In the present case, the Supreme Court delivered a significant judgement addressing the applicability of the Consumer Protection Act (“CP Act”) to legal services.
The Respondent in the present case, hired the Appellant's services to file a complaint against for dishonouring a cheque. The sum to be paid was delivered to the Appellant but did not reach the Respondent. Moreover, the Appellant filed a suit claiming that the sum was due to him as his fees.
In the complaint filed before the District Consumer Forum, the Appellant argued that the forum had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. However, the District Forum decided in the favour of the Respondent. The appeal before the State Commission was allowed holding that the services of advocates did not fall within the ambit of a ‘Service’ defined under Section 2(1) of the CP Act. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”) held inter alia that if there was any deficiency in service rendered by the Advocates/Lawyers, a complaint under the CP Act would be maintainable.
The Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the legislature never intended to include professions or services rendered by professionals under the CP Act. This contradicts a 28-year-old judgement in Indian Medical Association v. VP Shantha, which held medical professionals fall within the CP Act. The court addressed procedural propriety issues and observed that the decision of this case deserves to be revisited. Additionally, the court observed that the legal profession is not commercial in nature but is essentially a service oriented, noble profession, therefore the profession is sui generis i.e. unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other profession.
The Supreme Court held that the services rendered by an advocate do not fall within the ambit of the CP Act and that they come under the “a contract of personal service” as opposed to a “contract for service”. The Supreme Court ruling underscores the importance of maintaining high standards of professional ethics and conduct within the legal system. It highlights the procedure and principles governing the disciplinary actions against advocates.
The issue arising for consideration in the present case was relating to the validity of the High Court’s findings where grounds under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“1951 Act”) were established, warranting invalidation of the election of one Karikho Kri (“Appellant”). Two sets of civil appeals were filed before the Supreme Court under Section 116A of the 1951 Act against the decision of the High Court, which partially allowed an election petition holding the election of the Appellant as void but rejected the prayer of Nuney Tayang (“Respondent”), to declare him as duly elected.
The factual basis of the present case is such that in the year 2019, the Appellant won as an independent Member of Legislative Assembly from Tezu and his victory was challenged by the Respondent , of the Congress party on the ground that the Appellant in his election papers did not disclose certain vehicles in possession, being in occupation of a government-allotted cottage, and further did not provide certificates showing payment of rent, electricity, water, and telephone charges, etc. High Court held that the Appellant did not comply with the rules while submitting his nomination papers, and thereby violated Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and that the Appellant’s nomination papers should have been rejected by the election officer, as per Section 36(2)(b) of the 1951 Act. Consequently, the Appellant’s victory in the election was declared void, under Section 90(a)(c) of the 1951 Act. The Supreme Court while deciding the case observed that the High Court committed an error in concluding that sufficient grounds were made out under Section 100 of the 1951 Act to invalidate the election and upheld the candidature of the Appellant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the view that every defect in filing of the nomination form cannot be termed as a ground to consider the elections as void and every case has its own set of individual facts. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it is not necessary for a candidate to declare each and every item of the movable property that he or his dependent family members owns unless the same is of such value as to constitute a sizeable asset in itself or reflect upon his candidature, in terms of his lifestyle, and require to be disclosed. The Hon’ble Court further observed that non-disclosure of every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character.
Consequently, the Apex Court rightly held that a candidate’s ‘Right to Privacy’ would still survive in matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. Further, very defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case would have to turn on its own individual facts.
In the present case, the Apex Court discussed the legal implications of a promotional trailer of a movie and determined whether such trailer can create any contractual relationship and/or obligation leading to consumer dispute for deficiency of service and unfair trade practice.
