, the Respondent filed an appeal before the State Commission, and the same was allowed. The Appellant then moved the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”) against the said order of State Commission. NCDRC held that displaying a song in the promotional trailer and not showcasing it in the movie, amounts to unfair trade practice. Further, playing a song in the trailer leads to an implied promise, thereby amounting to deficiency in services by the Appellants. Being aggrieved by the NCDRC order, the Appellants approached the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the NCDRC order highlighted that the relationship between the Respondent and the Appellants is that of Consumer-Service Provider, because the Respondent has paid the necessary consideration. However, the promotional trailers are unilateral and do not qualify as offers and can never turn into promises, thereby not creating any contractual relationship /agreement to become enforceable by the law. Thus, there exists no deficiency in the services of the Appellants. The court further observed that the alleged deficiency arose because of the Respondent’s wrongful expectations and not because of the actions of the Appellants. Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the promotional trailer does not fall under the instances of unfair method or unfair and deceptive practice, as the promotional trailer does not make any false statement or intend to mislead the viewers. The promotional trailers are only meant to encourage viewers to purchase the movie ticket.
The Supreme Court ruling clarified the major legal issue involved in relation to the promotional trailers and rightly held that they do not qualify as offers eliciting acceptance, are just an advertisement and as such they do not transform into promises much less agreements enforceable by law. Such trailers are only works of art and the filmmakers have creative freedom and this distinction should be kept in mind while deciding similar cases.
The Apex Court in the present case discussed the ramifications of the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public’s right to know in a pre-trial injunction granted against the publication of an article. The present case is a special leave to appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Court upholding the ex-parte ad interim order of the Additional District Judge (ADJ), South Saket Courts directing Bloomberg Television Production India Private Limited (“Bloomberg”) to take down an article allegedly against the Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited (“Zee”). Further, Bloomberg was also restrained from posting, circulating or publishing the article in respect of Zee on any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.
The Court relied on the well-established three-fold test for granting an interim relief which is (i) a prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) irreparable loss or harm. Furthermore, the Court stated that in suits concerning defamation by media platforms and/or journalists, an additional consideration of balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind. The Court said that the constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic expression cannot be understated, and Courts must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The Court said that the ‘Bonnard standard’, laid down in Bonnard v. Perryman must be followed while granting of interim injunctions in defamation suits.
The Court held that an ex-parte injunction should not be granted without establishing that the contents sought to be restricted are ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’. The Court stated that Injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the Respondent is given a chance to make their submissions. The Court further stated that the grant of an interim injunction, before the trial, often acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material sought to be published and hence the court should be mindful before granting such injunctions.
The Apex court held that neither had the Trial Court considered the merits of the Plaintiff’s case, nor did it deal with balance of convenience or irreparable hardship caused. The Trial Court also did not analyze as to why such an ex-parte injunction was essential. The High Court had mechanically upheld the order without assessing whether the three-fold test was correctly implemented. Hence the Apex Court set aside the orders of the lower courts.
The Apex Court in the present case highlighted the importance of para-wise reply to Plaint, and further stated that a general or evasive denial would not be sufficient. The matter was pertaining to the genuineness of a registered Will executed by the testator in favour of his brother’s daughter without any mention of his widow or daughter in the same. After considering the evidence, the Court did not find any error in the High Court’s decision holding the Will genuine.
The Hon’ble Court highlighted that the Plaint filed by the Respondent in the instant matter contained 10 paragraphs besides prayer, while the written statement filed by the Appellants did not contain a para-wise reply but depicted their own story containing 15 paragraphs besides prayer. The Court expressed that “in the absence of para-wise reply to the Plaint, it becomes a roving inquiry for the Court to find out as to which line in some paragraph in the Plaint is either admitted or denied in the written statement filed, as there is no specific admission or denial with reference to the allegation in different paras.”
The Apex Court made reference to Court referred to Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 regarding specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the Plaint. Further, the Court placed reliance on Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., and Lohia Properties (P) Ltd. v. Atmaram Kumar and clarified that a general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient and it further added that “In the absence thereof, the Respondent can always try to read one line from one paragraph and another from different paragraph in the Written Statement to make out his case of denial of the allegations in the Plaint resulting in utter confusion .”
Consequently, the Hon’ble Court re-affirmed these already well-established position that the allegations made in the Plaint are deemed to be admitted unless the same has been specifically denied in the Para-wise reply of the Plaint.