The Respondents filed a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Redressal Forum against the Appellants, a well-known producer, for not containing the song ‘jabra fan’ in their movie, ‘Fan’. The complaint was dismissed on the grounds that there is no relationship of consumer and service provider. Against the said order, the Respondent filed an appeal before the State Commission, and the same was allowed. The Appellant then moved the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission (“NCDRC”) against the said order of State Commission. NCDRC held that displaying a song in the promotional trailer and not showcasing it in the movie, amounts to unfair trade practice. Further, playing a song in the trailer leads to an implied promise, thereby amounting to deficiency in services by the Appellants. Being aggrieved by the NCDRC order, the Appellants approached the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside the NCDRC order highlighted that the relationship between the Respondent and the Appellants is that of Consumer-Service Provider, because the Respondent has paid the necessary consideration. However, the promotional trailers are unilateral and do not qualify as offers and can never turn into promises, thereby not creating any contractual relationship /agreement to become enforceable by the law. Thus, there exists no deficiency in the services of the Appellants. The court further observed that the alleged deficiency arose because of the Respondent’s wrongful expectations and not because of the actions of the Appellants. Additionally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the promotional trailer does not fall under the instances of unfair method or unfair and deceptive practice, as the promotional trailer does not make any false statement or intend to mislead the viewers. The promotional trailers are only meant to encourage viewers to purchase the movie ticket.
The Supreme Court ruling clarified the major legal issue involved in relation to the promotional trailers and rightly held that they do not qualify as offers eliciting acceptance, are just an advertisement and as such they do not transform into promises much less agreements enforceable by law. Such trailers are only works of art and the filmmakers have creative freedom and this distinction should be kept in mind while deciding similar cases.
The Apex Court in the present case discussed the ramifications of the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public’s right to know in a pre-trial injunction granted against the publication of an article. The present case is a special leave to appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Court upholding the ex-parte ad interim order of the Additional District Judge (ADJ), South Saket Courts directing Bloomberg Television Production India Private Limited (“Bloomberg”) to take down an article allegedly against the Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited (“Zee”). Further, Bloomberg was also restrained from posting, circulating or publishing the article in respect of Zee on any online or offline platform till the next date of hearing.
The Court relied on the well-established three-fold test for granting an interim relief which is (i) a prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) irreparable loss or harm. Furthermore, the Court stated that in suits concerning defamation by media platforms and/or journalists, an additional consideration of balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind. The Court said that the constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic expression cannot be understated, and Courts must tread cautiously while granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The Court said that the ‘Bonnard standard’, laid down in Bonnard v. Perryman must be followed while granting of interim injunctions in defamation suits.
The Court held that an ex-parte injunction should not be granted without establishing that the contents sought to be restricted are ‘malicious’ or ‘palpably false’. The Court stated that Injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the Respondent is given a chance to make their submissions. The Court further stated that the grant of an interim injunction, before the trial, often acts as a ‘death sentence’ to the material sought to be published and hence the court should be mindful before granting such injunctions.
The Apex court held that neither had the Trial Court considered the merits of the Plaintiff’s case, nor did it deal with balance of convenience or irreparable hardship caused. The Trial Court also did not analyze as to why such an ex-parte injunction was essential. The High Court had mechanically upheld the order without assessing whether the three-fold test was correctly implemented. Hence the Apex Court set aside the orders of the lower courts.
The Apex Court in the present case highlighted the importance of para-wise reply to Plaint, and further stated that a general or evasive denial would not be sufficient. The matter was pertaining to the genuineness of a registered Will executed by the testator in favour of his brother’s daughter without any mention of his widow or daughter in the same. After considering the evidence, the Court did not find any error in the High Court’s decision holding the Will genuine.
The Hon’ble Court highlighted that the Plaint filed by the Respondent in the instant matter contained 10 paragraphs besides prayer, while the written statement filed by the Appellants did not contain a para-wise reply but depicted their own story containing 15 paragraphs besides prayer. The Court expressed that “in the absence of para-wise reply to the Plaint, it becomes a roving inquiry for the Court to find out as to which line in some paragraph in the Plaint is either admitted or denied in the written statement filed, as there is no specific admission or denial with reference to the allegation in different paras.”
The Apex Court made reference to Court referred to Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 regarding specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the Plaint. Further, the Court placed reliance on Badat and Co. v. East India Trading Co., and Lohia Properties (P) Ltd. v. Atmaram Kumar and clarified that a general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient and it further added that “In the absence thereof, the Respondent can always try to read one line from one paragraph and another from different paragraph in the Written Statement to make out his case of denial of the allegations in the Plaint resulting in utter confusion .”
Consequently, the Hon’ble Court re-affirmed these already well-established position that the allegations made in the Plaint are deemed to be admitted unless the same has been specifically denied in the Para-wise reply of the Plaint.